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TO 



Appomattox Court pouse ; 

OR, 

THE LAST HOURS OF SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY. 

BV 

H. EDWIN TREMAIN. 



1^ 



LA ROYALE: 

(Part YIII, Amended Edition.) 

THE LAST TAVENTT-FOUR HOURS OF THE ARMY 
OF NORTHERN YIRGINIA. 

WITH MEMORANDA RELATING TO 

Rarmville, Fording and Bridging. 

BY 

J. WATTS DE PEYSTER. 



m 



pew IJotrfe: 

■o^irS) Charles H. Litdwig, Printer, 10 & 12 Reade Street. 







1885. 



^M^Sm" 











TAKEN IN HIS LATER YEARS. WHEN ABOUT 63 

%\n\xnv ^timm %\xm\mm^ 

Beigadieb-General, Chief of Enginbebs, 

Brevet Major-Gekeral U. S. A., and Major-General U. S. V. 

Chief of Topographicai. Engineers, 186S-3. 

COMMANDING Provisional Division, afterwards 3d Division, Fifth Corps. 

1862-3 ; and 2v Division, Third Corps, 1863. 

Chief of Staff, 8th July, 1863, to 25tii November, 1864. 

Commanding combined Second-Third Corps, 1864-5. 

Army of the Potomac. 



SAILORS' CREEK 



TO 



App" 



MjlTTOI COU^T HOUS 



U, 



7th, 8th, 9th April, 1865 ; 

OR, 

THE LAST HOURS OF SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY. 



Q5ai^ " GQemoi^anda 
- / 

HENRY EDWIN TREMAIN, 



MAJOR AND A. D. C, BREV. BRIG.-GEN., U. S. V. 



Bdited, witi} Notes and Chapters on Farmville, Fording, &.c. 



BY 



J. WATTS DE PEYSTER. 



few l0ffe: 




Charles H. Ludwig, Printer, 10 & 12 Reade Street. 



1 885 







^ 



^7-1^ 



COPYKIGHT, 1885, BY J. WaTTS DE PeYSTER. 



INTRODUCTORY. 



"■How eiitertaiidiifj Trcmam's luqyer was; it brovglit everytJdng to a 
focus." Humphreys to de Peyster, 1 Nov., 1873. 



This pamphlet constitutes the Second Part of a Series of Me- 
moranda hastily thrown together by General Tremain, who was 
aide-de-camp to General Crook, and was an eye-witness and actor 
in the scenes which he undertakes to record; consequendy they 
may be considered almost Notes of Occurrences, jotted down on 
the spot. General Tremain placed his manuscript — tlie majority 
written while in camp, about Wp,shington, in the summer of 
1865, on paper with superscription, " Headquarters District of 
Wilmington, N. C., 1865 " — in my hands to revise, edit and publisli, 
in 187 1-2, and the first part, entitled,' "The Closing Days About 
Richmond ; or, the Last Days of Sheridan's Cavalry," was printed 
under my supervision in a pamphlet for private circulation (brevier 
type, 66 pages), in 1873. A copy of this pamphlet was sent out 
to the Clarendon Historical Society, of Edinburg, Scotland, of 
which I am an Honorary Member, and they deemed it of sufficient 
value to reprint it among their annual issues, in No. 13, January 
and February, and in No. 14, March and April, 1884. 

To enhance the value of the work I have added some maps, 
which were prepared under the supervision of my dear deceased 
friend, Maj.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys (for over fifteen months Chief 
of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, and from the 24th Novem- 
ber, 1864, to the close of the operations of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, in command of the combined Second-Third Corps, 
which did jLhe hardest work and fighting throughout the pursuit of 
Lee, and who, if he had been adequately supported and rein- 
forced on the afternoon of 7th April, 1865, would have finished 

3 



the campaign at Cumberland Church, near Farmville; whereas, not 
being so, the labors and losses dragged on, to be terminated less 
gloriously two days afterwards at Appomattox Court House) — 
which maps were originally prepared for my own " La Royale ; 
or, the Grand Hunt of the Army of the Potomac," that ap- 
peared in eight numbers during the years 1872-73-74. I have 
also inserted a chapter on the battle of Cumberland Church or 
Heights of Farmville, and on Fording, together with some Notes? 
which have been added, chiefly in brackets ( [ ] ), on which great 
labor has been expended. 

The original manuscript, written in great haste and amid diffi- 
culties, was so involved and nearly illegible in places that it had 
to be recopied before it could go into the hands of the printer. I 
not only read the copy with the original, but also compared the 
copy and proofs several times, in whole or in part, with the auto- 
graph. This labor of love was cheerfully undergone, because the 
Narrative contains facts which have never elsewhere been pre- 
sented to the public. 

As an Appendix will be added a biographical sketch of Gene- 
ral Tremain, prepared by me in the winter of 1883, when he 
was a candidate for the office of U. S. Senator from the State of 
New York. 

As General Tremain is a cherished member of the old Third 
Corps, Army of the Potomac, this little work is affectionately de- 
dicated to the Third Army Corps Union. 

[Signed,] • J. WATTS de PEYSTER. • 

Honorary Member of the Clarendon Historical 

Society, Ediuburg, Scotland. 

First Honorary Member, Tliird Army Corps Union. 

Bi-evet Major-Generai, S. N. Y. 

&c., &c., &c. 



CHAPTER I. 

(original chapter xr. of complete memoranda.) 

" If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will surrender," says 
Sheridan, in his official dispatch to Grant, at the close of to-day 
[Thursday, 6th April, 1865]. The next day [Friday, 7th April, 
p. p. M.] Grant wrote first to Lee on the subject. 

Long before dawn, the next morning [7th April | the cavalry 
bugles were echoing through the bivouacs a lively reveille^ and 
everybody was astir. It was with cheerful, hopeful spirits that 
the sleepy soldiers obeyed the summons. They lit their little 
coffee-fires, groomed and saddled their horses and mules (for the 
latter were now an important ingredient of " Sheridan's Ca- 
valry " ), rolled up their packs, breakfasted frugally on their salt 
meat and hard-tack, and at the first break of day only awaited 
the order to move. Any particular headquarters might be dis- 
tinguished by a movable flagstaff", surmounted by a carriage 
lamp, planted in the ground before a fire rather more blazing than 
its neighbors, around which a group of officers might be seen 
crawling from under their blankets, or making a hurried toilet; 
while just behind was a candle in a bottle candlestick, flickering 
upon some rude structure intended to serve as a table and show- 
ing a unique set of tin and crockery table furniture, no two of 
whose dishes belonged to the same set. Here was an army 
wagon backed almost upon the table, with its tailboard let down, 
exhibiting its load of tents, pots, kettles, valises, boxes, barrels 
and all such paraphernalia, waiting to be reinforced by the table 
and its contents. The hot coffee fumed in delicious fragrance 
over bright and burning rails, and was not unfrequently upset by 
some careless fellow as he moved around the fire at every change 
of wind to avoid the smoke ; the ham and bacon, or tough beef- 
steak, if anybody was s > fortunate as to have it, " sizzled " away 
in the frying-pan, Avhile the cold, uninviting, huge plate of hard- 
tack announced to the general and staff" that breakfast was ready. 
Some few might be able to find seats, but more usually was this 
simple, weird-like meal sleepily partaken of by all "standing and 
in silence." All was over by daylight. The hum of busy pre- 
paration was passed; a division general and staff" quietly mount ; 
the bugles sound, " To horse ! " " Forward ! " the confused mass ot 
horses and mules and men takes shape ; and a column files out from 
among them to follow their leader. 



6 

Every soldier appreciated what the cavalry were to do to-day. 
In their comprehensive phraseology it was nothing else but to 
"pitch in." "If we could only once get the Rebs started" . . . 
they used to say in less encouraging times. But now they were 
really " started," and all were eager to keep them " on the wing." 
In the cavalry operations of to-day it was intended that the im- 
mediate pursuit of the enemy should be resumed ; that he should 
be attacked and harassed wherever found ; and the subsequent 
movements of the day were to be determined by events. Crook's 
column was given the advance. Shortly after starting it, how- 
ever, Sheridan learned that a command of General Ord (of the 
Army of the James) having, during the fight of the day before, 
met a strong and formidable line of the enemy on the railroad 
between Burkesville and Rice Station, had not been able to press 
far enough to prevent the possibility of Lee's escape by moving his 
main body around the left flank, and Grant's armies, and thus get 
ahead of him on the road, south, to Danville. Especially might 
this be attempted on the part of the enemy, as a good and wide 
road ran from Lee's bivouacs near Farmville through Prince Ed- 
ward Court House in the very direction to assist such a move- 
ment. Fearing an attempt of this kind on the part of the Rebels, 
which, if successful, would undo all the strategic advantages of the 
day before, Sheridan divided his forces and sent General Merritt's 
corps to march around the rear of the Army of the James and to 
strike the road mentioned at Prince Edward Court House as soon 
as possible. Deeming this matter of the utmost importance Sheri- 
dan rode himself with this column, which constituted about 
two-thirds of his entire command — Custer's and Devin's Di- 
visions. 

I do not beheve that Lee could have attempted any move of 
the nature indicated, with the shadow of success, especially with 
the deficiencies in his supply trains. Besides, he was much nearer 
Lynchburg than Danville, and had a better chance of reaching 
Lynchburg. He must have thought so then, for no move was 
made in the direction feared by Sheridan, and the long march of 
Merritt's corps on this day was without further incident than is 
afforded by uncertain country roads and the passage of two or 
three deep and sluggish branches of the Appomattox — the Sandy 
river, the Bush river and the Briary river. 

It should be added, however, that this move afterwards proved 
the best that could possibly be made for the main body of the 
cavalry, as it located them again on the extreme left flank of 
Grant's lines and placed Sheridan so as to be able to operate 
away from the entanglements of our infantry columns, while it 
situated him most favorably for that grand march of the day fol- 



lowing [Saturday, 8th April], when the enemy was intercepted, 
his last supplies captured, his reserve artillery parks attacked ; and 
his army commanded [compelled ?] to halt for the night, that 
Grant's infantry might march up and demand a surrender. 

The main pursuit, then, by the cavalry, on the 7th of April, 
fell to General Crook's division, the old cavalry of the Army of the 
Potomac. Soon after starting and marching in the direction 
the enemy had traveled, as indicated by the wreckage and re- 
mains of wagons, baggage, caissons, destroyed ammunition, cloth- 
ing, documents and stragglers, Crook found that the gallant Hum- 
phreys, ever vigilant and earnest, was already marching on his 
right with the veterans of the combined Second-Third Army 
Corps. Each had calculated upon marching by the same road ; 
but, giving way to the infantry, the cavalry sought its way through 
the woods and across plantations, and neither column halted in 
the eager pursuit. It was a clear and glorious morning, and the 
sun seemed to smile in triumph over the beaten tracks and the 
abundant evidence of a defeated and flying foe. 

The Lynchburg railroad between Rice's Station and Farm- 
ville, as may be seen by the map, curves like a siphon between 
the two stations, crossing the Appomattox river nearly equi- 
distant from each, at High Bridge. Here is also a country bridge 
for ordinary vehicles. Thither Humphreys marched at once, 
hoping to overtake the enemy and effect captures before he could 
cross, and prevent, if possible, the destruction of this valuable 
structure. In this he was only partially successful, reaching the 
river just as the wagon bridge was being fired by the enemy's 
rear-guard, and while the second span of the railroad bridge was 
burning. The smaller bridge, fortunately, was secured, and Bar- 
low's Division, having the advance, at once prepared to cross. 
The ground on both sides of the river is high and affords most 
commanding positions, and on the opposite bank appeared a con- 
siderable force of the enemy, drawn up to oppose the passage, in 
a good position strengthened by redoubts. Artillery was posted 
to cover the attack and Barlow advanced. The enemy's skir- 
mishers were quickly driven from the bridge and ten pieces of 
artillery captured from him in the works he abandoned on the 
north bank, while on the south side eight more pieces were taken. 
But, the fort blown up, the Rebel column moved off without 
awaiting further attack. 

Meanwhile Crook diverged from Humphreys to the left and 
west, marching by the most direct route towards Farmville, 
where the railroad again crosses the Appomattox and where in all 
probability important captures would be effected. Leaving the 
combined Second-Third Corps and crossing the railroad, two 



small tributaries to the Appomattox, the Sandy and Bush rivers, 
lay on his route. Reaching the former. Rebel cavalry appeared 
on the opposite bank, while a few men made a bungling attempt 
to fire the bridge. The infantry skirmishers of General Ord's 
column at the same time appeared. The enemy fled without a 
shot and all hands went to work to put out the fire. Rather a 
difficult task for men provided with nothing more serviceable 
for this purpose than muskets and sabres. The bridge was high, 
too, and forty feet long ; its beams were already burning. There 
were no pails there either- but the fire was put out. Exactly 
how, it is pretty difficult to tell; it did not take long either; but 
" where there is a will, there is a way," and so7iie soldiers carried 
water in their hats. This was the vicinity of that terrible 
slaughter of the day before, where a detachment from the Army 
of the James, under General Reed, its adjutant-general, sought to 
march around the enemy's rear, reach High Bridge and destroy 
it and all the crossings of the Appomattox before the enemy had 
yet crossed it. But when near Sandy river they had marched into 
a snare. They found the enemy on all sides of them, as a "V," 
and out of the little picked brigade of about 1,500 men scarcely 
a third escaped. General Reed was killed, the colonel of his 
cavalry (the 4th Massachusetts) was seriously wounded, and all 
the command was killed, wounded, captured or scattered. The 
1 1 6th and 123d Ohio were almost destroyed and the wonder of 
the sad affair is that any survived it. 

This was the most serious reverse of the campaign, but fortu- 
nately did not in the least affect its results. But while the loss in 
life is deplorable, the dangerous character of the important ser- 
vice purposed, the enthusiasm which prompted and led the whole 
affair and the fruitless gallantry and heroism of those engaged, 
commands universal admiration. It was a part of the war. 

After crossing Sandy river. Crook soon again encountered 
Rebel cavalry and some very sharp skirmishing continued for 
about a mile, until reaching the Bush river near its junction with 
the Appomattox, to which it is tributary. The road to Farmville, 
on which the column proceeded, here crossed this little stream by 
a country bridge within sight of High Bridge, and while Hum- 
phreys' operations were going on there, the Rebels also attempted 
to hold Crook in check until the bridge ahead of him should be 
destroyed. Here, too, the banks were steep, the bridge low, and 
the grounds on each side of it swampy and impracticable for 
cavalry. Smith's brigade was dismounted and, while skirmishing, 
the head of General Ord's infantry column arrived. The destruc- 
tion of the bridge was prevented and after some little delay in 
fighting and manoeuvring the enemy retired with our advance 



9 

close in pursuit^ at about the same time that Humphreys crossed 
High Bridge. [Mark! the infantry were up with the cavahy !] 

Taking now a short but rugged plantation by-way, the cav- 
alry moved quickly towards Farmville, leaving the better and 
more common road on the left to the infantry following. 

Farmville is a pretty little town nestling at the foot of its sur- 
rounding hills, in Prince Edward county, near the junction of the 
Buffalo with the Appomattox rivers, and before the war of about 
fifteen hundred inhabitants. It is old enough to look thoroughly 
Virginian, is the principal point on the railroad between Peters- 
burg and Lynchburg, about sixty-eight miles W. S. W. from the 
latter. It is thereYore an important tobacco depot and much of 
the weed was found stored here. During the war it has been 
the location of extensive work and repair shops. Ambulances, 
wagons and many other manufactures for army use were here 
made and repaired by the Confederates. Near the railroad depot 
there was a firm trestle bridge across the Appomattox, which is here 
ordinarily not fordabie [error?] [and " is navigable for batteaux 
from Farmville to its mouth"]. Arriving at the top of the 
cleared hills overlooking the town, the Rebels were found to be in 
occupation, with strong rear guards of cavalry to defend the 
neighboring heights. Fighting at once ensued and after an hour's 
heavy skirmishing, assisted greatly by Lord's battery of horse 
artillery, the enemy sullenly retired down the hills towards the 
town, when our men, suddenly emerging from the woods, found 
themselves on the brow of most commanding heights, in a most 
beautiful and open country, with Farmville at their feet. On the 
bridge over the Appomattox a train of cars was standing, while 
the fields on the opposite bank were black with a multitude of 
men. Who could these be ? Humphreys, it was known, had 
crossed the river below, but he could not have marched the main 
body of his corps around there so quickly. It could not be the 
enemy. He must have known on which road we were marching, 
and it was not usual for him to treat us with such bad general- 
ship as thus to expose a whole corps to destruction. 

It was probably, then, some strong body, suddenly detached 
by Grant from one of the extremes of his army, and which had 
succeeded in forcing some extraordinary march. If so, good, for 
here was a considerable body of Rebel cavalry intercepted. The 
sky had clouded over and the distance was too great to distin- 
guish uniforms. Whoever they might be, there they were beneath 
us — one vast crowd of men, not resting in hnes, but wandering 
in disorder over the field. They seemed completely under our con- 
trol ; their lives at our command. From the water's edge to the 
'wooded brow ot the hill beyond, they appeared a moving, rest- 



10 

less mob. Now a few men were observed on the railroad bridge, 
and soon a little tuft of smoke puffs out from one of the cars ; 
the wind fans it into a flame." 

" They have not been able to get that train off the bridge," 
says one officer, " so they are burning it." 

" No," rephes somebody else, " it is our men destroying the 
bridge to prevent the Rebel cavalry down in the town from cross- 
ing and will "gobble up " the whole lot of them certain." 

To open fire on them would surely entail a most fearful loss of 
life. To justify it there must not remain a single doubt that it is 
not the enemy. If Rebels, every moment was precious to us. 

Generals peered through their glasses and staff officers gal- 
loped off to find a negro citizen or somebody who might decide 
the question, and thus passed several minutes of terrible uncer- 
tainty. We can wait no longer; it must be the enemy; at any 
rate it will soon be determined. 

" Tell General Smith to charge down through the town," was 
a simple order which now needed no further explanation; and 
" Train those guns on those men ! " indicated that somebody 
would be hurt. The bursting flames and black heavy smoke 
arose from the railroad bridge. Helpless to prevent it and before 
our very eyes almost, under our feet was the destruction now 
being completed. Two Napoleon guns were at once rolled to 
the brow of the hill and trained as if for a pleasure salute towards 
the mass of men on the low fields beyond [the river]. A shot 
was fired and in their very midst a shell exploded. Another 
quickly followed, and another, and another, as fast as two brass 
guns could be loaded and fired for a few rounds. Had there 
been here a few more guns, I doubt if many of those men would 
have escaped with their lives; as it was, they were powerless. 
What could they do ? Not fight ! They were infantry. A river 
was between us, and they were down on a plain under our guns, 
and musket fire could not injure us. So they quickly glided 
away. What were the actual casualties just at this particular 
time can never be known. General Lee himself was there and 
under his personal direction a section of artillery was posted and 
answered to our fire. But its shots were wild and futile and were 
only laughed at by our officers. 

The Rebels of course sought safety in flight ; yet so great 
among them was the general demoralization of their forces and 
so worn out with continual marching and fightingof the campaign 
that many exhibited no desire for escape. They seemed resigned 
to the chances of death or the sure fate of capture and evinced much 
reluctance to retreat any further. So plain were the evidences of 
this fact that a mounted guard was seen to encircle the whole 



11 

field with a full skirmish line and by force drive away the multi- 
tude of stragglers beyond the range of the guns now playing upon 
them. Such being the morale of an army no wonder the sur- 
render of its remnants followed within forty-eight hours. 

These troops proved to be of Anderson's corps and had re- 
tired on Farmville after the battles of the day before [6th J. Part 
of the army, however — as has already been seen — retreated from 
[LittleJ Sailors' Creek by way of High Bridge. Lee himself was 
with the former portion, which reached Farmville during the 
night, the troops crossing the river and bivouacking where they 
were first seen by the cavalry, while their venerated commander 
took up quarters in the town of Farmville. In the morning, fully 
appreciating the close pursuit and straitened circumstances of the 
Rebel army, many of the citizens had begged General Lee to re- 
move his men from the vicinity of the town as soon as possible 
and thus avoid, perhaps, its entire destruction, which would be a 
likely consequence of any battle in the immediate neighborhood. 
We shall presently see with how much cousideratioii these inhabi- 
tants were treated by their rebellious countrymen. 

Meanwhile, Smith, with his gallant little brigade of the ist 
Maine, 6th and 13th Ohio and 2d New York, had ridden down 
towards the edge of the town. There was no " masked " fighting 
here ; no manoeuvre was hidden ; the Rebels saw him coming and 
were prepared. It is common for historians to tell of bloody 
charges up to the deadly crest ; how brilliantly and gallantly this 
command stormed a position ; or that one scaled a height. But 
you do not often read of a charge doivn hill, least of all such a 
cavalry charge. Yet here it was. Gen. Putnam, a name always 
revered by Americans, than whom [according to popular opinion] 
none bore a more honorable part in the nation's virgin war, acci- 
dently helped himself to immortality by a John Gilpin escape 
down a flight of stone steps! Connecticut people to-day will take 
visitors to the field and, with no little pride, point out the hill and 
precise location of the now obliterated steps. Why may not 
Virginians do likewise? To be sure there are no stone steps there, 
but there might have been if rocks had been more plenty, and 
then this deficiency is compensated by numbers. In Connecticut 
only one warrior rode down hill [in the defense of the nation ; in 
this case there were a thousand patriots as true as any Putnam]. 

By this time the remainder of Crook's cavalry had come up 
and were marching into the town. Davies' brigade arriving as a 
support to Smith, had taken charge of the place, while the latter 
was pursuing the enemy to a safe distance and recalling and re- 
forming his regiments. Guards and patrols were placed about the 
streets and, while the troops were passing through, the bands 



12 

played, colors waved, and the soldiers were filled with content- 
ment and enthusiasm. But there was no answering sympathy 
among the people. Stores were shut up, houses closed, fi'ightened 
women peeped through dilapidated doorways, sullen men lolled 
about the porches, obsequious and venerable negroes attempted 
to bow in respectful salutation to each individual soldier of the line, 
while others, less reverent, attired in such dazzling colors as their 
own or their former proprietor's limited wardrobe might afford, saun- 
tered carelessly through the streets, as if they were celebrating a 
holiday and the arrival of the blessed Yankees, which they inno- 
cently believed bestowed, finally and forever, upon them that 
complete and practical freedom which their crude intelligence 
conceived as the only result of emancipation. 

The infantry of the Army of the James and the head of the 
Sixth Corps now appeared and massed on the neighboring hills, 
while Humphreys with his [combined] Second-Third Corps had 
pushed on after the retreating enemy from High Bridge on the 
direct road to Lytichburg, sending Barlow's Division, however, to- 
wards Farmville, as a matter of judicious precaution and to inter- 
cept any part of the enemy who might yet remain there. This 
excellent disposition of Humphreys greatly accelerated tXiQ retirement 
of Lee's forces from Farmville and its vicinity, and a large por- 
tion of them narrowly escaped capture. Barlow had considerable 
skirmishing, but the enemy was well posted on commanding hills 
and was enabled to check an advance until his main body, from 
Farmville, had retired well on the road before him. Barlow's at- 
tacks, however, more than annoyed the enemy. In abandoning 
the town and its environs the Rebels were compelled to burn about 
one hundred and thirty of his wagons which he was unable to get 
away. Retiring, then, before Humphreys' main column, as well as 
Barlow's detachment, the enemy fell back to a well-chosen position, 
some four or five [three] miles from Farmville. 

During these operations, Brigadier-General Smythe, com- 
manding one of General Barlow's brigades, a gallant young offi- 
cer who had risen rapidly in the service and whose Irish extrac- 
tion had only added notoriety to a well-earned reputation, was 
mortally wounded while conducting in person the operations of 
his skirmish line. General Humphreys mentions in his official 
report that the fall of General Smythe " led to the loss of some 
part of our skirmish line." It is claimed that he was the last 
Union officer killed in the war. [But let it not be forgotten that 
Maj.-Gen. Gershom Mott, of New Jersey, who commanded the 
Third Division (representing all that remained of the Old Third 
Corps) of the combined Second and Third Corps, had been 
severely wounded the preceding day, 6th April.] 



13 

ly Marching through Farmville, Crook's cavalry sought to 
ford across the Appomattox and by a slow and tedious crossing, 
over a deep and difficult ford, succeeded in the course oi the 
afternoon in forming itself for further operations on the other side. 
Barlow's Division was here met, and after a short deliberation be- 
tween the generals, the advance was continued by General Crook, 
while Barlow moved oft further to the right to rejoin the main 
body of his corps. The Sixth Corps was visible on the hills to 
the south of the river and it was supposed that they would cross at 
once and follow the cavalry. The difficulties in crossing infantry, 
however, and the destruction of the bridges prevented, and they 
occupied the afternoon in preparing a suitable bridge. This was 
not accomplished until after dark, so that no further operations 
took place during the afternoon of the 7th [April] in the imme- 
diate vicinity of the enemy, except the attacks upon him of Gene- 
rals Humphreys and Crook. 

The road to Lynchburg from High Bridge was the main road 
of that section of the country, and over this it was now ^quite evi- 
dent that Lee with his main body was retreating. The principal 
part of Humphreys' Corps was following on the same road. This 
road, however, was intercepted by two nearly parallel roads from 
Farmville, which were also the main routes for country travel 
from the latter town to Lynchburg. On one of these Barlow 
moved and again, about dark, established himself in connection 
with the remainder of his corps, while on the other and a mile or 
two further to the left [west] Crook marched with his cavalry divi- 
sion, hoping to intercept the trains or at least some part of the forces 
whom the Second Corps was pursuing. Four or five miles [3] north 
of Farmville, near where the two roads above spoken of unite, 
General Humphreys found the enemy strongly entrencJied, cover- 
ing both these roads, known as the Stage and Plank roads. This 
Rebel force were posted apparently with the purpose of remaining 
there and resisting all attacks, until the trains, whose movements 
it was thus covering, should be well out of the way. General 
Humphreys at once formed his troops for attack, advanced his 
skirmishers, and developed the position of the enemy in his front 
to be one naturally strong and well entrenched. They had chosen 
the crest of a hill which gradually sloped off 'in front over open 
ground, well swept by artillery, leaving no opportunity for a front 
attack. A flank manoeuvre was attempted, but the Rebel hne was 
found to extend far beyond our own. General Humphreys 
having as yet only two divisions with him, and finding so strong 
a portion of Lee's army thus posted in the front — indeed the in- 
dications were that it was the main portion of the Rebel army- 
occupied himself with watching and manoeuvring until Barlow's 



14 

division, which was now ordered up, could arrive. Not being 
aware of the difficulties of crossing the river, at this time, at 
FarmviUe, owing to the destruction of the bridge. General Hum- 
phreys in sending information of his own situation to General 
Meade, naturally suggested that an attack should be made at 
once by troops — the Sixth Corps, for instance — from the direction 
of Farmville. The stiggestwn, hoivever, proved jmavailing. 

General Humphreys with his Combined Second-Third Corps 
disposed in the immediate front of the enemy, and just at this time 
the only portion of Grant's army halted and so situated, awaited with 
appropriate demonstrations the arrival of General Barlow's division 
before any more serious attack should be made. While doing so, 
however, he heard firing from the direction of Farmville and sup- 
posed that the Sixth Corps had attacked the enemy, as he had sug- 
gested to General Meade. He at once ordered an attack on his ex- 
treme right with a part of General Miles' division. This was made 
by three regiments from the First Brigade, General Ramsey's; 
but it was unsuccessful and resulted in considerable loss. The 
enemy had not reduced his strength in his front, nor had he yet 
given Humphreys an opportunity to turn his flank. But the 
firing heard by Humphreys did not proceed from an attack of 
the Sixth Corps, as he had premised, that command not having 
yet crossed the river. It resulted from an engagement between 
the enemy and General Crook's cavalry, and this affair is, per- 
haps, more distinctly than any other in that vicinity, entitled to 
be known as the Battle of Farmville. To be sure, there was a 
kind of a battle at Farmville in the morning, when the charges 
were made, and constant smaller engagements in its immediate 
neighborhood had been going on all day. But this particular con- 
test can be described separately; it had a well-defined beginning 
and end, and enjoyed a complete entirety unusual to combats be- 
tween the opposing forces in a running campaign. It deserves a 
little narrative of its own. Crook's cavalry, having crossed the 
river and formed, took up the line of march along the Old Plank 
road and moved without encountering any enemy directly to- 
wards the right flank and rear of the Rebels, whose centre and 
left were in front of Humphreys. 

The fording of a stream by a cavalry column is an occasion of 
very general interest and amusement. In the first place it usually 
affoids an excellent opportunity for refreshing the animals with- 
out any delay, while the fresh rippling of the waters seems to 
stir up the dry jokes among the soldiers. The boys, too, have a 
keen sense of the ludicrous and find no little enjoyment in the 
various mishaps of their comrades in the middle of the stream. 
The efforts of a " pack train" are especially amusing. The " pack 



15 

train" of a column beggars description. It generally contains 
more mules than horses, and often more contrabands than either. 
It takes the place of wagons and is intended to consist of 
extra-horses and animals of burden, carrying rations and blankets, 
officers' and pack-horse feed. Practically it is a sort of " omniwn 
gatherunC of all the little necessary traps used in camp and 
bivouac comprising a column which, when marching, stretches out 
to the length of a regiment wherein every man rides one animal 
and pulls another half way alongside of him, in vain attempts to 
lead him in the way he should go — both creatures stepping to the 
flapping music of loose dishes and hard tack, as improvised 
paniers shake at every trot their unmentionable contents. When 
equipped and ready for the move, the demure mule, who usually 
bears the heavy packs, stands before you in his natural plaintive at- 
titude, betokening compulsorysubmission to two large champagne- 
baskets or cracker-boxes strapped tightly to his sides, while on the 
top of his back are huge piles of brown blankets, shelter tents, 
tent flies, india rubber ponchos, and massive bags ot corn or oats. 
On top of this, indeed, will often be fastened an extra camp chair 
or two, a valise, a tin wash basin, iron coffee kettle, a venerable 
looking axe, spade, and hatchets, -with sometimes an extra saddle 
or two. Indeed, a roll of hay or corn-fodder sometimes sur- 
mounts all this, and not unfrequently is a poor animal so com- 
pletely hidden with his burden that head, tail, legs and ears ap- 
pear as only the animate protuberances of a concentration of stable, 
kitchen and household-ware. Overcome with such weighty em- 
barrassments, it will easily be seen why that pulling at the halter 
of laden animals is a greater inducement for him to attempt an 
elongation of the neck than to accept the earnest tugs at his head 
as a pressing invitation to speedy locomotion. Encumbrances of 
this character require considerable care in their adjustment, and, 
unless well-secured, accidents often occur, so that is not unusual 
in crossing a stream to observe an unexpected stumble of a faith- 
ful mule cause his unevenly balanced burden to describe a graceful 
evolution from the back and poise itself beneath the animal in a 
position more interesting than convenient. Should the water be 
deep and the current swift, some hungry shivering officer mourns 
the following night the loss of his bivouac Penates. 

When General Crook's column was again on the march after 
crossing the stream. Gen. Irwin Greggs' brigade was in advance, 
followed closely by that of Davies and of Smith's and Lord's Bat- 
tery. Light showers had lain the dust, and the brilliant successes 
of the morning added to the zeal which inspired the troops. 
There were no signs of an enemy visible, and officers and soldiers 
rode quietly and carelesly along, discussing incidents of the day 



16 

and the prospects of the pursuit. The road lay through culti- 
vated farms, fine timber, and was lined with well-built fences, an 
item always noted by campaigners. After a march of two or three 
[one] miles, a wagon train was discovered moving in the direction ot 
Lynchburg and cutting across the road on which Crook was 
travelling. The white covers of the wagons were partially screened 
by the woods, yet nothing more than a picket guard appeared to 
intervene. At the same moment a column of Rebel cavalry was 
espied moving with the train. Without a moment's delay the 
advance regiment under Colonel Young (4th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry) charged down the road, severing the enemy's column 
and attacking his train. The success bid fair to be speedy and 
complete, but before one brigade could deploy, the Rebel cavalry, 
comprising in all about two brigades, quickly rallied under cover 
of the hills, one to the right of the road and one to the left. Gal- 
lantly charging, they enclosed Gregg's column on the narrow road 
in perfect V. There was little chance to fight, and the high fences 
on each side prevented countercharges. While our first attack 
had thus been sudden and without resistance, the return of the 
compliment was now impetuous and irresistible. To retreat was 
to expose the whole column to utter disorganization, by turning 
in its head upon itself Pistols and carbines at short range was 
the order of things. Sabres might have been but for the fences, 
and before they could be removed, the inimitable " pack train" 
decided the present issues, sustaining their general reputation 
in the army of never being on hand when wanted and always be- 
ing where they were not wanted. By some mishap a portion of 
one had fallen into the column, not far from its head. The result 
was that the contrabands, mules, and all the various camp-para- 
phernalia thereunto appertaining, were not just at this unfortunate 
moment in a situation appropriate to non-combatants. They 
found themselves in plain view of more Rebel cavalry than they 
had any reason to believe existed in the entire Confederacy, 
and, with that quick appreciation of danger so characteristic of 
non-combatants, the conclusion was speedily arrived at that 
masterly inactivity was not then and there entirely appropriate. 
Thus, seriously exposed to the fire of the Rebels, retreat was 
instantly determined upon, and extra horses, beasts of burden, 
lazy mules, and frightened contrabands united, suddenly, in one 
glorious charge, invincible — but, to the rear. The same impetuos- 
ity of this handful of animals, if propelled in the other direction, 
must certainly have seriously damaged any foe with which they 
came in contact. As it was, dashing headlong down the narrow 
lane, they carried to the rear everything before them. Regiments 
calmly marching forward to their places, suddenly found them- 



17 

selves completely broken by a contagious panic, while the pack 
animals and their leaders flew on as if messengers of destruction. 
Of course, these things seriously interfered with the formation of 
the troops, as well as with their morale, while the Rebels, appre- 
ciating the advantage, pressed on and doubled the head of the 
column completely back upon itself. The First Brigade was entirely 
broken up and its commander, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Irwin Gregg, was 
fence-cornered and taken prisoner in the melee while attempting 
to reform his men. General Crook also narrowly escaped cap- 
ture. The rout at this time bid fair to be complete ; but the 
'next brigade (the First, under General Davies) at this time coming 
up and meeting the retreating and pursued forces, where the 
country was more open, quickly formed and checked the enemy. 
Broken up by the countercharge, while the enemy rallied for an- 
other, a line of battle was quickly assumed, with Davies on the 
right of the road and what was rallied of Gregg's Brigade under 
Colonel Young on the left. Lord's Battery was posted to com- 
mand all parts of the field and Smith's Brigade held in reserve. 
Prisoners taken now brought out the fact that Crook's advance, in 
attacking the enemy's wagon train, had actually ridden into the 
lines of a large force of infantry belonging to Anderson's corps, 
and that this corps was now posted in our front under cover of 
the dense woods. Further attacks on our part were just then and yet 
unadvisable. The Rebels, too, relieved us of the responsibility by 
again advancing their cavalry to the attack. When cavalry fight 
cavalry, both will naturally choose open country, and, probably, 
there are no more really exciting scenes in war than to witness 
the charges and countercharges of cavalry. This was one of them. 
Every movement of the Rebels here w'as plainly visible, and the 
gallantry wath which the colors were waved in the advance, urging 
forward the reluctant, displayed a spirit worthy of a better cause, 
and told more plainly than South Carolina bombast that the old 
elan and military ardor was not yet lost in the defeated army. 
The moral effect of the few artillery shots that were now fired by 
Lord's Battery was instantly perceived. Well directed and effect- 
ive, the " rude throats" of these mortal enemies spoke in loud 
tones of warning, and, after one or two unsuccessful attacks,-no 
further aggressions were attempted on our lines. I^^The 
skillful operations and manoeuvres of General Humphreys about 
the same time seriously aided in producing this effect. ,^^^3] 

There was no other road leading to Lynchburg on this [the 
north or left] side of the river, except the one in use by the enemy, 
and General Crook remained in his position until he could hear 
from his superiors. Before Sheridan, who was now at Prince Edward 
Court House, could be heard from, it was after sunset. Mean- 



18 

while General Grant had arrived at Farmville [see collection of Tele- 
grams and Despatches, collated and appended] and had ordered 
General Crook's division to recross the river, and to march to- 
wards Lynchburg by the nearest route, south of the river, along 
the railroad, and to halt at Prospect Station. The cavalry, there- 
fore, recrossed the Appomattox, marched again through the town, 
and arrived about midnight without further incident at its destina- 
tion. This evening had given quite a new appearance to the quiet 
little town of Farmville. |^^ The country about it became one vast 
bivouac for the Army of the James and the Sixth Corps of the 
Army of the Potomac, while the fields were filled with parks of 
artillery and wagon trains. ^^J Eligible houses on the outskirts 
of the town were occupied as various headquarters, at some of 
which the sweet strains of serenade softened the asperity of war, 
subduing the boisterous groups about the bivouac fires. Many a 
weary soldier after a tedious day march gazed musingly into the 
curling flames of his camp fire, and was carried back to comfort- 
able homes, cherished voices and loving faces, as the night 
breezes wafted over the fields the notes of a familiar selection. With 
the twinkling stars unhidden, the blazing, crackling rails, the little 
cup of " sizzling" coffee, the steady tramp of the sentry, the dim 
outlines of tents and wagon covers, the " munching" of the 
animals, the otherwise hushed quiet of the sleeping ramp about 
him, the soldier muses on the day gone by and conjectures the 
changes of the morrow. Who — but those have once experienced 
it — can tell the effect, with this weird scene, of the solemn strains 
of the Miserere, the wild notes of Robert le Diable, the voluptuous 
serenade from Don Fasguaie, or the stirring marches from Eniani? 
Who, then, will taunt military music as a superfluous expense, as 
only the "pomp and circumstance of glorious war! " None know 
better than commanders the silent potent influence of the 
" Bands." 

Near Prospect Station several roads crossed the railroad lead- 
ing south in the direction of Danville from the roads on which 
Lee was known to be moving. Apprehensive that by these means 
the Rebel general miglit even yet make an attempt to change the 
direction of his retreat towards Danville, Sheridan, on his arrival 
at Prince Edward Court House, sent McKenzie with his cavalry to 
cross the Euffiilo river, and to make a reconnoissance to Prospect 
Station. This was accomplished by the latter without meeting 
anything but stragglers from the enemy. McKenzie had scarcely 
been gone half an hour from the station, when the head of 
General Crook's column arrived there, and at once went into 
camp. The station house was filled with tobacco, and the only 
other building in the locality seemed to be occupied by a "lone 



19 

widow," her children and servants. It has been amazing how 
many " widders" the Yankees found in the Confederacy. This 
particular one had a story a little different from many others. "She 
did not know" — on enquiry — '•'■where her husband was." " Had 
she a husband at all ? " "Yes, she did have one ! " "Well, what had 
become of him, then ? " " She didn't know ; he went down the road 
one day to get some rations, and she never had heard of him since. 
This was some months ago, and she supposed now that he had been 
cutoffr 

Arriving at Prospect Station, it was a little difficult to learn 
from the intelligent contrabands whether a column of I^ee's army 
had passed that point or not. So great had been the number of 
Rebel stragglers that they were by many mistaken for regular or- 
ganizations of regiments and brigades on the march. This may 
account somewhat for the reports brought to Sheridan's head- 
quarters, by scouts and others, that part of the enemy were 
believed to be moving towards Danville. The country over 
which we were now operating had not before been visited by 
large bodies of soldiers, and the simple inhabitants were deceived 
by the squads and crowds of stragglers which travelled every 
road. Many of these soldiers were accompanied by their line 
officers, and with most the conclusion had been arrived at that 
the war was now about finished. 

The operations of the 7th of April, of the tenth day of the 
campaign [the " Last Hunt,"] may be summed up in brief to be 
the close pursuit of Lee's army from daylight until dark for about 
the distance of fifteen miles, during which skirmishes had taken 
place at the crossing of every creek, the Sandy river, Bush river, 
High Bridge, FarmviMe, and again a few miles beyond. The loss 
of the enemy was nineteen pieces of artillery and the destruction 
of about one hundred and thirty wagons of their train, and this 
was inflicted by the Combined Second-Third Corps alone. The 
loss, also, of the stores, machinery and material at Farmville was 
not inconsiderable. No accurate mention can be made of the 
number of prisoners taken during the day, or the nupber of 
stragglers induced away from their commands by the vigor of the 
pursuit. Among the Rebel generals known to have been severely 
wounded, was Brigadier-General Lewis, commandant of a brigade 
in Walker's division, Gordon's corps, who fell into our hands. 
The loss on our part was principally in the Combined Second- 
Third Corps, although Crook's cavalry also lost quite heavily. 
Humphreys loss was six [five] hundred and seventy-one in killed 
and wounded [since he started on this hunt ; how many on the 7th 
has never been separately stated. This statement (if erroneous) 
originated with William Swinton. As soon as one wolf howls, the 



20 

pack, without cause, will join in a chorus of discord; so it has 
been in this matter.] Probably one thousand is a large estimate 
for Grant's entire loss; among the officers were Brigadier-General 
Smyth, mortally wounded, and Brevet Brig. -Gen. John J. [not the 
famous David McGregor] Gregg, taken prisoner. 

General Gregg, it will be remembered, was captured in the 
heat of battle near Farmville, on the yth, p. m., and at the same 
time his watch, pocket-book and valuables demanded of him as 
the price of his life, a threat which could have easily been en- 
forced, and his death charged to the general conflict. Discretion, 
however, was the better part of valor, and two days afterwards 
General Gregg was released, his captors being themselves caj)- 
tured with the army. 

The movements during the day of the various corps under 
General Grant may be easily traced on the map. The combined 
Second Third Corps moved from Sailors' Creek across the Ap- 
pomattox, via High Bridge, to Farmville, and about five miles 
beyond on the Lynchburg road. The Sixth Corps, direct from 
the battlefield of Little Sailors' Creek, via Rice's Station, to Farm- 
ville. General Ord's column of the Army of the James also 
moved from its position near Rice's Station direct on Farmville. 
The Fifth Corps, which was early in the morning near the com- 
bined Second-Third, followed the latter corps to High Bridge, 
when it moved directly across the rear of the army, from its ex- 
treme right to its extreme left, and halted for the night at Prince 
Edward Court House Thither also Sheridan had moved Mer- 
ritt's cavalry corps, via Rice's Station, from [Little] Sailors' Creek. 
Crook's wing of cavalry moved in the front and centre of the 
army, on the left of the combined Second-Third Corps; but after 
crossing the river at Farmville [to no purpose except to show that 
it could be forded] recrossed again and encamped about midnight 
at Prospect Station. To the latter point McKenzie's cavalry also 
had made a reconnoissance from Prince Edward Court House. 
No indications, however, had yet appeared that Lee was disposed 
to attempt a retreat on Danville. His object seemed to be to get 
out of Grant's way by the most available routes, without jiaying 
any special attention to their general direction. Lee, too, was out 
of rations, and the account of the operations of 8th April will in- 
dicate his ])ros])ects as to a retreat towards Lynchburg and how 
they were baffled. 

A last, but a most important item of to-day's results are the 
two little notes which passed l)et\veen the commanders of the op- 
posing forces, beginning the correspondence which terminated 
the contest. General Grant's first letter was written on this day, 
wherein he expresses his conviction that the result of the last 



21 

week must convince General Lee " of the hopelessness of further 
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this 
struggle." He regards it, therefore, as his duty to shift from him- 
self the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking 
the surrender of his enemy. An interesting preface to this note — 
perhaps its inspiration — is read in a dispatch from General Sheri- 
dan, dated the previous evening, 6tli April, 11.15, p. m., and re- 
porting his engagement of that day. This characteristic dispatch 
tersely concludes, "If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will sur- 
render." (The " thing" was " pressed," and Lee did surrender.) 
Lee replied to General Grant's note under the same date, recipro- 
cating the i' desire to avoid useless effusion of blood." But 
General Grant did not receive this answer until the following 
morning (8th). [Be it remembered in this connection that all the 
correspondence, to and fro, of the 7th and 8th, passed through 
the lines of the combined Second-Third Corps under Humphreys, 
who alone was persistently pressing and almost the whole time in 
contact or treading on the very heels of Lee, on the 6th, 7th, 8th 
and 9th, and ready, with the help of the Sixth Corps, to demolish 
him on the 9th. Had the Sixth Corps reinforced Humphreys 
on the 7th (so has he often declared by letter and in conversation) 
it would have been done at Cumberland Church, on the 7th.] 



CHAPTER IL 

(original chapter XII.) 



Step by step we have marched over the great eleven days' 
campaign, and now we come to the last day of its continuance. 
The record of April 8th will be unusually dull and without bril- 
liancy ; yet, it was on this day that the marches and masterly [?] 
movements were made, which the next morning brought at bay 
the Grand Army of Northern Virginia, checked its fruitless 
attempts at escape, repelled its assaults, doubled it back upon 
itself, and encircled the ])roud and weary host with a final "ana- 
conda." April 8th was the day and the night when legs usurped 
the rights of valor, and fleetness, not impetuosity, won the victory. 
It is curious under these circumstances that the operations of the 
Army of the Potomac for this day should be officially detailed in 
two lines; but official reports should be brief General Meade's 
is especially so in this instance; his account of this day's move- 



22 

ments being contained in the remark, that '' the next day, April 8th, 
the pursuit was continued on the Lynchburg Stage Road." 

From the position of Grant's forces the night before, of 
course, the combined Second-Third Corps had the advance, and 
took up the direct pursuit. Lee had encamped for the night 
along " the Stage Road," just mentioned, many of his troops ex- 
tending south as far as the Appomattox river. The camp fires 
of his numerous stragglers spread his forces out in every direc- 
tion, but the main body rested a considerable distance beyond 
the advance of the combined Second-Third Corps ; so that when 
Humphreys resumed his march, on the morning of the 8th, he did 
not come up with the enemy for several hours. Lee's march, 
however, could not have been perfectly serene. Four pieces of 
artillery were abandoned, the usual rubbish cast away by encum- 
bered troops and wagon trains still lined the roads. After a 
march of nearly fifteen miles, at New Store, the combined Second- 
Third Corps came up with the enemy's cavalry pickets. The 
corps had but one road to march on, and in his report Hum- 
phreys says that " a halt was made of about two hours at sunset, 
when the march was resumed with the object of coming up with 
the main force of the enemy ; but, finding no probabihty of doing 
so during the night, and the men being much exhausted from want 
of food and from fatigue, the head of the column was halted at 
midnight. The rear did not get up until morning, and the supply 
train of two days' rations later." Thus did the combined 
Second-Third Corps pass the day. 

Following the combined Second-Third was the Sixth Corps, 
which during the night had constructed such a bridge over the 
Appomattox at Farmville as answered the present purposes. The 
Sixth, therefore, played no important part during the day [but 
might have played the most important, if they had improvised a 
bridge on the yth, and hurried across to the support of the com- 
bined Second-Third Corps.] 

On the south side of the river, by the same route used by 
Crook's cavalry the night before. General Ord's command moved 
from Farmville along the railroad towards Lynchburg, followed 
by the Fifth Corps under General Griffin. These movements 
were under the personal direction of the Lieutenant-General, as 
the following brief dispatch will show, while, at the same time, it 
illustrates General Grant's judicious generalship in seizing the op- 
portune moment, and giving to his subordinates orders for their 
guidance too explicit and direct to admit of any mistake or modi- 
fication. 

[If this book expressed the Editor's sentiments, the preceding 
sentence would be obliterated and quite another substituted.] 



23 

Headquarters Armies of the United States. 
Farmville, April 7, 1865. 
General Meade: 

Order the Fifth Corps to follow the Twenty-fourth, at 6, a. m., 
up the Lynchburg road, the Second and Sixth to follow the enemy 
north of the river. [Signed,] U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General. 

Here was the programme for the infantry. Brief and complete, 
it offers another explanation to the harmony and success of the 
campaign. The vigilance of the Lieutenant-General suffered 
nothing to escape him, and on this occasion he himself arranged 
the details for the march of his armies, lest another such mistake 
[Whose? Grant's ! that of nobody else Meade, in this case was 
blameless, but saddled with the blunder] as that after the batde 
of Jetersville might again lose him a few hours and golden op- 
portunity. 

Sheridan, with the cavalry of Merritt and McKenzie, resumed 
the march at daylight from Prince Edward Court House direct to 
Prospect Station, where General Crook awaited his arrival. West 
of this point the railroad makes a considerable bend to the south- 
ward. The cavalry moved to the west, therefore, in two columns, 
one along the railroad, and one by roads further to the north ; 
Merritt's corps taking the latter, with his two divisions, under 
Custer and Devins, moving for a while parallel to each other, 
while Crook's wing marched along the railroad. 

This order of march placed the latter more distant from the 
enemy, and left General Merritt to manage affairs in their im- 
mediate vicinity. Although the Rebels were supposed to be 
moving on the Lynchburg Pike, yet, early in the day, httle had 
been heard of them. Custer, however, whose division was nearest 
to this road, began soon to gadier in quite a number of stragglers, 
and, from all he could learn, deemed it of great importance that 
his march should be prosecuted with every diligence. Hence he 
arrived first at the point where his road was crossed by the one 
over which Devins was marching, and, therefore, assumed the 
responsibility of continuing his progress, although the advance 
to-day properly belonged to Devins' (First) Division. 

(In explanation, — It was the custom in most ])arts of the 
Union Army, in forming the daily programme for march, to assign 
the advance to the various commands in regular rotation.) 

Sheridan himself accompanied the former [Custer]. The 
cavalry were followed on these routes by the Fifth and Twenty- 
fourth Corps. The march continued during the greater part of 
day, without anymore special interest than would be awakened by 



24 

the reception of a great variety of reports from the different sec- 
tions of country through which the column was marching. The 
large number of stragglers from Lee's army, who had been seen 
in some quarters, completely deceived the people. They had 
scarcely any definite idea as to the whereabouts of the Rebel 
army. Some thought that it had gone towards Danville, others 
that it was pretty well dispersed and all united in confirming the 
broken spirits of its soldiers. Some of the simple people, when 
asked what would be done, now that Richmond had fallen, re- 
joined with an expression of the most flnplicit confidence in 
General Lee. Two elderly ladies strolled quietly into the lines during 
one of the short halts, and, calling an officer aside, one cautiously 
remarked that she " didn't 'zactly know, but slie didn't see how they 
could fight any more now, nohow. Fact is," she added, in a 
much more confidential manner, and with a significant nod to- 
wards her companion, indicative of a suspicion that she might 
betray her, " they won't fight any more; they'll surrender. I 
think they'll really surrender." It is almost useless to say that 
the old lady at once became a favorite, although the veterans of 
the Army of the Potomac could scarcely credit the belief that 
their antagonist, for so long a time at the head of the Rebel army, 
should, under any circumstances, succumb thus early in the usual 
spring campaign. 

At Pamphn's Station, [about 8] miles from Prospect, were 
found some cars and disabled locomotives, while in the depot 
were stored sorghum and some boxes of fine new Springfield 
muskets. Meanwhile, Sheridan had learned through his ubiqui- 
tous scouts, that at Appomattox Station, about ten miles beyond, 
there were four trains of cars laden with commissary stores and 
supplies of various kinds for the Rebel army; and the cavalry 
pressed on with more vigor. It was a long day's niarch with but 
one short halt. While nothing had been seen of the enemy, a 
brush, more or less serious, was, of course, anticipated when the 
trains were reached. Of course a considerable force of Lee's 
army must, by this time, have reached that vicinity. It could 
scarcely be possible that Sheridan was completely in their ad- 
vance, and I do not think I am wrong in stating it as the general 
anticipation that, on encountering the force in the neighborhood 
of this new depot, we would be in the very midst of a large camp 
of the enemy. 

In reply to Custer's despatches to Sheridan, reporting his pro- 
gress and observations, the latter replied that. " if those trains 
can be taken work enough will be done for one day." But this 
was not the end of this day's work. 

Lee was more than weakened. His army was retreating, 



25 

where, or for what good purposes, who could tell. The Confede- 
rate capital had fallen and its President taken flight. Defeat and 
demoralization had dispersed the Army of Northern Virginia. 
Officers had told their men that they might as well go home now, 
everything was lost. Many arms had been thrown away. Artil- 
lery by batteries and wagons by hundreds abandoned, burned. 
Every calculation during the campaign for the supply of his com- 
missariat had been thwarted. The fall of Richmond, although 
perhaps anticipated and partially provided for, was sudden and 
premature. Ihere was no opportunity to care for the preserva- 
tion of the immense stores there, so necessary but now lost to the 
supply of Lee's army. Rebel officers are fond of inveighing 
against the Confederate authorities for the large amount of stores 
abandoned in Richmond. They might better, it was thought, 
have been given away to the soldiers and to the needy in the 
city, rather than to have been destroyed. Quantities .of coffee, 
flour and sugar were found there. It was a long and harassing 
march by night and by day, with skirmishes, and without the 
best of roads, from Petersburg, on its fall, on the 2d, to the Dan- 
ville railroad, which was reached two days afterwards. But here 
the supplies expected and so confidently telegraphed for were cut 
off and Lee detained to watch and to fight. Again he pushed for 
Lynchburg and succeeded, with a portion of his army, in meet- 
ing a few cars at Farmville. But his army received therefrom no 
substantial additions to its commissariat, and retreating, fighting, 
wearied, heartsick and almost without hope, his men marched on 
to the west again. The stores there awaiting their arrival were 
doomed to become spoils for Sheridan. Is it a wonder that this 
army, so closely pursued, harassed, pushed back from one road to 
another, away from the course it would follow, its supplies cap- 
tured and without any base of operations in the present or in 
prospective ; is it a wonder that these men lost spirit, dispersed, 
and, in a short ten days, from a large, well-appointed army dwin- 
dled away, down to a mere handful scarcely enough to constitute 
a good division. [This remark can only allude to those who had 
arms in their hands — some 9000 — when they surrendered, and 
cannot refer to over three times that number who had weapons 
and ammunition and were opposing the Union troops desperately 
or sullenly an hour or so previous.] This, too, while its commander, 
whom all so revered, was corresponding with his adversary for 
surrender. The wonder, rather, is, that any army was left, or that 
there yet remained any of that military esprit which delights in 
victory, which exhibited itself in some of the closing charges of 
the Rebel cavalry on the morning of the final surrender. 

Custer's Division, having the advance, first struck Appomattox 



26 

Station, defended only by a squad of cavalry, and by quick man- 
oeuvring surrounded and captured the trains, from which wagons 
were being loaded, before any force could appear for their relief; 
even before they could steam away — so complete was the sur- 
prise. The railroad at this point is about two miles south of the 
Lynchburg stage road, which runs through Appomattox Court 
House, and along which the main body of Lee's army was mov- 
ing. Near this point was a camp of hospital train, a large park 
of wagons and a park of surplus artillery, estimated by some offi- 
cers at twenty-five and by others at fifty pieces. Being well in 
Lee's advance these troublesome encumbrances to the speedy 
movements of an army were preparing to bivouac for the night in 
fancied security. The artillery was guarded by a small division 
of infantry and a division of cavalry. A detachment from Lee's 
advance also reached the depot about the same time with our 
cavalry. They were at once driven back, however, when the trains 
were captured, and followed closely by Custer, A portion of the 
wagon trains nearly succeeded in moving off, but there now oc- 
curred, here, however, one of the hottest and hardly contested col- 
lisions of the campaign. It was one of those affairs that did not 
really occupy a very great length of time and of which official re- 
ports would have nothing more interesting to say, than that " a 
short engagement with the enemy here took place." According to 
General Sheridan's official report, " General Devin coming up 
went in on the right of Custer. The fighting continued until 
after dark and the enemy were driven." But this briUiant little 
fight is entitled to more consideration. It took place near the 
Lynchburg stage road and was brought on by Custer m his at- 
tempts to drive the enemy and secure the possession of this great 
highway. It was the only route now open for Lee towards 
Lynchburg, or, indeed, the only main route that he could travel 
in any direction, in his efforts to escape our forces. Could Sheri- 
dan obtain and hold possession of this road thus directly in Lee's 
front, and there remain, well established, until a good portion of 
the strong corps of infantry following him should arrive for his 
relief [support or stiffening], Lee would be completely surrounded, 
with no possible means of escape. To the north of him and 
parallel with his line of march, wound the Appomattox, unford- 
able and with no established crossing for many miles. Even if 
any such had existed, a journey in that direction would have been 
of no avail to the enemy. In his rear the main body of the 
Army of the Potomac (the combined Second-Third and Sixth 
Corps, under Humphreys and Wright, respectively), was in close 
pursuit and [the former] constantly harassing him. On his left 
flank, towards the south, Sheridan's cavalry column, followed by 



27 

the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps, were marching ahnost directly 
parallel and endeavoring to intercept him, in which intention, 
should Sheridan be successful, reach and hold a point on the road 
beyond Lee's advance, there offered the Rebel leader no possible 
means of escape, other than to pierce the lines surrounding him. 
The appearance of Sheridan at Appomattox Depot, almost as 
Lee's extreme advance had arrived, was therefore an additional 
disaster, and sound military policy dictated that no effort should 
be spared to repel any further advance of the Union troops in 
this direction. But the small force of cavalry and infantry guard- 
ing the trains and surplus artillery, which had reached this point in 
advance of the main body in order to escape the uncertainties of 
battle, was not sufficient to delay, permanently, the onward pro- 
gress of Sheridan. It is a doubtful principle, but one held by 
some of our most successful cavalry leaders, that it is the pro- 
vince of cavalry never to hesitate in making an attack ; that no 
time should be lost in cautious reconnoitering. [This was Suwar- 
row's idea.] If anything is to be gained, the more precipitate 
and unexpected the attack, the greater its probable success. The 
chances in its favor greatly overbalance the risks of serious disaster 
incurred by attacking an enemy with a position and force uncer- 
tainly ascertained, and, should the movement-prove injudicious, a 
skillful general will usually discover it in time to prevent any great 
misfortune to a well-disciplined cavalry. It was in strict accord- 
ance with views of this character that Sheridan and his generals 
pursued this stirring campaign. Without " note or comment " 
the Rebels were attacked wherever found. No time was pre- 
viously consumed in reconnoisances and dispositions, but when 
the occasion presented itself a fight ensued. Thus it was in the 
attacks of each division, successively, at different points, of the 
enemy's line of march on the morning of the 6th (April) near [but 
south of] Deatonsville. [Let there be no mistake; not on the 
road on which Humphreys fought, over and ahead, fourteen 
miles and for eleven hours The cavalry, always claiming the lion's 
share of the glory of this pursuit, which justice cannot assign to 
them, is said to have been " in Deatonsville." Justly does Hum- 
phreys remark (i2, lo, 71): "The dispatch from Meade to me 
(signed " Webb, Chief of Staff "), telling me about Deatonsville, 
was I'eceived by me after I had got two miles beyond Deatonsville 
and had left it behind me foj- viore than an hour. If any one will 
look at the map, on which the operations of the different corps 
and services are distinctly marked, he will see that the cavalry 
were at work upon a mere side issue and moving on a lateral road. 
The whole district thereabouts may have been known by the prin- 
cipal settlement, as Deatonsville, but there was no " station." 



28 

General Custer admitted the cavalry were not on the line or route 
the combined Second-Third Corps tought over, driving the Rebels 
before them, from one strong and strengthened pobition after 
another. The fact is, history, "that vast Mississi{)pi of false- 
hoods," as Matthew Arnold styled it — particularly military his- 
tory, is simply an aggregation of special pleas tor this one or that.J 

It was again on the afternoon of the yth, near Farmville, 
when Crook's column was brought so quickly to a halt. Inde- 
pendently of the principle that the pursuers should always harass 
the pursued, the cavalry of Sheridan owes much of its success in 
previous campaigns, but especially in this one, to the dashing 
compliance ot its leaders with this interesting theory. 

So on this evening of the 8th April, Custer had captured the 
railroad trains near the station of Appomattox, while the proba- 
bility was that he should soon encounter a large camp of the 
enemy, or perhaps his main body. The facts are, that with the 
small force at his command and without awaiting further advice 
or instructions, he at once opened a battle. The trains being 
captured, the enemy began a most destructive artillery fire upon 
the station and there was great danger of the prize being lost. 
Upon this, just as when the Massachusetts 6th and New York 7th 
were on their first journey to Washington, at the breaking out of 
the war, and a call was made for engineers, to put the locomo- 
tives in order and start them out with the troops from Annapohs 
to Washington, there Avas a ready and competent response; so, 
now, at the close of the war, during the hasty movements conse- 
quent upon a cavalry engagement and while the shots flew over 
and through the newly-made prizes, and when each soldier had a 
duty to perform which might pardon him for not remembering 
what was his former civil occupation or whether he ever had any 
at all, a call was made for engineers from the ranks. " Who could 
engineer these trains from the danger of recapture ? " A re- 
sponse was ready in the Harris Light Cavalry and the new engin- 
eers assumed their posts. Soon a timorous whistle and labor- 
ious puffs announced the struggles of the iron monsters and in a 
short time a long bold whoop and the regular sounds of move- 
ments over the rails aroused the curiosity of the troops not yet 
arrived. The track being in order the trains were run into better 
established positions within our lines. They passed by columns of 
our men, awakening the most intense interest and curiosity 
among the soldiers of Devins and Crook, who were also march- 
ing up along the railroad. 

Meantime Custer continued his fight, to assure his position ^at 
Appomattox Station and to advance his troops, if possible, as far 
as the Lynchburg pike, capturing such artillery and trains as 



29 

might be between him and that road and holding a position here, 
directly across Lee's line of march, until further orders should be 
received from his superiors. This was the true plan and it was 
most skilfully and successfully executed. 

Pennington's and Capehart's brigades, numerically known as 
the First and Third Brigades, being the leading commands in the 
columns, were brought into action as soon as on the ground, and 
strong efforts were at once made to capture the artillery, which 
was doing considerable damage among the troops. Canister 
was freely used by the enemy, and it was at one. time quite doubt- 
ful whether the trains could be run off successfully. The extem- 
porized engineers from the " Harris' Light" did their work well, 
however, and the prizes were secured. The position of the enemy 
was covered by thick woods, on every approach, and night was 
fast coming on. But Custer maintained the fight by repeated 
charges, now on the right, now on the left, now in the centre. 
The enemy was kept thoroughly occupied and no opportunity 
was given him to reconnoitre or test the strength of the attack- 
ing force. Had he done so, with a well-disciplined although 
small force of infantry, the wooded character of the country was 
greatly in his favor as against cavalry. Custer's charges were re- 
pulsed or only a few rods would be gained. The Second Bri- 
gade (third in column), under Wells, was then brought into action 
and fresh charges made, both mounted and dismounted, against 
the enemy's position. His guns continued to grow more destruc- 
tive at each approach. Men and officers were becoming dis- 
couraged in these attempts, apparently so futile. Custer himself 
now led the charges and seemed ubiquitous, exerting his every 
effort to maintain every inch he could gain, and to imbue his men 
with the enthusiasm of his own nature. In this latter endeavor 
his mercurial temperament usually helped him to success. No 
rail fences were converted into slight breastworks, no defensive 
line attemi)ted; but bold, persistent and determined personal efforts 
were made to break the enemy's front. Many officers, however, 
engaged in this contest, expressed the belief that it was impossible 
to gain the position desired, and urged that further efforts be de- 
sisted from at present. Not the shghtest anxiety, however, was 
manifested as to Custer's ability to hold his own position before 
what opposition might here be brought against him 

The w^hole fighting force of the three brigades was kept in ac- 
tion. Darkness came on, and, guided by the flashes of the ene- 
my's guns, Custer was still pushing and pressing here and there 
along the line. His officers kept track of him with difficulty and 
sought him by recognition of his voice in words of command, or 
by the blasts of his bugle as ever and anon it sounded the " For- 



30 

ward ! " and " Charge ! " It must have been about nme o'clock 
in the evening, which had been ])assed in this entertaining manner, 
when, as though impatient of further delay, he shouted to a staff 
officer (Brevet Col. E. W. Whittaker, Chief of Staff and Lieut. - 
Col. ist Connecticut Cavalry), that " those guns must be taken in 
five minutes." The officer quickly passed the word along the line, 
which responded in renewed and hearty cheers. The shout was 
taken up from man to man and simultaneously the lines moved 
forward. The Rebels heard it and did not rejoice, but began to 
retire. They were discovered to be abandoning their guns, many 
of which had been taken off to the pike running from Appomat- 
tox Court House to Lynchburg, which road was not far distant 
from the scene of the fight. With cheer upon cheer the line ad- 
vanced and swept everything before it. The enemy's position 
was abandoned and an indiscriminate mass of guns, caissons 
and baggage-trains captured. Without stopping to lose them- 
selves among these trophies, under the lead of Custer, in the 
darkness, by a narrow obscure road and through the thickest un- 
derbrush, our men pushed on in pursuit. The column was 
obliged to march "by fours" only, but the random shots of stray 
pieces of artillery, by which the Rebels sought to intimidate our 
men, were now without result. The advance was continued and 
over an uncertain by-road the pike was finally reached. 

The enemy now took both routes of retreat; one toward 
Lynchburg and the other toward Appomattox Court House, not 
two miles distant, where Lee's army was bivouacking for the night. 
Here the troops emerged into an open country, while over un- 
dulating fields, and, glimmering like fire-ffies, on the hills just be- 
yond the little village, broke into view the camp-fires of all that 
remained of the Rebel host. Will the soldiers who saw them that 
night ever forget the scene ? 

But there was no time for contemplation. The road was 
packed with trains of baggage, supplies and artillery in one grand 
inextricable confusion, some headed one way and some another, 
and all so thoroughly interlocked and obstructing the road, that 
over this excellent highway, ordinarily passable for several wagons 
travelling abreast of each other, a single horseman could with 
difficulty selecc a bridle path. But the enemy was not yet dis- 
posed to abandon the hope of holding this road. They seemed 
to feel assured that our cavalry could not remain long upon it, 
and that portion of them who fled toward Lynchburg now un- 
limbered guns on our men from that direction, while those fleeing 
for rescue toward Appomattox Court House assisted in the an- 
noyance. While incidents of this character frequently gave com- 
manding generals the most anxious solicitude and attention, it 



31 

sometimes happens that the quick impulse of some officer meets 
the emergency. So it was here. Before any provision could be 
made for disposing, in the darkness, of the somewhat scattered 
troops to silence this fire, now in the rear, a group of horsemen, 
which was afterwards proved to consist, in great part, of officers led 
by the enthusiastic proposition of one of their number, guided by 
the flash of the guns, suddenly charged this new fire, silenced it, 
and captured the guns. All the plunder seemed now in our posses- 
sion, as well as the road by which Lee was retreating, and over 
which he must pass to escape the " anaconda." 

Custer did not halt, however, but continued his advance 
toward the Court House, until he encountered an infantry barri- 
cade, when a halt was ordered, and a line in front thereof estab- 
lished. Dii'ections were given to secure the artillery and valuable 
portions of the ca])tured wagon trains as speedily as possible by 
running them off to the south side of the railroad at the station. 

About this time. General Devin's Division dismounted, and 
reached the road on which Custer was operating from across the 
fields at his right. Devin's troops had been dismounted early in 
the action, and disposed on the right of Custer's line, where the 
service they rendered was chiefly to distract the enemy by the ap- 
pearance of " Yankees" upon every quarter. The dense character 
of the country rendered communication between the different 
generals exceedingly slow and difficult, especially after dark. 
Hence, Devin's troops did not become seriously engaged. 

It was now arranged that General Devin's troops should as- 
sume a line of one brigade, facing Lee's army toward the Court 
House, and one also toward Lynchburg at the west, thus reHev- 
ing General Custer's men, while the latter should be occupied in 
clearing the field of the captures. These, it was found, amounted 
to twenty-five pieces of artillery and over two hundred wagons, 
the latter filled mostly with baggage. It was midnight before 
Custer himself left the field, when he rode to the hospital and 
visited his wounded. Had it been daylight, then, he Avould have 
seen the green saplings, about which his men so valiantly and 
successfully fought, bent and split by canister from the artillery. 
The trees and the artillery carriages in the park were perforated 
with bullet holes; horses wallowed in bloody mud, and the first 
dawn of day upon the spot would tell any observer of the deadly 
character of that evening's contest. Surgeons of wide experience 
in the cavalry remarked that they never treated so many extreme 
cases in so short a fight The wounds were chiefly made by artil- 
lery, and were serious; many patients being badly mangled. This 
battle, fought on the eve of surrender, when the Rebel general 
knew too well that further resistance was in vain, entailed, as usual. 



32 

its sad sacrifices. Lieutenant-Colonel Aug. J. Root, of the 15th 
New York Cavalry, a noble and brave man, was killed in the last 
charge on the ''pike," near Appomattox Court House. His body 
fell into the hands of the enemy, and was found with Lee's army 
on the next morning after surrender, stripped ot all clothing. 
Major Howe, of the ist West Virginia Cavalry, Was also instantly 
killed in this action. But my pen fails me to do justice to the 
memory of aU these faithful soldiers. Their name, too, is legion, 
and 1 leave the task for better hands. 

Sheridan, of course, lost no time in notifying General Grant 
of the result of his day's operations, as well as Generals Ord and 
Grifilin, commanding the infantry on this wing and in this vicin- 
ity, respectively, of the Army of the James and of the Fifth Corps, 
which had started in the morning in rear of the cavalry. Know- 
ing that daylight would again appear before General Grant might 
be able to receive his message and to issue fresh orders upon his 
report, he urged the generals just mentioned to press on with all 
possible energy, and that, if they could reach him in time, there 
was no possible means of escape for the enemy. " The last ditch" 
had been discovered. These commanders judiciously determined 
to force the march, and the head of their columns reached Appo- 
mattox Depot about two o'clock on the morning of the 9th, thus 
having marched all day and the greater part of the night. The 
march, too, at times, was to some of the troops exceedingly 
tedious, owing to the frequent halts, which are often unavoidable 
when so large a column uses only one road of travel. 

["I" (Capt. Charles W. Greene, iiith Colored Troops, U. S. 
Volunteers), " belonged to Ord's column of the A'rmy of the James. 
I think it was on the 6th of April, 1865, that we arrived near 
Farmville [Rice's Station ?j. We encamped in dense young woods, 
and lay there till the 7th. We lay in shelter tents on the 7th. 
We marched eastward across a beautiful valley, fording two or 
three wide streams, waist deep, and encamped near Farmville. 
Early on the morning of the 8th we awoke, passed through 
Farmville in the early twilight, and made a splendid march of 
forty-seven miles (so it was said) to a point near Appomattox 
Court House. We had not a straggler — every man was in his 
place when, near midnight, we fell upon the damp April ground, 
and slept sweetly till 4, a. m,; then a rapid march, a halt for cof- 
fee (drunk boiling hot) and for a hard-tack bolted in haste ; a sharp 
cannonade, a swift double-quick, a headlong run, a rush of our 
cavalry out of the woods with some Rebel battle flags, with the 
news that Langdon's Battery was lost to the Johnnies. We rush 
in, our left in front, a hurrying deployment of two companies of 
skirmishers, a fine march into a field by the rear rank in our haste. 



33 

my company with the colors ; a halt, news from one of Sheridan's 
staff that Lee was about to surrender ; then a dozen or two hur- 
rahs, with tears of joy unnumbered ; then written orders from 
Grant to move no men, but to remain where we were; then direc- 
tions from Sheridan to move under cover of a hill to an unguarded 
road, by which, I doubt not, many of Lee's men might have 
escaped, if some did not ; then news of the Stirre?ider; and a clos- 
ing in of the lines and the exit of a large number of our prisoners 
from Lee's lines. That was news enough for one day ! "] 

That portion of Sheridan's cavalry which had not been en- 
gaged, aware of the length of the day's march they had accom- 
plished, went into bivouac, long after dark, and were astonished 
at the first break of the day, in answering to reveille, to find in the 
same field with themselves long stacks of trusty muskets. A 
cavalry soldier may feign a ivani of respect for infantry; but he 
7isually expresses a certain sense of relief on learning of the 
proximity of troops from that branch of the service ! So on the 
morning of the 9th ; conscious of the importance of the next few 
hours, these men answered in silent sympathy to each other. 

This infantry obtained little sleep during the night. Many 
were marching all night (Sth-gth), some not arriving until (9th) 
morning. The same was the case with the other wing of Grant's 
army, who were following Lee more directly, where the rear of 
the Second Corps did not get up until (9th) morning." If the 
pursuers were obliged to make these extraordinary exertions, 
what must have been the efforts of the pursued ? But it was these 
forced marches during the day and night of the 8th-9th of April, 
which settled the fact of Lee's surrender on April 9th. The 
cavalry could not have withstood by itself the attacks which, on 
the morrow, were brought against it. The march of a strong body 
of infantry, with a fleetness unknown, because, perhaps, unneces- 
sary, during many of the former operations against which Lee 
had contended, was unexpected to him; and, as we shall see in 
recounting the affairs of to-morrow — 9th April — when once he 
learned the fact, hostilities were suspended. It is universally ad- 
mitted in military circles, that the unusual march of the troops just 
mentioned Avas the most effective among the intermediate causes 
of the final surrender. 

Before daylight, the next morning, the rubbish which encum- 
bered the Lynchburg Pike had been cleared away by Custer's 
veterans ; and the bugles awakened the weary troops before the 
break of dawn. All were in the saddle, fully prepared for the grand 
contest anticipated. The unexpected sight of the infantry, too, 
served to impress the soldiers with the belief that their command- 
ers deemed hearty work to be before them, and the extraordinary 



34 

march accomplished made the infantry earnest of success. The 
hostihties of the day were opened by the Rebels in an attempt to 
dislodge the troops at the Lynchburg Pike, who were now halt- 
ing Lee's army. |^° There has been quite a popular impression 
that, on the morning of the 9th, seeing the difficulty of his position, 
Lee quietly determined to surrender without an engagement, and 
acted accordingly. 

This, however, is a serious error. ^^| It is true that some of 
his most prominent subordinates believed that nothing but cavalry 
was in his front!, and that a strong attack with infantry would 
open the way for his continued retreat. It was not thought that 
the Union infantry could possibly have marched so completely 
around the Rebels, and it was confidently expected, therefore, 
that the line in the latter's front toward Lynchburg might be forced 
early in the morning, before succor could arrive from the infantry 
corps presumed to be marching to the support of the cavalry. 
[The operations of the 8th and 9th would have been superfluous 
if the afternoon of the 7th had been properly utilised.] At 
an interview between the opposing generals, which took place 
later in tlie day, these sentiments were acknowledged, although 
there were one or two Confederate generals present who were en- 
gaged in the battle of the morning, and who expressed it as their 
opinion at the time that our infantry had arrived, and that it was 
useless to continue further hostilities. It was a contrary senti- 
ment, however, which induced the action, and the spirit which 
seemed to animate a considerable portion of the Rebel cavalry, in 
their manoeuvres of this morning, indicated that they were antici- 
pating an easy success. Under these circumstances a determined 
effort was made to break through the Union cavalry on the Lynch- 
burg road, clear the country m that direction and open a way for 
the further retreat of the Rebel army. Crook's Division, having 
been more fortunate than any other part of the cavalry corps in 
securing a few hours rest during the night, moved from its bivouac 
before the dawn, and by sunrise had relieved the troops of 
General Devins at the extreme front, allowing the latter to move 
off toward the railroad, across the fields on the right, that they 
might there attend to their horses and prepare for the work of the 
day. But the enemy was already alive. The fog of the morning 
was just rising from the open fields over which his movements 
were now obliged to be made. The sharp ring of carbines greeted 
the rising sun, and an occasional discharge of artillery [" the dia- 
pason of the cannonade"], harmonized with the clamor, intensify- 
ing a warlike prelude whose significance at this early hour every 
veteran appreciates. 

The Union infantry, for the present, remained near Appomat- 



35 

tox Depot to obtain some slight rest and refreshments, and the 
new dispositions of cavalry were quickly made. The extreme left, 
or the whole of the care of the Lynchburg Pike, was now left to 
General Crook, McKenzie's command being sent to support him. 
Merritt's Corps reorganized, and was disposed to meet any emer- 
gency which might arise on the right ot General Crook, and to 
protect the latter from being flanked from this direction, until 
the infantry of the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps could be 
brought up into a proper position. Sheridan himself had remained 
at his headquarters during the night, near Appomattox Depot, 
where, early in the morning, he was able to consult with General 
Ord as to the prospective labors of the day. The task assigned to 
General Crook soon proved to be of no little importance and difii- 
culty. Smith's (Third) Brigade, with a section of Lord's Battery 
(First U. S. Artillery), supported by J. Irwin Gregg's Brigade 
(Second), under Colonel Young, and McKenzie's brigade of 
cavalry from the Army of the James, were posted on a rising 
slope across the road; and, while attempting to repel the ad- 
vanced of the enemy in their front, also essayed, by patrols and 
detachments, to glean all possible information regarding their 
movements in other quarters. Davies' Brigade was sent to the 
north and west, militarily described as the left and rear, to give 
speedy warning and to cut off" and prevent, if possible, any move- 
ment indicating an attempt of the Rebels to march around the 
flank of those now confronting them. All of these commands 
soon became more or less engaged ; some of them quite seriously. 
With the clear sunrise, advancing toward Smith across the open 
fields, came the glittering lines of battle, with colors plainly 
flying. Not far behind them lay the little village of Appomattox 
Court House, surrounded by a most beautiful and undulating 
farming country. Just out of sight, beyond, were supposed to rest 
the remainder of the Rebel army ; while even within the view a 
few wagons and a bivouac fire here and there appeared as a dis- 
tant feature of the picture. 

The Rebel lines of infantry seemed not to advance with that 
mobihty and elasticity which usually characterized their move- 
ments, and the number of colors in the lines was remarkable. 
This latter fact was afterwards explained by the general demorali- 
zation of Lee's army, which was already so great that the men 
were gathered together irrespective of the particular command to 
which they may have belonged and as if by military instinct grouped 
themselves under the nearest colors convenient. Officers had for- 
borne to insist that every man should be present with his own regi- 
ment. Many commands had no representatives and men were 
collected and marshalled under any flag, in a manner most uncere- 



36 

monious and expeditious. The troops in front of Sheridan consisted 
chiefly of Gordon's and Longstreet's Corps and Fitz Hugh Lee's 
cavalry. [This is an error. Longstreet's Corps was opposed to 
Humphreys' combined Second-Third Corps, in the opposite direc- 
tion, towards the east ; the cavalry \Yere to the west of the Rebel 
lines and position.] The direct attack on Crook's front was not 
at first successful. Some sturdy men from Maine were there and 
Smith's Brigade were net accustomed to retire without the most seri- 
ous persuasion. The enemy then attempted to outflank Sheridan by 
sending cavalry completely around the left of his lines, with a 
view of striking the pike again nearer Lynchburg and then, by 
vigorously attacking his rear, break through his troops, effect a 
junction with Lee's main body and thus open the road for further 
retreat. In making this effort Davies' Brigade was enconutered, 
and this portion of the field being more wooded than others af- 
forded the latter the advantage of concealing his real strength, 
which was quite small, and allowed him to display a force at 
whatever point circumstances might require. Davies established 
a long, circular-shaped line, extending from the left of Smith 
around again to the pike, which he was obliged to defend against 
any movement from the direction of Lynchburg, While his at- 
tention was thus occupied, however, the fighting grew louder and 
heavier at the front. Warned by their first unsuccessful attempt, 
the enemy were now making a second stronger attack, directly in 
Crook's front. It was the last time that the infantry of the Rebel 
Army of Northern Virginia ever advanced upon the defenders of 
the Union. The latter occupied a well-chosen position over- 
looking the whole country, over which their assailants were obliged 
to manoeuvre ; and, behind hastily constructed rail barricades the 
Union dismounted carbineers, with four light pieces of artillery, 
held out manfully against many times their number. |^^ But the 
Rebel lines extended much beyond ours, both to the right and 
left.,^^^ Merritt's corps had not yet gone into position on the right 
and there was imminent danger of Crook's flanks being turned. 
The Rebel officers could be seen encouraging their men and 
leading them on in a manner most confident and valorous. The 
country to the right of Crook, as far as the railroad, was mostly 
thickly wooded and had aftbrded a convenient and appropriate 
location for a considerable number of his extra horses. Not 
meeting with much resistance in this quarter among these, the 
Rebels soon made their appearance. Our men [horse-holders] 
ran off the animals so speedily that few, hoAvever, were lost. 
About the same time also the right of the Rebel line of infantry 
overlapped our own left and compelled us to retire, while the di- 
rect advance pressed up closely to the overworked guns. The 



87 

ammunition, too, was giving out. The brigades heretofore held 
in reserve, under Colonel Young and General McKenzie, had 
been ordered into action, respectively, one to the left and the other 
to the right, and they temporarily checked the enemy's advance. 
The gallant little band in front, however, were becoming unable 
longer to protect their guns and, finally, sought to withdraw them. 
Many of the artillery horses had been killed. Amid smoke and 
fire and the whistle of bullets the pieces were dragged away, but 
one of them, becoming stalled, was abandoned. It was now an 
unsuccessful battle ; the Rebels had partially dislodged our cavalry 
and HI ere pressing with a force strong enough to complete its retire- 
ment. Nothing appeared to prevent their entire occupation of 
the coveted highway ; and while our men were rallying, a column 
of Rebel cavalry approached to charge the road. Officers were 
galloping to and fro, men were wandering about to find their 
companies, no lines were definitely established, and there was 
a lull of that "dread clamor" of glorious war; yet all was 
hopeful expectation. It was known that the infantry were 
not far distant and it must not be long before they would arrive 
on the ground. It was not more than eight o'clock and the mist 
of the morning had hardly cleared away. The air was thick with 
the smoke and dust of battle. The fresh sunbeams breaking 
through, lifted into view the Rebel horsemen. Slowly and confi- 
dently they rode in solid columns towards us. Their peculiar 
cheers [yells] broke the stillness of the temporary lull and their 
sabres waved with a joyful flourish. There seemed to be a re- 
newal of their ancient spirits. They had passed the spot where 
our guns this morning had first opened and where the Union 
lines had given way. The way seemed clear before them and the 
road to Lynchhirg once more secured. 

But joy was turned to grief. The sounds of battle had not 
fallen unconcernedly on the troops in bivouac. General Ord's 
infantry had already started from Appomattox Depot, and with 
scarce an hour for rest, after a night-long march, were hurrying to 
the scene of action. Foster's Division was in advance and had 
already reached the Lynchburg pike. Seeing the condition of 
affairs a regiment was at once formed across and a second one 
was going into line at its side. The column of Rebel cavalry at 
the same moment, by a little rise in the road, suddenly discovered 
the new enemy across their path. How their hearts must have 
shrunk with bitter disappointment ! Not a shot was fired. The 
officers, plainly visible, riding quietly at the head, quickly halted. 
General Foster and staff were in front of their troops, in person di- 
recting the dispositions. There was a moment of silent suspense, 
while the infantry hurried at double-quick into position. A Rebel 



38 

officer wheeled and gave a brief word of command. Sabres fell, 
cheers ceased; one, two, three, a dozen shots were now quickly 
exchanged. A volley followed and before the smoke could clear 
away the Rebel cavalry was gone and the lines of General Fos- 
ter were sweeping forward in close pursuit. Some colored troops 
appeared on the field, quickly assumed their positions, and, as 
frequently happens with troops when brought for the first time 
into action, opened a noisy volley, which was not without its effect 
in accelerating the enemy's movements. (This can not be con- 
strued into a reflection on the efficiency of the negro troops ; it is 
an occurrence by no means unusual, even among veteran regi- 
ments.) The Rebel infantry was soon met and the firing con- 
tinued with renewed vigor. Foster's and a part of Birney's (Col- 
ored) Divisions were about to become seriously engaged. All 
was activity and preparation. Fresh artillery was going into po- 
sition. The lines of infantry were readjusted. The morning had 
become bright and clear and on the open fields now before the 
Unionists was spread out an enemy whose complete destruction 
was most imminent. Seeing their danger the Rebel cavalry again 
attempted to move around the command of General Davies and 
to strike the Lynchburg road beyond him. By making a wide 
detour, they were finally enabled to accomphsh this result, though 
not without some loss in wounded and prisoners, caused by the 
constant charges of Davies on their flanks. Once in possession of 
a portion of the Lynchburg pike they proceeded by a dashing 
charge to break through Davies and overtake the rear of the 
forces advancing toward Appomattox Court House. But this 
attempt was unsuccessful. The cavalry under McKenzie and 
Colonel Young, which by this time had reformed without serious 
loss and which had captured from the enemy during the short 
fight several stands of colors, was ordered to reijiforce Davies, 
and the latter was instructed to whip anything he could find 
worth fighting and then hasten to join in a grand charge on the 
enemy at Appomattox Court House. Meanwhile Sheridan had 
formed Davies and Custer on the slopes of the hills surrounding 
the little village, for an impetuous charge on the main body of 
Lee's army, which now appeared plainly visible on the hills and 
in the valley beyond. 

Meanwhile the Fifth Corps, which had bivouacked for the 
night close to General Ord's command, moved forward at dawn 
and marching directly across the country from the railroad, about 
six o'clock had reached the vicinity of Appomattox Court 
House. Learning through Sheridan that a portion of the cavalry 
was heavily engaged and hard pressed, Ayres' division was 
pushed forward at a double-quick, two Pennsylvania regiments (the 



39 

igoth and 191st Pennsylvania Volunteers), armed with Spencer 
rifles, deployed as skirmishers and the main part of the division 
formed at once in two lines of battle. General Bardett's (First) 
Division, formed Hkewise on the right of Ayres, was covered with 
a heavy skirmish line (155th and 198th Pennsylvania and 185th 
New York Volunteers). Thus disposed, the corps moved forward 
and attacked the enemy. 

At the same time Sheridan had formed the two divisions of 
Merritt's cavalry corps, under Devins and Custer, to the right of 
the infantry (Fifth Corps), on the slopes of the hills to the west- 
ward of the little village of Appomattox Court House, for a grand 
simultaneous charge on the main body of Lee's army, spread 
out before them on the fields in the valley beyond. 

It was a thrilling spectacle, on this beautiful spring morning, 
to witness the advancing lines of the Union grand army. AU its 
movements were now in fair and open view and could be taken 
in at a glance. The troops here may be said to have constituted 
one wing of Grant's, army; while the combined Second-Third 
and the Sixth Corps, following directly in the rear of Lee 
and more immediately under the command of General Meade 
[so to speak; Humphreys was in actual command] may 
properly be named as the other. (The Ninth Corps did 
not advance beyond Farm villa during the campaign.) Sheri- 
dan was the leading spirit of the [west] wing now more 
immediately referred to, and amid the various colors which 
moved rapidly among the troops, followed by a group of horse- 
men, his headquarter pennant was especially distinguishable. 

Custer's gay color was likewise conspicuous, and, while the at- 
tack by the infantry was progressing, his division was sweeping 
along the hills and forming nearer the village for a charge in col- 
umn of squadrons. // 7tias 07te grand Jubilee ofivai'/are ! The sight 
to every soldier was inspiriting. Advancing lines of battle " to the 
right of him and to the left of him ; " the steel glistening in the morn- 
ing sunlight; hundreds of colors proudly waving along the lines; 
the eager generals, with their staffs and escorts, here and there dot- 
ting the fields ; the artillery rumbling ponderously by battery front, 
now hurriedly unlimbering its guns and now skilfully limbering-up 
again; aides and orderlies dashing gaily over the plain ; while at 
right angles to the grand advance, and almost within sight of every 
man, the squadrons of cavalry swept along the slopes in a style 
peculiarly attractive. It was about nine o'clock. The enemy, no 
longer able to maintain the semblance of organized resistance, 
retreating, kept a good distance beyond our advance. But retir- 
ing directly over the country whence they came, they must soon 
encounter the rest of the Army of the Potomac under General 



40 

Meade. Who now could doubt that capture or annihilation was 
before them. The panoramic view and the moral spectacle of this 
morning was unparalleled. Long and patiently had many a 
weary soldier waited for this day. Proud and haughty had many 
a noble-spirited youth felt it postponed by " strategic " retreat. 
Brave and vaHant had many gallant soldiers found their graves in 
fighting, that we might see it. Hopeful and sincere had noble 
women prayed that it might come. Silent and obedient the vete- 
rans longed for it. Industrious, energetic, intelligent and faith- 
ful, the army had worked for it. Powerful and unyielding the 
whole nation demanded it. Quiet and persistent the Lieutenant- 
General determined it. A short time longer and this pomp and 
circumstance of battle would be turned to combat and slaughter. 
Weary, hungry, defeated, pursued, harassed, surrounded, the 
Rebel " Army of Northern Virginia " was helpless. When, 
therefore, its further defiance was complete destruction, Captain 
Simms, of General Longstreet's staft", hailed General Custer, bear- 
ing a large white towel, asking, in the names of Generals Lee and 
Longstreet, a suspension of hostilities. 

Colonel Whittaker, of General Custer's staff, was, thereupon, 
sent with Captain Simms to General Longstreet, to reply that 
General Custer was not in chief command, and he could not, 
therefore, avert his impending charge without the announcement 
of unconditional surrender. General Longstreet hoped he would 
do so, and replied that Grant and Lee were in " conference," 
which was not the fact. General Grant did not reach the field 
until afternoon; for, under his own hand, we are informed that at 
1 1.50, A. M., on that day, he was " about four miles west ofWalker's 
Church," which was nearly ten miles distant. 

General Custer, however, stayed his column, aud quickly sent 
to General Sheridan information of the state of affairs. The pre- 
caution was taken, also, to form the troops in a defensive attitude 
with carbines at a " ready," to be prepared for any emergency. 
Colonel Whittaker also carried the same flag of truce to our in- 
fantry. Their advance was halted, and neutral ground was 
marked out between the opposing forces, it being generally con- 
sidered that the surrender was virtual. 

When Sheridan received Custer's message, he rode at once to 
Appomattox Court House. On approaching this place, he was 
fired into by some parties of the enemy, who, doubtless, miscon- 
ceived his staff and escort to be an advance detachment of the 
cavalry whose charge had so recently been averted. It is 
miraculous that among so large a group this fire was harmless, 
while it is equally curious that men accustomed to distinguish one 
part of an army from another should have mistaken a general 



41 

officer, accompanied by his staff, color bearer and a few orderlies, 
riding in advance of well-defined bodies of troops, for a charging 
squadron of cavalry. Sheridan was about to order his lines in- 
stantly forward again; but the mistake (?) was soon rectified. 
Soon afterwards he met Generals Gordon, Wilcox, Longstreet 
and others of the Rebel service, and, at their request, a suspension 
of hostiUties was agreed upon, pending negotiations for a sur- 
render then said to be progressing between Generals Grant and 
Lee. It seems the latter had expected to meet General Grant 
personally, at ten o'clock this morning, " on the Old Stage Road 
to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies." In 
the same note in which this was stated, and which was written 
late on the day before (8th), General Lee had also said that, "to 
be frank, he did not think t/ie e7)iergency had arisen to call for a 
stirreiidery This would indicate that he thought there was yet a 
possibility for the escape of his army, |^^ which opinion he cer- 
tainly could have not entertained, had he been acquainted with the 
massed and speedy movements of Union troops marching to in- 
tercept and to occupy the only route, at that time, open for the 
further march of the Rebel army.,^^^;j Lee, therefore, desired to 
meet General Grant only to learn whether he had any " proposals 
that would tend to the restoration of peace ! " General Grant 
had previously informed General Lee of the single condition 
upon which a surrender would be accepted, and, hence, in a note 
written early on the morning of the 9th, he declined to meet 
General Lee. So, when the latter rode out towards the rear of 
his own army, the next morning, to see General Grant at ten 
o'clock, as he had appointed, he, there, received this note of 
Grant, last referred to. 

It is worthy of remark, here, that no proposition had yet been 
made by Lee for the surrender of his army, and that, about the very 
hour now spoken of, his subordinates, generals in front ofSheridan, 
having been for several hours convinced of the impracticability of 
escape, in their own namj; requested the suspension of hostilities. 
While Lee was going to the rear for the purpose of conferring with 
General Grant on "terms of peace," his troops were making one 
more final effort to escape. The news of this unsuccessful attempt 
was fresh in the mind of Lee, when he learned, on the picket line, 
that the Lieutenant-General had declined to meet him. It was 
THEN, and not before, that Lee again requested an interview, with 
direct reference to the surrender of his army. Therefore, be it 
said that, next to Lieutenant-General Grant [Gen. A. A. Hum- 
phreys], to General Sheridan, more than to any other one man, is 
the country indebted for the speedy and complete success of the 
great " Eleven Days' Campaign." 



42 

The temporary truce being agreed upon, as soon as assurance 
was given that a surrender was intended, and of which there could 
be no doubt, General Forsyth, of Sheridan's staff, was sent by the 
shortest route, directly through the enemy's camps, to inform 
General Meade of the truce agreed upon in this part of the field. 
The infantry and cavalry, under Generals Ord and Sheridan, 
rested just where they had halted in their lines on the sloping 
fields. Before them lay the little village, and about it a confused 
mass of troops and wagons ; our soldiers strained their eyes to 
observe every feature of the scene. 

They sought to observe it more accurately, and, while there 
Avas naturally among them some vacant curiosity, there were more 
speculative whispers, or else a proud triumphant silence. The 
various commanding generals, being notified, repaired without 
delay to the Court House, which remained between the lines of 
the two armies. Here were soon assembled : General Ord (the 
ranking officer of this, the left, wing of the army), commander of 
the Army of the James; General Gibbon, commanding the 
Twenty-fourth Corps, only two divisions of which were in this 
campaign; Generals Foster, Turner and Birney, division command- 
ers ; General Griffin, commanding Fifth Army Corps ; Generals 
[Crawford] Ayers, Bartlett, and other principal general oflicers from 
the Fifth Corps ; General Sheridan, commander of all the cavalry 
and of such infantry corps as, from time to time, might be assigned 
to him ; Generals Merritt, Crook and the other principal cavalry 
generals whose names have been, heretofore, so frequently men- 
tioned — being, in fact, all the chief officers of the wing of the 
army now under Ord and Sheridan; together with Generals Long- 
street, Gordon, " Runy" Lee, Wilcox, and a number of other lead- 
ing generals of the enemy. These gentlemen exchanged such 
simple courtesies as might be expected between officers of rank 
who had fought in opposing armies through many campaigns, and 
whose troops had, as a consequence, come to regard each other 
with no httle respect. Indeed, soldiers as well as officers strike a 
bond of sympathy, as between brothers in a foreign land, when 
unexpectedly acquaintances are formed between those who stood 
face to face in the same battle. It is true, too, that the veterans 
of either army habituahy entertain a higher regard for the soldiers 
of the other than they do for those bombastic patriots whose love 
for the cause, be it good or bad, has been expended in urging 
others to the field of action. If we were to search the whole 
country for the elements of the Northern and the Southern popu- 
lation best calculated to harmonize in the great work of "recon- 
struction," " rehabihtation," "regeneration," "restoration," or by 
Avhatever title is indicated a general fixing up of our national af- 



43 

fairs, we should be mobt successful in bringing together the old 
soldiers who fought under Lee, and the sturdy veterans of the 
old Army of the Potomac. 

About twelve o'clock, when the head of his column was not 
more than three miles from Appomattox Court fiouse, General 
Meade received a note from General Lee, requesting, -for the pre- 
sent a suspension of hostilities, and, about the same time. General 
Sheridan's staff officer arrived with information of the state of 
affairs on the other side of the enemy's camp. General Meade 
consented to a truce of two hours, and communicated this arrange- 
ment to General Grant. The combined Second-Third Corps had 
the advance of this wing of the army, but had not been able to 
begin the day's march before eight o'clock, on account of un- 
avoidable delay in receiving and distributing the supplies just ar- 
rived. A march of about three hours was made before the final 
halt, although many temporary interruptions were occasioned by 
the passage across the advancing line of the communications 
already spoken of 

There is one other feature of the military operations of the 
day, already casually referred to, which deserves mention again, 
as in all probability representing the very last contest between 
any portions of these two great armies. It will be remembered 
that, early in the day, shortly after the infantry arrived on the field, 
Davies, who had been defending the left and rear of Sheridan's 
or Ord's wing of the army, was ordered to engage all the Rebel 
cavalry he could find and to whip them, and then to repair to 
Appomattox Court House for further service. Apparently a good 
force of the anemy's cavalry had succeeded in marching toward 
Lynchburg around the flank of Sheridan's position, and these troops 
it was designed to defeat cotemporaneously Avith the first flag of 
truce to Custer; they were stationed across the Lynchburg pike 
and Davies was disposing his troops to charge them. 

The country was quite broken and troublesome fences inter- 
vened. Before we were prepared to advance the Rebel cavalry 
made an impetuous attempt to break through our hnes ; but they 
were beaten back by Davies' brigade. A second charge met with 
the same success, while by this time General McKenzie and Colo- 
nel Young had arrived, each with a brigade from a different part 
of the field, and were ready for the fresh and exciting task just 
assigned them. 

The soldiers had learned of the grand advance, and success 
cotemporaneously progressing in that part of the field nearer 
Appomattox Court House, and evinced a laudable desire of emu- 
lation. Skirmishing was brisk; many of the fences had been 
leveled. " To horse ! " sounded ; battalions and squadrons dis- 



44 

posed for a charge, according to the nature of the ground, and 
all was ready for a fight. // was to be successful j everybody said so 
and FELT so ; and then there was to be a grand pursuit which might 
take the pursuers half-way or even as far as Lynchburg itself. It 
was to be more, too, than a simple success. It was to destroy the 
Rebel cavalry force in front, known to be a portion of Fitzhugh 
Lee's Division. This was the work in hand. 

It was just at this critical moment, when a short time longer 
would have made it impossible, quickly, to stop the fight, that an 
aide arrived from the Court House other [East] front, bringing the 
startling but welcome intelhgence that hostilities were suspended; 
that Grant and Lee were holding negotiations for a surrender ! 

I said welcome intelligence. But there were some among 
these troops who were anxious to witness a real enthusiastic suc- 
cess. It had been the good fortune of most of them to have had 
experience of many battles, but to have participated in few or none 
where the opposing forces were comparatively annihilated. Now 
total destruction only was being anticipated. 

But orders for the truce arrived and the charge was averted. 
Not, however, until some time after the general cessation of hos- 
tilities along the main lines of the army. So that there could be 
no doubt that the last hostile shots between the " Army of North- 
ern Virginia " and the Army of the Potomac were exchanged by 
the cavalry of whom we now speak. 

As to what particular regiment fired the last bullet, that is most 
difficult to say. 



CHAPTER III. 

(original chapter XIII.) 

The next morning Sheridan's Cavalry was early on the move, 
and marched through the bivouacs of the army eji route again to 
Petersburg. |^^ There was not a little disappoint meiit in many 
quarters that no opportunity was given the victorious soldiers to ob- 
serve more closely the men and officers of Lee's army. Thousands 
expressed their dissatisfaction at the U7iprecede7ited liberality granted 
to the Army of Northern Virginia, and at the manner in which it 
was allowed to disperse. Our soldiers did not cherish any spirit of 
revefige, 7ior any desire to see brave men humiliated, but there was a 
most natural anxiety on their part to catch an interior vieiv of the 
remnants of the Rebel forces^ or to witness a formal surrender of the 
veteran host which they had so long confronted on the field of deadly 
strife. 



45 

The two armies lay hidden from each other, and while some 
of our men straggled within the enemy's lines for a coveted 
glimpse of the combined strength of Lee's army, the weary and 
destitute soldiers of the latter visited our camps and gratefully 
shared our soldiers' rations. They woods were filled with those 
who, not yet paroled, were availing themselves of the permission 
"to go where they pleased." 

1^^ There was, too, not a little chagrin in some qtmrters that 
Pickett a?id other officers of distinction who tvere deserting from 
the United States service at the outbreak of the war, should be allowed 
the same generous terms accorded to the others. ^^^^ But there was, 
notwithstanding, a quiet acquiescence in the final settlement which 
said, in the plainest terms: "Well, I guess, Grant is right after 
all ! " [He was not.] The disposition to murmur soon died 
away and was speedily swallowed up in the joy of victory. [Am- 
erican patience I] 

The infantry corps remained near Appomattox Court House 
a day or two for rest, but the cavalry, being in need of forage, 
marched from the memorable field without an hour's delay. The 
news of the surrender was received by the whole army with quiet 
enthusiasm — if such a term be proper. An unfeigned pleasure 
possessed every heart, but the victory [to the Army of the PotomacJ 
was without one -tenth part of that exaltation and sensation 
with which it inspired the North. There was among the soldiers 
an unexplainable feeling of wonder at what would come next. [Just 
my sensation at the time, inserted the copyist, a conscript who 
served in the Shenandoah Valley and elsewhere]. There was 
scarce a single instance of that wild fervor which assembled the 
thrift and intelligence ot Wall Street around the steps of the 
Custom House and gave the key to that grand chorus of voices 
which, at midday, and at the busy exchange, swelled in unison 
thousands of voices in praising " God from whom all blessings 
flow." Not that any soldier failed to appreciate the great success, 
but the habitual quiet acceptance of facts as they are, surrounded 
every proud member of the victorious army with an halo of dig- 
nified reserve. As to the number of men actually surrendered, 
accounts have much differed. It has been, however, authorita- 
tively stated recently, " from the rolls in possession of the govern- 
ment. General Lee's army, when it surrendered, contained 28,000 
men [this is a very low estimate] and General Johnston's 37,000." 
[Associated Press dispatch from Washington.] The number 
actually paroled at Appomattox by General Sharpe, of General 
Grant's staff, was a trifle over 26,000. 

A low estimate of the strength of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia when the campaign opened [pursuit commenced], places it 



46 

"between 40,000 and 50,000 " — perhaps nearer the latter; that it 
lost over 10,000 men in killed and wounded ; over 20,000 in pri- 
soners and deserters, including those taken in battle and those 
picked up in the pursuit. The actual number of muskets surren- 
dered, however, was not over 8,000 or 10,000, although more 
than twice that number of men were present. This, however, in- 
cluded teamsters, hospital and quartermaster's employees and 
other non-combatants, ivhile many of the soldiers had no arms. 
At any rate the available fighting force at the time of the surren- 
der could not have exceeded 12,000 or 15,000 men. [Great error.] 
The total amount of artillery captured during the battles and 
pursuit amounted to about 170 guns. As to the number of wa- 
gons taken and destroyed, the only possible method of arriving 
at any accurate calculation is to ascertain from General Lee, or 
his responsible officer, the number which started with his army 
from Richmond and Petersburg, and, deducting therefrom the 200 
or 250 wagons surrendered, we have the immense number previ- 
ously destroyed or captured by our troops. The Rebel trains 
during this movement were large and cumbersome, and the ani- 
mals were in bad condition and overworked. Had Lee chosen to 
have abandoned all his trains, his chances of escape, in several 
instances, tvoiild have been excelle7it. [Editor always said this, in 
conversation, communication and print.] 

In the agreement for surrender the officers gave their own 
parole for the men within their command. The following form 
of the personal ]:)arole of officers is taken from that given by 
General Lee and a portion of his staff: 

" We, the undersigned, prisoners of war belonging to the Army 
of Northern Virginia, having been this day surrendered by Gene- 
ral R. E. Lee, commanding said army, to Lieutenant-General 
Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, do hereby 
■ give our solemn parole of honor that we will not hereafter serve 
in the armies of the Confederate States, or in any military capacity 
whatever, against the United States of America, or render aid to 
the enemies of the latter, until properly exchanged in such man- 
ner as shall be mutually approved by the respective authorities. 

R. E. Lee, General. 

W. H. Taylor, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G. 

Chas. S. Venable, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G. 

Chas. Marshall, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G. 

H. E. Praton, Lieut.-Col. and Lis. -Gen. 

Giles Booke, Major and A. A. Surgeon-Gen. 

H. S. Young, A. A. G. 
" Done at Appomattox Court House, Va., this ninth (9th) day 
of April, 1865. " 



47 

The above parole is the same given by all officers, and is 
countersigned as follows : 

"The above-named officers will not be disturbed by United 
States authorities as long as they observe their parole, and the 
laws in force where they may reside. 

George H. Sharpe, Gen. Asst. Provost-Marshal." 

The obligation of officers for the subdivisions under their com- 
mand is in form as follows : 

" I, the undersigned, commanding officer of , do, for 

the within-named prisoners of war, belonging to the Army of 
Northern Virginia, who have been this day surrendered by Gene- 
ral Robert E. Lee, Confederate States Army, commanding said 
army, to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies of the 
United States, hereby give my solemn parole of honor that the 
within-named shall not hereafter serve in the armies of the Con- 
federate States, or in military, or any capacity whatever, against 
the United States of America, or render aid to the enemies of the 
latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as shall be mu- 
tually approved by the respective authorities. 

" Done at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, this 9th day of 
April, 1865." 

" The within-named will not be disturbed by the United States 
authorities so long as they observe their parole and tlie laws in 
force where they may reside." 

On the tenth of April Lee published his farewell to his army. 

General Lee's Farewell to his Army. 

Headquarters Army Northern Virginia. 
April 10, 1865. 

General Order No. 9. — After four years of arduous ser- 
vice, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of 
Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming 
numbers and resources. I need not tell the survivors of so many 
hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that 
I have consented to this result from no distrust of them, but 
holding that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that 
could compensate for the loss that would attend the continuation 
of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of 
those whose past vigor has endeared them to their countrymen. 

By the terms of agreement officers and men can return to 



48 

their homes and remain there until exchanged. You will take 
with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consequences of 
duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a merciful 
God will extend you his blessing and protection. With an in- 
creasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your 
country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous 
consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell. 

(Signed,) R. E. Lee, General. 



To Brevet Major-General Merritt was assigned the duty of pa- 
roling the Rebel cavalry, and, after completing this work, rejoined 
his command at Nottoway [Court House] on the 15th April, 
1865. On the road thither he met Gen. W. H. F. Lee and staff, 
coming in to surrender, their men having almost entirely deserted 
them. 

A correspondent of the daily press shrewdly remarked, con- 
cerning the general surrender : " The Rebel army laid down 
their arms by brigades, but an officer remarked that a targe number 
of men appeared ivithout arms of any kind. * * * * 

It was noticed aiso that all the good horses in Lee's army ivere pri- 
vate property. General Gordon's private baggage is said to have 
filled four or five army wagons which were furnished to take it 
away. (Which fact, the author [H. E. T.] thinks, is quite doubtful.) 

In a volume entitled " The Fourth Year of the War," written 
in the interest of the South by Pollard, and whose author is not 
famous for reliability, Lee's surrender is thus spoken of: 

" There can be no doubt in history that Gen. Lee, in taking 
his army away from Richmond and Petersburg, had decided, in his 
own mind, upon the hopelessness of the war, and had predetermined 
its surrender. The most striking proof of this is, that on his re- 
treat there was no order published against straggling — a thing 
unprecedented in all deliberate and strategic retreats — and no- 
thing whatever done to maintain discipline. The men were not 
animated by the style of general orders usual on such occasions. 
They straggled and deserted almost at will. An idea ran through 
the Virginia troops that, with the abandonment of Richmond, 
the war was hopeless, and that they would be justified in refusing 
to fight outside the limits of their State. Nothing was done to 
check the notorious circulation of this notion in the army. The 
Virginia troops scattered off to their homes at almost every mile 
of the route. We have seen that Pickett was left with only a 
handful of men. [Note. — Sheridan can also tell why " Pickett 
was left with only a handful of men." H. E. T.] Some of the 
brigade commanders had not hesitated to advise their men that 



49 

the war was virtually over, and that they had better go home and 
' make crops.' 

" But there are other proofs, besides the omission of the mea- 
sures against straggling usual on retreats, that General Lee had 
prevised a surrender of his army. He carried off from Peters- 
burg and Richmond all the transportation of his army, sufficient, 
perhaps, for one hundred thousand men — certainly largely in ex- 
cess of the actual needs of the retreat. The excessive number 
of Virginia troops who were permitted to drop out of the ranks 
and return to their homes shows very well that there was no firm 
purpose to carry the war out of the limits of that State. Prison- 
ers taken on the retreat invariably reported that the army was 
soon to be halted for a surrender ; and General Custis Lee, when 
captured by the enemy, is alleged to have made the same revela- 
tion of his father's designs." 

The return march of Sheridan's cavalry was continued, with- 
out any special interest, towards Burkesville, and, except at nights, 
no halts were made until the column arrived at Nottoway Court 
House, a little station on the Southside railroad and the county- 
seat, as its name implies. Here the command expected to re- 
cuperate. 

General Grant had hastened to Petersburg and thence to 
Washington, for conference as to the future. While North, he 
took occasion to make a flying visit to his family and thus nar- 
rowly escaped the blow of the assassin prepared for him. Not 
so with the lamented Lincoln. The crowning martyr to a glori- 
ous, but tedious though successful war, he had shared its trials and 
hardships, had Avatched its struggles with paternal care, had 
guided its issues. The vicissitudes of the contest had educed his 
wisdom and the bloody scenes of this national drama were closed 
with the vile and mournful tragedy of his death. 

It had been a warm spring day. The camps were basking in 
the sun. The soldiers lolled carelessly about, or built little fires 
and washed their clothes along the banks of the Nottoway. In 
the absence of the blacksmith they tinkered at a loose horseshoe 
or burnished a cherished carbine, polished an honored sabre, 
wiped Virginia mud from equipments, patched a dilapidated 
bridle, or straggled out of camp in search of chickens, horses and 
other good things, or amused themselves with divers employ- 
ments congenial to the modern disciples of Mars. More than an 
ordinary halt in the march, it was one of those well-defined pe- 
riods in a campaign whence each one dates a fresh experience, a 
" landmark" of time about which to group facts of history. // 
7e/as really the first calm after the storm, the first resting spell which 
the cavalry had enjoyed since leaving Petersburg to begin the 



50 

grand advance of this spring campaign, and a convenient oppor- 
tunity to review the eventful doings of the past ten days. Sol- 
diers only can appreciate these periods. 

Martial music appropriately toned the evening scenes and the 
bands had concluded their indifferent attempts. There was no 
moon, the stars were shining brightly. A cheerful rail fire broke the 
night chill and crackled merrily on the neat grass plot of an old 
door yard, fitfully lighting into view the background of white folds 
of open and inviting tents. A group of officers lazily reclined 
in Turkish postures on blankets and overcoats, smoking, recount- 
ing experiences and chatting over the scenes of the past two 
_ weeks as only such groups can talk. The virtues of the slain 
were feelingly narrated, the successes of the living freely dis- 
cussed. There was a sense of relief, freedom from care, an 
appreciation of the absence of all possible alarm, a quiet content- 
ment that nothing was likely to disturb, and a general relish of 
security and peace. Not only was the campaign ended, but the 
conclusion of the war seemed now inevitable. The serenity and 
quiet of the evening was only broken by the soft notes of the 
bugles as the night breeze wafted their musical " tattoo." Com- 
fort and contentment were reigning supreme. 

The spurs and sabre of an officer on duty suddenly rattled by 
the group. 

" What's your hurry ? " says one, making room for another in 
the little circle. 

" Bad news to-night, boys," briefly answers the aide, as he 
hurries by towards the general's quarters. 

" What is it ? What is it ? " is eagerly asked, and the whis- 
pering reply is caught : 

" The President is assassinated ! " 

Who believed it ? Each man sought an explanation in the 
amazed and saddened countenance of his neighbor. Who dared 
repeat the message ? Did you understand him correctly ? There 
must be some mistake. Silent and contemplative faces waited 
around that camp-fire. Presently the aide reappeared. He ex- 
plained, reading a brief dispatch from the War Department (from 
Major Eckhart) to General Meade, who in turn had sent it from 
Burkesville to General Sheridan. It announced that President 
Lincoln had been assass.inated at Ford's Theatre; /le 
was msensible and would not likely recover. Verily was a pall 
cast over the nation, as, on the next morning (April i6th) after 
this tragic deed, men of one accord closed their places of busi- 
ness, and, instead of celebrating the nuptials of a re-united people, 
felt that the country was turned into an house of mourning. But 



51 

the silent anger and grievous sadness in the army ! Who will 
depict it ? Every soldier felt the loss of a personal friend ! 

Revenge and retribution found no little favor among many 
natures; sadness was in all. " ' Ttvas well" said one, '' that this 
did not happen before the surrender of General Lee I " and the sig- 
nificant sentiment met with a deep response. The soldiers 
gathered in groups, discussing the subject in a subdued and reve- 
rential manner. Strong and hardy men, commanders, too, of 
others, bent in tears among their comrades. Who shall tell the 
stories of the next day as the sad news floated through the 
camps? The army wept! 

[" There was one man in the Army of the Potomac who saw 
all this clearly, and spoke out in trumpet tones — Major-General 
Horatio G. Wright. He has not been mentioned in the course of 
the Third Corps biography more than was indispensably necessary, 
because the writer was desirous of avoiding any side issues, but 
by no means because the noble commander of the Sixth Corps 
was not fully appreciated. Were it necessary to cite proofs of 
the nobility of soul possessed by the " Burster into Petersburg," 
one would be almost sufficient to demonstrate the man, viz., his 
dispatch to Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the 
Potomac, of the 15th April, 1865, in connection with the death 
of Lincoln : 

" Headquarters Sixth Army Corps. 
April 15th, 1865. 
Major-General Webb, Chief of Staff: 

With deepest so;tow the dispatch, announcing the assassin- 
ation of the President of the United States and the Secretary 
and Assistant-Secretary of State, is received, and I advise that 
every officer of the Rebel army within control of the Army ot 
the Potomac be at once closely confined, with a view to retalia- 
tion upon their persons for so horrible an outrage. 

H. G. Wright, Major-General."] 

The march of the cavalry towards Petersburg was resumed 
and continued, without further incident, under General Crook, 
General Sheridan having preceded the command for better com- 
munication with General Halleck at Richmond and General 
Grant at Washington. 

A corps having been left at Appomattox Court House, to at- 
tend to the details of matters connected with the paroling and 
disbanding of Lee's army, the Army of the Potomac withdrew to 
Burkesville Junction and the Ninth Corps was distributed along 
the Southside railroad. Sheridan camped his cavalry corps at 
Petersburg. All eyes were now turned towards North Carolina 
and Johnston's army. The fate of the latter was certain, yet, 



52 

without an immediate surrender, an active campaign in North 
CaroHna was inevitable. 

General Grant had sped to Washington immediately after 
Lee's surrender, and the first orders from the government were is- 
sued looking towards a retrenchment of necessary military expen- 
ditures. The victories around Petersburg ; its fall ; the capture 
of Richmond; the successful battles in the hasty pursuit; the 
final surrender of the Rebel Army of Northern Virginia ; the 
assassination of the President; and the simultaneous attacks 
on the lives of the nation's leaders ; had thrilled the country with 
the intensest excitement. The public mind was prepared for any 
news and yet could scarcely comprehend the passing events of 
day to day. 

But the skill and wisdom of the head of the Union armies did 
not stand startled and quiescent at success. Each moment was 
appreciated and every opportunity grasped. Johnston's Rebel 
army had acknowledged itself to be at bay before those marching 
hosts of Sherman, and the wily Rebel leaders sought to take ad- 
vantage, themselves, of the discomfiture of their brethren else- 
where to gain wide and retrieving terms in support of their falling 
fortunes. Sherman's " arrangement," which it is not proposed to 
discuss, was quickly vetoed in Washington and the Lieutenant- 
General himself became the messenger of a new programme. He 
started at once for Sherman's headquarters in North Carolina, 
having first, however, taken such preparatory measures as would 
be rendered necessary in case Johnston should decline the " uncon- 
ditional surrender" which was now to be demanded and enforced. 

As far as Sheridan and the Army of the Potomac were con- 
cerned, these wise precautions comprised orders to the former to 
be prepared to move his whole force, with such a number of rations 
and light supplies as indicated a long campaign without an im- 
mediate base, and to the latter for the detachment of the Sixth 
Army Corps, under General Wright, which was to- be ready to 
march under similar conditions. 

Nothing more favorable being heard from Johnston, these two 
columns were put in motion, both under the command of General 
Sheridan, the Sixth Corps moving from Burkesville on Sunday the 
24th and the cavalry from Petersburg on Monday, 25th April. The 
infantry column marched directly south along the Richmond and 
Danville Railroad, towards Danville, while the cavalry left Peters- 
burg by the now famous Boydton plankroad. It was expected, 
therefore, that after three or four days the two columns would uiiite 
near the southern boundary of Virginia and march thence into 
North Carolina, to operate as circumstances might require. The 
march of the cavalry was without special interest, the country 



53 

traveled over being well worn out with war and possessing natur- 
ally but few attractions. The spring weather was becoming 
warm and the roads dry and dusty. The Boydton plankroad 
bore painful evidences of having once been a " plank " road and 
its dilapidated condition added seriously to the difficulties of the 
march. Troublesome creeks and rivers, where bridges had been 
destroyed, were to be crossed and occasioned no little delay. 
Rebel officers and soldiers of Lee's army now and then were met, 
many of whom were not yet paroled, strolled to the column for 
protection, a parole, or out of idle curiosity. 

At the crossing of Stony Creek, the ford was found to be im- 
practicable, but the abutments and piers of the bridge appeared 
in good order ; all else was destroyed. With tools and a few 
skilled workmen the bridge might, in ordinary times, have been 
repaired in a day or two. Now a few beams floated about in the 
stream as the only material, axes the only implements and soldiers 
the only workmen on hand. The bridge must be rebuilt. A regi- 
ment of troopers dismounted and their officers set to work in 
right earnest. It was in the middle of the day and every hour 
delayed the march. Sheridan, Crook, Davies, and other generals 
who happened to be near the head of the column, watched and 
nursed the work, so that in less than three hours a complete bridge, 
fifteen feet high and thirty to forty feet long, was ready for the 
passage of cavalry, artillery and trains. ||^"[This activity is no- 
table and contrasts with the inactivity at Farmville, 7th April.],^^| 
Meanwhile two Rebel officers rode up and watched the scene. 
After a short time said one to a soldier near him, " No wonder you 
Yankees always get along so fast. Our men would never have 
gone to work to rebuild this bridge in that way." 

"What would you have done ? " 

" We would have waited for the ' construction corps ' and the 
niggers to come up, or else dashed in and forded the river anyhow." 

" Suppose you had artillery ? " 

1^^" Oh, we would have emptied the caissons, carried the 
ammunition across the foot-bridge and pushed ahead. ",^^1 

To have adopted this course would have crossed a few men, 
rendered the ford impracticable, separated the command and thus 
delayed the march. This was the difference between Southern en- 
terprise and Yankee ingenuity. The latter would give the entire 
column a short halt and an unimpeded passage of the river, the 
former would have created accident and delay. The compliment, 
however, to Sheridan's soldiers, was gracefully paid by one of 
the foemen who had fought them, and as kindly received as it was 
intended. 

The general impression of the people along the route of march 



54 

was that Johnston's army had already surrendered. They had 
heard of the first truce which was agreed upon between Sherman 
and his opponent and taken it for granted that the latter's terms 
would be acceded to, or that the armistice must end in a sur- 
render. They believed that the present march of Sheridan 
through the country was entirely uncalled for. They were unable 
to appreciate the policy of subjecting their beautiful country of 
Southern Virginia, hitherto scarcely visited by troops from either 
army, to the devastation and scourge of war. 

The chief feature of this peaceful march of Sheridan was 
the new experience of traveling through the enemy's country 
without the ordinary precautions of war. Four years of life a 
la qui vive, which is, or should be the normal condition of a sol- 
dier, gave to a journey, without it, a joyous and reckless character. 
The weather was pleasant, the beauties of spring just budding 
and the country betokening comparatively few evidences of the 
civil strife now happily drawing to a close. Brigades and divi- 
sions marched without advanced guards or the delays of recon- 
noitering. Officers preceded the columns daily for miles, to select 
appropriate bivouacs, a convenient practice not heretofore within 
the b|punds of prudence. Regular and irregular foraging parties 
scoured the country for miles on each flank of the column, and 
woe to the innocent quadrupeds which fell in their path. [This 
reads like Michelet's paragraph summing up the conquest of the 
kingdom of Naples in 1495, " ^ captain without soldiers was sent 
into Calabria to require the submission of the province," the most 
savage of barbarous districts, the ancient Bruttii, so faithful or sub- 
missive to Hannibal, a country and people which, between the great 
" Carthaginian" and earthquakes, have not recuperated in 2,000 
years. " In every direction the French soldiers, armor laid aside, 
in undress, their feet in slippers, went about with pieces of chalk, 
marking their lodgings." The famous and infamous Borgia said, 
that " the French expedition of (six-toed and six-fingered) Charles 
VIII., (in this respect like the Philistine giant of the Hebrew 
Chronicles, or the six-toed Henry the Pious ; or the two-thumbed 
Princess Hedwig Sophia, of Sweden), — had conquered Italy, not 
with steel, but with chalk; " and, Macaulay observes, "The only 
exploit which they had found necessary, for the purpose of taking 
military occupation of any place, had been to mark [with chalk] 
the doors of the houses where they meant to quarter." To cite 
another example, the " court chaplain, in speaking of this expe- 
dition " (the campaign of Gustavus Adolphus in Kurland, Semi- 
gallia and East Prussia, in 1826), "said, 'The King took cities 
with as much promptitude as he crossed the country on horse- 
back.' " — Stevens, 137.1 



55 

The region along the Dan and Staunton rivers always enjoyed 
a favorable reputation for its stock, and knowing, as the soldiers 
did, that few, if any, troops had ever visited it, every nerve was 
strained to discover and seize its horses. Every negro was inter- 
rogated, every stable searched. The news of our approach 
spread through the country as if by telegraph, and farmers rushed 
their animals to the woods and swamps, endeavoring in every im- 
aginable way to secrete them from the search of the omnipresent 
troopers. The " intelligent contraband," however, appeared in 
his old character, as an unfailing well of information, and, either 
from natural sympathy, or personal fear, in nine cases out of ten 
revealed the concealments of the coveted animals. Many a val- 
uable steed was thus obtained. Indeed it was scarcely possible 
that for ten and often for twenty-five miles off each flank of the 
line of march, a single horse could escape capture, so thorough 
was the search for a prize most highly esteemed among these 
energetic troopers. It seemed hard, often, to take from his com- 
fortable stall the pet of the family, or to lead out a clean-limbed, 
nimble little mare for the heavy packs and saddle of the cavalry- 
man. But was it inappropriate for the stern-eyed, haughty 
and wilful stalhon to be " drafted into the armie." Yet it was 
harsh to leave the plow standing in the furrow, and who could 
fail to be moved by the pitiful appeals of the poor people, begging 
that their animals might be spared, lest the crop should fail and 
children ask for bread in vain. 

" Sheridan's scouts," on this expedition, were more ubiquitous 
than ever. Being in appearance undistinguishable from the ex-Rebel 
soldiers, who were by this time well dispersed through the country, 
and being relieved of the natural caution exercised by campaigners 
in the presence of the enemy, these enterprising individuals extended 
their rides for many miles in every direction, meeting with numer- 
ous opportunities to expedite their journeys by the resident relays 
awaiting them on every farm. Their incursions and excursions, 
however, were not without profit in a strictly military, as well as 
personal, point of view. They learned the character of the coun- 
try, its resources and the various roads, and, thus, each night as- 
sisted the commander to determine the most feasible line of 
march for the day following. If a bridge had disappeared they 
learned all about the fords or the probable length of time it would 
take to rebuild an old or to construct a new one. 

Their most remarkable success, however, about this time, was 
the construction of a complete bridge over the Staunton river, near 
its confluence with the Dan. The stream at this point is wide 
and turbulent (?) and Sheridan's cavalry column was not provided 
with a pontoon train [! ?]. Unless a crossing could be effected in this 



56 

locality, a detour of many miles, causing a delay of several days, 
would be necessary in marching higher up the stream to a more 
established crossing. The Sixth Corps had crossed the Staunton 
river near the Richmond and Danville railroad ; but, if Sheridan 
should now be obliged to cross at the same point, the cavalry 
would be in the awkward position of two or three days' march 
behind the infantry. This, on approaching an enemy, would be 
almost inexcusable in any commander. Under these circum- 
stances it was not a little embarrassing to find that the excellent 
road along which we were now marching led only to an ordinary 
flat-boat ferry, over which to transport five thousand cavalry, with 
its light trains and artillery, would occupy perhaps a week. 

The scouts dispersed up and down the river banks for miles. 
Clarksville, a little village to the south, was visited, and, on one 
pretext or another and by the compulsory employment of any 
negroes whose labor could be made available in one day, a large 
number of flatboats were collected and " poled " to the ferry. 
These boats were about twenty-five feet long and just wide 
enough to admit a wagon. The river could not have been less 
than two hundred feet broad and was quite deep. The current 
was rapid and it seemed inevitable that the column must halt 
and paddle itself across with great delay in small detachments. 
It appeared impossible to bridge it. Yet, one by one the flat- 
boats arrived from up and down the stream, and, as it happened, all 
were of the same size. It was at once determined to fasten them 
together as firmly as the odd ropes and chains collected would 
permit. It was ascertained that there were just enough boats to 
reach across the stream and with remarkable ingenuity they were 
soon swinging into the current, a few of them anchored and, in 
almost as short a time as it takes to lay a pontoon bridge of the 
same length, a secure passage for the column was provided. It 
could scarcely be supposed that this frail structure would have 
supported the burden of a large cavalry force, yet, without 
a moment's delay, the whole command crossed without a single 
accident. The scouts, however, accustomed to move with the 
advance, did not watch the result of their engineering skill with 
the ardor of r^;/;/(?m(f//;'j", and, with the troops fairly across, left the 
bridge to look after itself, so that, when the lumbering commissary 
trains attempted to cross, they found themselves too late. The 
bridge was just broken and the flatboats were floating carelessly 
down the stream. 

The impromptu construction of this bridge and the rapid 
crossing over it of Sheridan's cavalry column is an episode worthy 
of serious attention by the military student. Had it occurred 
during more active operations, in the presence of an enem}-, it 



61 

would have been recorded as one ot the most remarkable instances 
of industry and enterprise in the history of war. [A similar 
conception was that of Colonel Bailey, when he bridged (i8th 
May, 1864) the Atchafalaya, at Simms' Port, over 1,800 feet 
(about a third of a mile) across with steamboats, over which the 
wagon train passed 19th May, p. m.] How will the work of ener- 
getic unprofessionals, so successfully and skilfully completed, 
compare with the efforts of those military savants, which were 
manifested earUer in the war in digging earth before an inferior 
foe and in purposing that a victorious and pursuing army should 
construct a line of defense as a protection from a retreating 
enemy. [See Chapter, infra, on " Fording and Bridging."] 

It may not be generally known that, after the battle of Wil- 
liamsburg [sth May, 1862J, on the Peninsula, in May, 1862, one 
of General McClellan's representatives asked General Heintzel- 
man (commandmg the troops of Hooker and Kearny, by whom 
the battle was won) if he did not think it would be advisable to 
construct a military road across the Peninsula, to aid the com- 
munication between the wings of the army in the neiu line of de- 
fence which was about to be assumed. At this moment the 
fighting was over and the enemy under Magruder [Longstreet] 
were in full retreat. General Heintzelman also received orders 
the next morning not to advance his troops without further 
authority. Kearny's division was at that moment pursuing the 
rear-guard. 

At the Staunton river, Sheridan had learned that Wright, with 
the advance of the Sixth Corps, had entered Danville without 
opposition. The cavalry therefore pushed on up the Dan river for 
the first available crossing, with the intention of marching by the 
shortest route for Greensboro, North Carolina, or if the enemy 
was found to be too troublesome, to unite with the Sixth Corps 
at some convenient point south of the Dan. The bridge over 
the latter, at South Boston Station on the Danville Railroad, pre- 
sented the first opportunity, and on the afternoon of Friday, April 
28th, Sheridan here encamped. Crook's command being crossed 
to the south bank. Early in the afternoon, while the troops 
were being assigned to their various bivouacs, General Sheridan 
received a dispatch from General Halleck at Richmond, inform- 
ing him of the final surrender of Johnston to Sherman upon the 
same terms accorded by General Grant to General Lee at Appo- 
mattox Court House, and ordering General Sheridan with his 
troops to return at once to Petersburg, 

The necessity of obtaining forage and the eager horse hunts 
had scattered small parties through the country in every direction. 
Some even penetrated as far south as Roxbury and Yanceyville 



68 

and several visited Milton, North Carolina. Every flat-boat ferry 
over the Dan was used by one or more of these venturesome for- 
agers, who met with not a few interesting adventures. They 
became thoroughly acquainted with the spirit and temper of the 
inhabitants, as well as with the resources of the country. The 
news of the presence of these foragers in any particular locality 
was quickly noised abroad, and, as Johnston's surrender was 
in these parts believed to have taken place at the time of 
the original truce between Sherman and himself, not a few of the 
people openly disputed the right of roving troopers to inspect 
their stables. This fact only increased their misfortunes and led 
to a more vigilant and determined search. As parties from 
Wheeler's Rebel cavalry were riding about North Carolina, pil- 
laging and helping themselves to stock in some localities, the citi- 
zens had improvised small bodies to protect themselves. It 
therefore happened sometimes that our men narrowly escaped 
serious encounters and in a few instances single collisions ac- 
tually occurred, one of which was fatal. Some of these foragers 
had extended their operations so far from the main body of the 
corps that they did not succeed in rejoining Sheridan until after 
he had reached the camp at Petersburg. 

The return march was without noteworthy incident, unless the 
parade of the cavalry corps through the city be recorded. Dusty 
and triumphant, that series of reviews through Petersburg, Rich- 
mond and Washington, of Sheridan's, Sherman's and Meade's 
grand armies commenced one pleasant afternoon in the streets of 
the city around which for now nearly a year great hosts had 
battled and where the skill, science, industry and magnitude of 
war was without a parallel. The people naturally were worn out 
with battle and manifested little or no interest in the affair, while 
the irrepressible negro watched the passing array with unobtru- 
sive grinning satisfaction. The cavalry corps was encamped on 
the north bank of the Appomattox. 

The Army of the Potomac soon arrived in Richmond and 
these war-worn veterans marched as victors through the city at 
which they had toiled and fought for nearly four bloody years. 
Generals Halleck and Meade reviewed them eii passant. The 
troops continued their course over the old battle-grounds of Vir- 
ginia, across war-worn fields, through destroyed villages, old 
encampments half hidden in the underbrush, and passing unculti- 
vated wastes on which solitary chimneys stood as monuments of 
a complete desolation. Did not the hand of Providence guide 
those hosts on their homeward march along the former fields of 
strife, to impress on each the image of " grim-visaged war " and 
the " wrinkled front" of its declining days, that the veteran might 



59 

the more appreciate his home of happiness and prosperity, peace 
and virtue. 

Sherman's armies, after most Expeditious marches, were soon 
reviewed in Petersburg and followed on to Richmond. Sheridan 
now turned over the command of his cavalry to Major-General 
George Crook and himself repaired to Washington for consulta- 
tion with the Lieutenant-General, 

Before the corps was placed en route for Washington, how- 
ever. General Gregg's brigade of Crook's Division was sent to 
garrison Lynchburg and the surrounding country, and General 
Smith's Brigade was assigned to the same duty at Petersburg. 
Taking up, then, the line of march, the remainder of the corps 
started north, passing General Sherman's armies in camp near 
Manchester. Marching through Richmond without display it 
continued towards Washington by a westerly route via Louisa 
Court House and Warrenton Junction, crossing the Rapidan at 
Raccoon Ford and the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford. This 
detour was rendered judicious in order to leave the more direct 
roads unobstructed fop the march of Sherman's infantry, artillery 
and trains. By this route many scenes of former conflicts were 
visited and reminiscences revived of Sheridan's first raid about 
Richmond. This, it will be remembered, had occurred just a year 
previous, during that memorable campaign of Grant from the 
Rappahannock to the James. |^°" Yellow Tavern " was passed, 
scarcely a mile or two out of Richmond, where fell the famous 
Rebel cavalryman, J. E. B. Stuart, and whence — as his followers 
now acknowledge — nothing coiUd have seriously prevented the 
march of Sheridan'' s troopers through the streets of the Rebel capi- 
tal.^^^ The line of the Virginia Central railroad was observed 
until the column approached another battlefield at Trevellian 
Station. The railroad was lined with evidences of destruction 
and decay; violence and want of repairs, in some instances, had 
rendered it scarcely passable. Temporary shanties or silent ruins 
were often all that remained of the former depots. 

Stevensburg was passed, with its existence known only by a 
name on the map, one or two houses were standing and only an 
experienced antiquarian could have discovered evidences of a 
village. The beautiful country between the Rapidan and the 
north fork of the Rappahannock was rich with the verdure of in- 
nocent spring, but it afforded scarce an object of animate life. 
Not even the "intelligent contraband " greeted the " true blues." 
Of fences there were none. The fresh sunlight of heaven smiled 
anew across the overgrown fields ; the old log huts of the army 
camps were falling to decay, as if conscious of approaching peace; 
the feathered songsters chirped merrily through the pleasant 



60 

woods ; the little stf eaffis rejoiced again in mountain purity ; ^' vain 
man " seemed to have departed and his lands regenerated and re- 
dedicated to freedom. 

The valley of the Rapidan, the beautiful slopes of rolling 
Culpepper charmed the eye; the desolate hearthstones chilled 
the heart ; the ruined homes awakened sympathy. Then a little 
ways beyond the half-covered grave reopened that wound and an 
ill-fated batde ground recalled the present triumph. From the 
Rappahannock to Centreville, every inch of the ground might 
tell a battle story. Who will attempt to conjecture the silent 
emotions of these homeward bound veterans, as they marched 
finally and peacefully across the historic fields of Virginia. 



CHAPTER IV. 

[original chapter XIV.] 

By the middle of May [1865], two hundred thousand vete- 
rans had encamped about the [national] capital. South of the 
Potomac the country was for miles a vast camp. It was but an 
,item of the host that you might view from any one of the forti- 
fied hills ; yet, glance in any direction, toward any point of the 
compass, and in that line ot vision alone an army appeared, 
stronger than that which was supported by [or at the disposal of] 
the Continental Congress [during the Revolutionary War, or our 
First Struggle for Independence]. The garrisons of the numer- 
ous forts straightened themselves up and looked with pride on the 
less punctihous but honored campaigners about them. 

It had been scarcely three years since the first grand army of 
the republic [alluding to the Army of the Potomac in 1862] had 
moved from the same grounds in search of an enemy who fled ere 
its first advance. War-worn and weather-beaten, after perils and 
adventures by land and by sea, after retreats and victories, battles 
and sieges, the vicissitudes of burning summers or shivering win- 
ters, after pleasant marches, or experiences of snow, ice and mud, 
these veterans now returned to end their military career where it 
had voluntarily begun. The dome of the Capitol was visible 
from every camp. The soldiers saw it and remembered that when 
they started it was unfinished. Now it typified their success. 
Freedom was triumphant ! The nation was entire ! When the 
fiat of emancipation was proclaimed the Queen of Freedom was 
enthroned. It was only then that the Statue of Liberty sur- 
mounted and adorned the nation's capitol ! 



61 

Preparations were now commenced for the Grand Review 
with which it was proposed to honor the triumphant armies as 
well as to give the country and the troops an opportunity to ap- 
preciate the military power which was about to be dissolved and 
the strength and energy of which was soon to be absorbed in the 
arts of peace. 

Objections in some quarters had been hinted against any pa- 
geant or attempt at a holiday display so soon after the death of 
him for whom the nation was mourning. But its propriety was 
very generally conceded, and, in view of all the circumstances, 
the close of so severe a struggle, the inauguration of a new Presi- 
dent, the assembling at the capitol of the grandest and one of 
the largest armies the world ever saw, the discharge and dissolu- 
tion of these veterans so soon to occur, and the universal desire 
of the people to give the soldiers who had won their victories 
every official and substantial recognition of the value of their 
services within the power of the United States to bestow, the 
wise consideration prevailed, so that the motives for the proposed 
review could not be misconceived, while its effect, both on the 
troops themselves, on the officials at the head of the government, 
on the people at large and • on the powers and populations of 
foreign nations, all justified its propriety and usefulness. 

Soon after the arrival of the various armies about Washington 
the city began to be rapidly filled up with strangers from all sec- 
tions of the country. When the time of the review was formally 
announced, every train brought hosts of the relatives and friends 
of the troops. By the time the actual display occurred, it was 
estimated that there were more people in Washington than at any 
inauguration within the memory of the oldest inhabitant. Hotels 
reaped a harvest and in the usual Washington style. Men stood 
behind each others' chairs at table and took their turn in attempt- 
ing to make a meal. 

On the 1 8th of May the initiatory order for the review was 
thus announced ;****** 

The troops which were here named to participate in review 
comprised commands which had served in every insurrectionary 
district and were representatives from every loyal state. There were 
in Sherman's army men who had been with Grant at Shiloh ; who 
had campaigned in Missouri and Arkansas ; who had fought at 
the siege and in the battles about Vicksburg ; who had accom- 
panied Sherman in his famous unsuccessful raid from the Missis- 
sippi to Meridian ; who had been transferred from the Mississippi 
to Tennessee ; who had participated in the glorious summer 
campaign culminating at Atlanta; who had made the " March to 
the Sea " and through the Carolinas, in those series of extensive 



62 

operations which ended at Chappel Hill in the surrender of John- 
ston's Rebel army; who had thence walked across the broad and 
beautiful state of Virginia to the fallen capital of the enemy ; who 
had trodden the sacred grounds of the Potomac battlefields and 
who had finished at the nation's capital a military career, perhaps 
begun on the Ohio and including in its varied experience the 
vallies of the principal rivers, from the Missouri to the Potomac. 
Few soldiers, indeed, can boast of fortunes so diverse, yet there 
were such veterans gaily cooking coffee around the bivouac fires, 
the smoke of which girdled in close and small or farther and 
farther and more expansive circles, the White House. 

It was regretted on the part of many, who had some definite 
notion of the nature of a military review, that there was not to 
be a formation of all the troops, so that the grand whole of their 
imposing lines might be enjoyed from some eligible locality by a 
comprehensive view. But the number of troops would have made 
a mass too unwieldy to manoeuvre on any locality adjacent to the 
national capital. The topography of the- country about Washing- 
ton is at best unfavorable, while the presence of the river between 
the proposed scene of the review and the main camps of the 
army presented another very serious difficulty. A marching re- 
view only was practicable, and this informal display would, per- 
haps, be the more appropriate in any case, in view of the 
recent public bereavement. As soon as it was known, however, 
that Pennsylvania Avenue was to become the ground to be 
made classic by the tread of this veteran and triumphant host, 
the whole country was alive for the sight. The fact was quite 
forgotten that was to be simply a " march " of the troops through 
the city and that one regiment and one brigade looked very like 
another, and that each day would witness the same constant, 
never-ending stream of bayonets and blue. 

Workmen had already commenced to prepare stands for the 
accommodation of the reviewing officers and the military and civil 
dignitaries who were expected to be present on the occasion. Im- 
mediately in front of the White House the main stand was erected 
and directly opposite another stand for certain staff" officers and 
others who were fortunate enough to secure places thereon. Not 
far distant were other smaller stands, erected by diff"erent officials 
for the accommodation of disabled soldiers and their friends and 
whoever else could get on them. Near Major-General Augur's 
headquarters, at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and Six- 
teenth street, another stand was constructed by the military; 
while near the Treasury building, at the head of the avenue on 
Fifteenth street, and looking straight down this spacious thorough- 
are to the Capitol, some enterprising individuals had built a stand 



63 

on their own account and for a consideration of one, two or three 
dollars, in greenbacks, be the same more or less, an eligible posi- 
tion was to be obtained, whence, at a glance, a mile of solid, 
moving, glistening bayonets came before the spectator. As he 
looked thence, down towards the Capitol, and saw, for eight 
hours each day, this close column of marching soldiers, their tat- 
tered banners waving joyously, their steel shining in the sun, 
heard the inspiriting music to which they walked in cadence, saw 
the prancing war-steeds who seemed to know the day, and 
watched the bronzed and happy countenances of officers and 
men, or caught the firm lines in the face of a famous commander, 
an unexplainable thrill crept over the beholder; delight amaze- 
ment, chagrin and triumph in turn possessed him. Could it be 
possible that the great war was over and so many soldiers left ? 
Could it be possible that so many soldiers had fought and the war 
not ceased before ? Could it be possible that this was only a 
portion of that grand army which for four long years had waged 
so many bloody conflicts with another army not much smaller in 
size and equal in determination and valor ? Now it was possible 
to begin to appreciate the magnitude of the recent contest and to 
rejoice that peace was at hand. 

But this is diverging. To return to the official history of this 
event. General Grant's order was succeeded by two other 
orders, respectively issued by the officers who had been tem- 
porarily assigned to the command of the troops on each day of 
the review, viz. : General Meade on the first day and General 
Sherman on the second :***** 

The camp of the cavalry corps was about halfway way between 
Alexandria and Washington, while the camps of all the other 
armies stretched along the hills, up and down the Potomac. With 
only two bridges across the river it would be impossible on the 
day of the review to pass troops over fast enough to keep a large 
body moving in close column. It became necessary, therefore, 
that some should cross before, and another camp was selected for 
the cavalry corps in the vicinity of Bladensburg, Maryland, whither 
they were ordered to move on Sunday morning. 

General Sheridan had not yet rejoined the command since 
leaving it at Petersburg, but, being at Willard's Hotel, the cavalry 
corps continued to move under his directions. His subordinate 
generals, however, found it convenient in making this change of 
location to pass directly by the quarters of their favorite com- 
mander, who, it was now generally known, was about to depart for 
new and distant scenes of service. Sunday morning [21st May], 
unfortunately, was stormy, and the column moved in the mud and 
dirt usually accompanying such weather. Early and unheralded. 



64 

however, the clatter of squadrons, as they splashed slowly across 
Pennsylvania Avenue, awakened the citizens and in a short time 
Sheridan and staff appeared on the balcony to receive the infor- 
mal and impromptu compliment of a marching review. 

The soldiers were without the trappings of a holiday parade 
and were encumbered with the usual unmentionable paraphernalia 
belonging to a moving cavalry column. The spirits of the men 
were light and gay, but the weather was dull and heavy and these 
famous troopers were reviewed by that portion of the population 
enthusiastic enough to see the " pomp and panoply " of war as it 
looked in the drenching rain. The column occupied a good part 
of the morning in passing through the city, and wagons followed 
during the whole day. 

The affair created no little stir among the good people of 
Washington and the more demonstrative evinced a practical pa- 
triotism in setting out in front of their houses all the bread and 
biscuits that happened to have been cooked, while others heated 
their ovens and according to their capacity and ability dispensed 
the warm food from their thresholds to troopers who had already 
had a comfortable soldiers' breakfast before breaking camp, but 
who, true to martial instinct, never lost an opportunity to eat or 
drink. It was a happy sight, however, and not without its 
good eifect on the mind and heart of every soldier, to see the 
little ones run to the edge of the sidewalk with a plate of hot 
biscuit in one hand and a glass of water in the other and a pretty 
speech, like " Mister, have a bite, sir," and without dismounting 
one thankfully accepted the hospitality and wondered if this is but 
the beginning of the cheerful reception which awaited the veterans 
throughout the country [sadly forgotten in a short time in favor 
of rum-sellers, pohtical dead-beats and bums]. It was new and 
unexpected and awakened a lively appreciation of the fact that 
the troopers were no longer in an enemy's country. 

One venerable patriarch, more patriotic than thoughtful, and 
unmindful of the martial distinctions between a mounted squad- 
ron and an awkward four-mule team, enthusiastically received 
the troops under the joyous folds of his household's " star- 
spangled banner," and even after the column had passed, gaily 
continued waving his flag at every individual, mule and wagon- 
master in the baggage train. 

The whole affair was simply an unavoidable march of the 
corps through Washington City, but it was telegraphed [with the 
usual accuracy of such reports] all over the land that Sheridan 
had held a grand preliminary review of his cavalry. 

Tuesday, May 23d, dawned bright and pleasant and none 
who saw them can ever forget the scenes of that day at the capi- 



65 

tal. The walks were just drying in the morning sun after a most 
dehghtful shower and the streets of the city presented every ap- 
pearance of a hoHday. There was, however, a notable defi- 
ciency of that private enterprise which, had this grand review 
taken place in any other city, would have exhibited itself in 
numerous banners, arches and every possible civic adornment. 
The preparations for the reception of the troops, however, seemed 
to have been chiefly made by those expressly directed to do so by 
the officials to whom t?ie charge was confided. This was appropri- 
ate, but the fact involves comparison to the streets of New York 
city on the occasion of some simple militia parade. 

By eight o'clock the whole of Sheridan's cavalry were formed 
in column on Capitol Hill, the head resting near the famous 
" Old Capitol." Not far distant was the infantry of the Ninth 
Corps, which, by the order of march, was immediately to follow 
the cavalry. The old Army of the Potomac, proper, which com- 
prised the chief part of the troops reviewed, were now marching 
across Long Bridge and so forming as to be ready to assume 
their appropriate place in the line. All the troops were to move 
in heavy column. 

Soon Major-General Meade, the commander of this day's re- 
view, appeared with his staff and escort. General Sheridan, the 
day previous, had left for his new post in the Southwest and 
General Crook, the next ranking officer, had been allowed a leave 
of absence. Thus Major-General Merritt, whose acquaintance 
the reader has already made, assumed command of the cavalry 
corps for the review. General Custer and himself, heretofore 
only brevet major-generals, had just received promotions to full 
major-generalships. 

Before nine o'clock the bugles sounded, and promptly at that 
hour the commanding general appeared at the head of Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue. 

As the head of the column passed the Capitol every niche 
and window, every conceivable standing place on the porticos 
and around the pillars, were crowded with " fair nymphs and well- 
dressed youths." The children of the public schools had been 
gathered there in holiday attire, and, rich with gay ribbons, fresh 
toilets, appropriate mottoes inscribed on tasty banners, and with 
flowery garlands, they had assembled to do honor to the soldiery. 
What big heart, throbbing under bronze features, did not melt at 
this unexpected homage, to sturdy veterans, from childish purity 
and innocence. There seemed no limit to the fragrant luxury of 
the spring wreaths and bouquets, of all shapes and sizes, rained on 
the head of the column. The horsemen caught some as they 
flew over their heads, others fell on the ground and were trampled 



66 

under the following squadron ; so that soon the very street over 
which they rode was carpeted with flowers. Children's voices 
broke in unison upon the cheerful morning air, as they sang with 
glee the words of happiness and welcome. 

The people elsewhere had scarcely believed that so immense 
a military display could be entirely prompt to the hour appointed 
and the streets were as yet comparatively quiet; few persons had 
assembled. Indeed it would seem that high officials agreed in 
this opinion, for the President, Secretary of War and General Grant 
did not reach the reviewing stand until after General Meade and 
several other officers had passed. General Sherman accidentally 
rode up the avenue about the same time, on his way to the re- 
viewing stand. Ifis triumphal ride occurred twenty-four hours 
later, when he rode up the same street at the head of those 
armies who had campaigned from the Mississippi to the Potomac. 

The cavalry, as well as the other troops, marched in close 
column, and of the former not the least noticeable feature after 
the many days heavy work they had so recently experienced, was 
the excellent appearance and condition of the horses, than which 
nothing, after a march, will more quickly indicate the efficiency 
of cavalry. 

Without intending to give a detailed account of this review, 
the cavalry would never excuse my omission to mention that no- 
torious incident which bereft one of its favorite generals of the 
dignified circumstance of martial array and carried him past the 
reviewing officer, the President of the United States, his Cabinet, 
the military, civil and diplomatic functionaries of this and many 
other countries, not in the stately and sedate manner of a war- 
rior-chief on his prancing charger, but shooting like the wind. 
On an Arabian race-horse, with dishevelled locks, uncovered 
head, aye, lost helmet, dangling scabbard, no trusty blade at his 
shoulder, but hands, arms and bare head working to check the 
frantic steed, the pomp of generalship was completely enveloped 
in the unexpected character of John Gilpin ! Was this a disap- 
pointment or was the sensation agreeable? Who among the 
spectators or performers at this state occasion will forget " how 
Custer's horse ran away with him ? " But there was nobody hurt 
and the review continued. 

The most correct schedule of this Grand Reception which 
has yet been published, is to be found in the Army and Navy 
'yourjial of 27th May, 1865, and these cursory sketches cannot 
better be closed than by acknowleding indebtedness to that num- 
ber — 92 (Vol. II., No. 40), pages 628-29 ^"^^ ^3^ — [where the 
programme is to be found] which constitutes one of the most 
comprehensive and interesting exhibits that has yet been published 



6Y 

regarding a martial occasion, which for the present — thank God 
— practically ended the career of the x\merican armies. [Re- 
member these pages were thrown together in the summer of 
1865.] 

A few daj'S after the review, the cavalry removed its camp 
again from Bladensburg to the Alexandria and Fairfax Court 
House turnpike. As a corps it retained its nominal organization 
for some time afterwards, but its regiments were consolidated or 
mustered out of the service as fast as the orders and the neces- 
sary papers could be prepared. A brigade was placed en route 
to Missouri, where it was supposed it would soon follow Sheridan 
to Texas ; another was sent to Kentucky ; another to West Vir- 
ginia. Several New York and Pennsylvania regiments were, 
after some little difficulty, consoHdated with others from the same 
States, and some were likewise ordered home to be mustered out. 

On the I'ourth of July, 1865, only one small brigade was left 
in camp to rei)resent the corps. Meanwhile General Crook had 
been ordered North to await further orders; Generals Merritt and 
Custer had left for the Southwest, under orders, immediately after 
the review. In the course of the last month or six weeks of its 
life, therefore, necessitated by the various changes, the cavalry 
corps came under the command, successively, of Generals Crook, 
Brevet Major-General Devins, Brigadier-General Wells, Brevet 
Brigadier-Generals Thompson and Avery. 

By the middle of July the last regiment was en ronte for home, 
the last staff officer had been ordered away, and the books, pa- 
pers and headquarters establishment of the cavalry corps were 
engulfed in the depths of the quartermaster's department. No 
formal order of the Secretary of War had disbanded it, but Sheri- 
dan's cavalry was forever dispersed. 



APPENDIX.- 

Regarding the conference (informal) at Appomattox Court 
House between a few of the prominent generals of each army, 
of which mention is made in Chapter II. (original Chapter XII.), 
there are to be inserted the following facts. 

The conference at Appomattox Court House, about eleven 
o'clock on the morning of the 9th, was merely to arrange the 
suspension of hostilities, until Generals Grant and Lee could ad- 
just the terms of the surrender. Among the Union generals 



68 

present were Sheridan, Crook, Merritt, Ord, Griffin, Barlow, Gib- 
bon, Ayres and Forsythe, and among the Rebel generals were 
Longstreet, Heth, Wilcox and Gordon ; " Rooney " Lee was near 
by, but did not join the circle. The tone of conversation at this 
interview was very friendly and both sides appeared glad to see 
each other [Rebels and Southerners were generally always amiable 
and conciliatory when they had points to gain and Northerners to 
take in. " Timeo Danaos" &c., &c., a trite proverb, always apposite 
in every place, &c.] Many mutual inquiries were made after old 
friends and acquaintances. Heth said that he would rather fight 
the politicians who brought on these difficulties, than the soldiers 
arrayed against them. Gordon said that for himself he had fought 
conscientiously and had established somewhat of a reputation as a 
fighting man, but had he known that his friends would have been 
received so kindly and treated so magnanimously by their ene- 
mies, he would have long since laid down his arms. Wilcox, 
alluding to an obsolete idea entertained by some of the Southern 
people, facetiously inquired how high the grass had grown in the 
streets of New York ? 

Copy from a New York daily of Sept. loth or i ith inst., 1862 r 

(From th.t Richmond Dispatch, Sept. 8th, 1862.) 

The following named Yankee citizen and negro prisoners were 
received at the C. S. prison, corner of Gary and Twentieth 
streets, Saturday, Sept. 6th, from Gordonsville, via Central Rail- 
road, at nine o'clock, viz. : 

^ ^ "jp 9f ^ ^ * 

(Here follow the names of fifty-eight officers, including H. 
E. Tremain, A. A. A. G., Sickles' Brigade.) 

Besides these there were about fifty-seven members of the ist, 
2d and 3d Virginia regiments (Pierpoint's Sattelites) mostly with 
very outlandish names for persons claiming to be Virginia Volun- 
teers. The following citizens were also in the group, having been 
found in suspicious company, viz. : (7 names.) 

Negroes. — Tann Genns, from New York, free boy ; Geo. 
Jordan, do., Pennsylvania ; Tom Jackson, do., New York, do ; 
Esau, slave of Wm. Bowen, who has taken the oath of allegiance to 
Lincoln's government; Chas. Montgomery, free, from Washing- 
ton ; R. B. Wilson, free, Ohio ; and John Williams, free, from 
Alexandria, Va. 

All the white men in the above lot who bore conwiissions are 
considered as beloiiging to Pope's anny, and are therefore not pri- 
soners of war" 1^^ ?j^?r HOSTAGES to suffer D'E.A.IU — by lot — 

BY HANGING. 



GEN. H. EDWIN TREMAIN. 



Having devoted a number of years to the studies necessary 
to complete a History of the Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, 
it was but natural in the course of the work to prepare a series 
of Biographical Sketches of ofificers who made themselves promi- 
nent in it. Among these was the present Brevet Brig.-Gen. Henry 
Edwin Tremain. 

It is wonderful how soon, when red tape or routine are tem- 
porarily dethroned and a nation appeals to the patriotism of its 
population, what numbers of admirable ofificers are furnished by 
the learned professions. That doctors should make good soldiers 
is not surprising, as carving and kilhng is their natural trade ; but 
why the study of the law should lend a peculiar dash to the wearer 
of a uniform is enough to awaken reflection. During the Revolu- 
tionary war certainly the cavalry commander who acquired the 
most world-wide notice was Tarleton, who, if he never practiced 
law, certainly studied it, and passed from the quill to the sabre. 
What is more curious, when it is necessary to embody volunteers 
and the legal profession form an organization apart, they are 
almost invariably known as the " Devil's Own." Why such things 
should be has no solution, but many exemplars. One of them 
constitutes the subject of the present sketch. 

Henry Edwin Tremain, like so many of the distinguished men 
of the Third Corps — like Kearny, like Sickles, like Graham, is a 
New Yorker born, grew up in this city, and in i860 was graduated 
at the College of the City of New York, aged twenty, and imme- 
diately entered upon the study of the law at Columbia College 
Law School. April 17, 1861, he enlisted as a private in the New 
York Seventh Regiment, and served in the ranks during its first 
brief campaign. Soon after, in company with a younger brother 
(Lieut. Walter R. Tremain, who died in the service), he recruited 
a company in the city of New York, and went to the front as First 
Lieutenant in the Second Regiment Fire Zouaves (Seventy-third 
N. Y. Volunteers), which was attached to the deservedly famous 
Excelsior Brigade. He served until April, 1862, in the line, and 
as adjutant of this regiment. At the siege of Yorktown he was 
promoted to the staff of General Nelson Taylor, commanding the 
Excelsior Brigade, in which capacity he served during the Renin- 



TO 

sular Campaign under McClellan and the final operations of Pope, 
his brigade being attached to Hooker's glorious second division, 
the " White Diamonds," of Heintzelman's Corps. He partici- 
pated in the engagements at Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Williams- 
burg Road, of June 25; Savage Station, Glendale and Malvelii 
Hill the operations of the Seven Days' Retreat, the battle of 
Bristow Station and the Second Bull Run, under Pope. 

At the Battle of Williamsburg he was one of the aids on the 
staff of Gen. Nelson Taylor, commanding the brigade, and in his 
official report of that engagement General Taylor takes occasion 
to express his satisfaction with the able manner in which Lieu- 
tenant Tremain's duties were performed. General Sickles' official 
report of the Battle of Fair Oaks thus speaks of him: 

"My particular acknowledgements are due to Lieutenant H. 
E. Tremain, A. D. C. and A. A. Gen., upon Avhom I relied for 
nearly all the staff duty in the field through the day. His arduous 
duties were performed with courage, zeal and ability." 

The official report of the battle of Malvern Hill also says: 

" Lieutenant Tremain, the only officer of my staff able to re- 
port for duty, was, as usual, distinguished for zeal and gallantry, 
although suffering throughout the day with severe indisposition." 

During the Second Battle of Manassas, participating in a 
charge, he was taken prisoner and sent to Libby Prison at Rich- 
mond. On arriving in the Rebel capital the authorities announced 
that Lieutenant Tremain and other officers should be held as 
hostages to prevent the execution of Pope's obnoxious order in 
regard to the destruction of Confederate property, and in case 
the same was enforced these officers were to suffer death. [See 
page 68, supra^ 

General Nelson Taylor, in his report of the participation of 
his Brigade in the Second Battle of Bull Run, makes this allusion 
to Tremain : " His bravery and gallantry excited my admiration 
and have my warmest thanks; he was taken prisoner while en- 
deavoring to check the panic and the rapid advance of the 
enemy." 

When the Army of Virginia had failed, through causes beyond 
the control of its commander, ofiticers belonging to the army corps 
that had been serving in McClellan's Peninsular army were re- 
leased on parole. Less than thirty days found Lieutenant Tre- 
main in Washington negotiating through the War Department for 
a special exchange. This being accomplished, and his parole 
canceled, he resumed the field on the staff of General Hooker's 
old division (Second Division of Third Army Corps), at this time 
under the command of General Sickles. In 1862, Lieutenant 
Tremain was promoted to be captain, and served on the staff of 



n 

General Sickles at the battle of Fredericksburg, and until the re- 
organization of the army. 

Shortly after General Hooker assumed command of the Array 
of the Potomac, Captain Tremain was, on 25th April, 1863, com- 
missioned as Major and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Vols., for the staft 
of the Third Army Corps. Here he served Avith great efficiency, 
as shown by the army records and extracts from special reports. 
For gallant services at the battle of Chancellorsville he was spe- 
cially recommended for a brevet, which he received in 1865. 

General Tremain 's connection with this battle of Chancellors- 
ville is worthy of special note. [See "Anchor's" (J. W. de P.) 
publications and criticisms on " Chancellorsville."] 
. "Early on Sunday morning. Sickles' front, the apex or salient 
of the Union Hne, was fiercely attacked by the Confederates, ac- 
cording to their wont, in successive lines. Furious as were the 
onslaughts, they were met by resistance no less fiery in its de- 
termination. Indeed, the weight of the battle fell on this point, 
and the resistance was Avorthy of the assault. On this day Sickles 
was severely injured in repulsing, or checking, the enemy; and 
Maine's grand volunteer representative. Berry — the noble Berry — 
fell in a charge worthy of mention with any of the loudly trum- 
peted efforts of modern war. 

"Again and again did Sickles send to Hooker, asking for re- 
inforcements. They did not come. Then, about 8 to 9 o'clock, 
A. M., Major Tremain, senior aide to General Sickles, bore to 
Hooker his last and most urgent appeal for support — a support 
indispensible, since the last reserves at the disposition of Sickles 
had been put into position. When Tremain reached the Avell- 
riddled Chancellorsville House — afterwards destroyed and con- 
verted into a pile of ruins — Hooker, who saw him coming, and 
was eager to receive his report — one of many of similar import 
brought in that day — bent over the rail in his anxiety to hear it, 
Avhen a heavy missile — a twelve-pounder solid shot, it is said — 
struck the column against which Hooker had been leaning, tore 
it from its base, dashed it against his body and head, and struck 
him down apparently lifeless. Well might Tremain, in narrating 
this catastrophe, dilate with horror upon his feelings at that 
moment. It would have been terrible enough at any time to see 
his commander-in-chief thus smitten down before his eyes and at 
his feet; but, at that supreme moment, the awful consequences of 
this disabhng of the directing mind and central source of power 
was a still heavier shock to the comprehensive mind of the able 
and experienced aide-de-camp. He says the result (that result 
the compulsory abandonment of another key-point — a dreadful 
necessity when, west and east, to right and left, disaster and de- 
lay had already lost so much), was the crisis." 



72 

i\fter uiis campaign, while visiting New York, hearing of Lee's 
second invasion of Maryland, Tremain telegraphed to General 
Hooker, volunteering his services in any capacity until his own 
general (Sickles) should return to the field. General Hooker 
promptly thanked him and requested him to join his headquarters 
at once. Tremain thereafter served on the staff of the command- 
ing general until Hooker was relieved by Meade. General 
Hooker thus wrote to Governor Fenton of Major Tremain's ser- 
vices: 

" He served in my command during the whole time that I 
was connected with the Army of the Potomac in a capacity which 
brought him within my immediate notice. I have always regarded 
him as an officer of uncommon promise ; he is capable, energetic 
and devoted in the discharge of his duties, brave in battle and of 
unexceptionable moral character." 

When General Hooker's command of the army ceased, Major 
Tremain resumed duty at the headquarters of the Third Corps, 
and, as the chief staff officer of that organization, played an im- 
portant part in the battle of Gettysburg. In 1864, Major Tre- 
main was sent with General Sickles, by order of President Lin- 
coln, on special service to the West, and he visited every army in 
the field. While with Sherman's army at Chattanooga, he volun- 
teered to act on the staff of Maj.-Gen. Butterfield, in response to 
a request to this effect, and served in this capacity in the 
Twentieth Army Corps during the operations before Dalton, and 
in the engagements at Buzzard's Roost and Resaca; and at the 
latter battle General Paul A. OHver and he were the two staff' of- 
ficers selected to accompany and direct the storming column. On 
the occasion of Major Tremain's departure from the Twentieth 
. Corps, under orders. General Butterfield wrote : 

"As you are about to leave us, with a feehng of sincere regret 
at losing your valuable services, it is a great pleasure to thank you 
for them. Your devotion and energy in camp and on the march, 
your gallantry at our assault of the enemy's works at Resaca, and 
your genial qualities have endeared you to us all. Our best wishes 
go with you. I speak not only for myself, but for all the staff". 
* * * I shall always be grateful for your generous services 
at so opportune a moment." * * * 

Upon his return East, Major Tremain was ordered to remain 
with General Sickles, who was at home in New York awaiting 
orders. But, after the election in 1864, Tremain was unwilling to 
retain his commission unless his services were desired in some 
more active field. Upon communicating this determination to the 
War Department, Secretary Stanton promptly ordered Major 
Tremain to report to General Meade for assignment in the Army 
of the Potomac. 



73 

Hastening to comply, he was soon, at his own request, as- 
signed to the cavahy corps. Here he served in the operations 
about Petersburg, on the stafif of General D. McGregor Gregg, 
and his successor. General Crook, and participated in the battles 
of Hatcher's Run, Dinwiddie Court House, Five Forks, Amelia 
Court House, Sailor's Creek, Farmville and Appomattox Court 
House. 

At the termination of this campaign. Major Tremain, on re- 
commendation of General Sheridan, was breveted lieutenant- 
colonel, "for gallant and meritorious services." Shortly afterward 
he was breveted colonel. He also served a short time on the 
staff of General Mott, commanding Second Division [combined] 
Second [Third] Corps, in front of Petersburg. 

By reason of his services, from time to time, at so many and 
various headquarters, he was probably more generally personally 
known in the Army of the Potomac than any other officer of his 
rank in that army. In 1865, as the armies dispersed. Col. Tremain 
was ordered on reconstruction duty at Wilmington, N. C, on the 
stafif of General Crook; but, in November, 1865, he asked to be 
mustered out of service, and returned to his home. While awaiting 
his discharge, he resumed his legal studies at Columbia College 
Law School. Instead of his muster-out, as desired and expected, he 
was ordered to duty at headquarters, Department of South Caro- 
lina, and was also breveted brigadier-general. He continued on 
duty in South Carolina until April, 1866, when, after completing 
five years of continuous military service, he resigned his commis- 
sion and returned to New York city, where he opened a law of- 
fice and commenced his civil professional work. 

With the military services of the present presiding officer of 
the "Third Army Corps Union" (1880) this biographical sketch ap- 
propriately terminates. Still, in civil life, it is pleasant to be enabled 
to have recourse to the synopsis of a career which demonstrates 
that the young lawyer who achieved so much when transmuted 
into a soldier, did not fall below the high mark which he set for 
himself when he resumed the practice of his original profession. 

During a temporary absence from the field, in 1864, he had 
submitted himself to the usual examination of applicants, and had 
been admitted to the bar. He was graduated at Columbia Col- 
lege Law School in 1867, having already acquired no little pro- 
fessional experience and a most promising business. His practice 
and clientage speedily increasing, in 1869 he organized with 
Colonel Mason W. Tyler (a young officer from Massachusetts, 
and a graduate of Mr. Evarts' law office) the present well-known 
firm of Tremain & Tyler. In 1870, Mr. Tremain received the 
nomination for Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, in the city 



of New York. Although Tremam, received more votes than any 
of his associates on the county ticket, he was defeated, his party 
being in its usual hopeless minority on New York island. In 1870, 
the United States Marshal employed Mr. Tremain as special 
counsel to aid in the prosecution of cases for infringement of the 
census law, and in enforcing the United States election laws, then 
for the first time applied and tested. 

Mr. Tremain has often been employed by the Government as 
special counsel, both before and after his appointment as first As- 
sistant United States District-Attorney at New York. This posi- 
tion he occupied with signal ability during the second term of 
President Grant's administration, and until some months after 
President Hayes' inauguration, when he resigned. Subsequently 
the Treasury Department at Washington employed Mr. Tremain 
to conduct the trial of some important revenue suits, in which he 
was remarkably successful. For four years there was scarcely 
a notable case tried to which the Government was a party 
where Mr. Tremain was not of counsel. While in the United 
States District Attorney's office, the cases he conducted were 
generally of such prominence that he was obliged to encounter an 
imposing array of skillful adversaries. The questions also were 
such as required settlement by the United States Supreme Court, 
before either party would give up the controversy. On questions 
of law the result before appellate tribunals generally justified his 
advice. Before juries Mr. Tremain was rarely unsuccessful. Dur- 
ing his experience at the bar he has probably conducted the trial 
of more civil causes than any man who is not his senior in years 
in the profession. 

In 187 1, Mr. Tremain was elected President of the Alumni of 
the College of the City of New York, to which position he was 
annually re-elected for five terms. He took an active interest in 
all matters relating to public education, and was frequently called 
upon to make public addresses in that connection. In 1869, he 
was elected by the Columbia College Law School to deliver the 
Annual Alumni Address at the Academy of Music, before the 
graduating class, and his address, entided " Lawyers and the Ad- 
ministration of Justice," was received with marked appreciation. 

At the same place, he addressed the Literary Societies of the 
New York College, in 1877, in favor of higher and more extended 
means of public education. Among Mr. Tremain's many literary 
efforts, his address, delivered by special invitation, on the occasion 
of the Centennial at the " Gospel Tent," in New York city, in 
1876, has been given extensive circulation among the clergy of 
the country, in a work entitled " Under Canvas." Mr. Tremain 
had not unfrequently been a contributor to the press. During the 



75 

war he was often a correspondent of the New York Evening Post. 
While stationed at Wihiiington, in 1865, he wrote editorially for 
the Wilmington Herald. He has also been employed editorially 
in professional publications. In May, 1879, he was elected Pre- 
sident of the Third Army Corps Union. 

If this record of a life still young is read carefully and calmly- 
reflected upon, it will demonstrate a length of service, and a strict- 
ness, a success, and an honorable discharge of duty in the most 
opposite careers, to which it will not be easy to find a parallel. 

Anchor (J. W. de P.) 




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LA ROYALE! 

[Fanfare, or Call on the Hunting Horn, sounded when the Hounds 
arouse and attack a " Stag of Ten" Antlers.] 

PART VIII. 

" The ' toils were set' and the 'Stag of Ten ' was to die at bay." 
—{''Pickett's Men," ijd.) 

[Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1872, by J. Watts de Peyster, in the 
Office of the Librarian of Congress, Washington, D. C] 



REMARKS, INTRODUCTORY AND EXPLANATORY. 

As soon as the " Great American Conflict " had terminated 
and our " Boys in Blue " commenced returning home, the writer 
lost no time in beginning to collect and jot down information in 
regard to the terrible struggle of four years. In the seven years 
ensuing, the mass of memoranda, manuscripts, &c. — such as let- 
ters, statements and reports — gradually accumulated, until they 
constituted a huge mass of crude facts for historical mastication 
and digestion. In addition to this, shelf after shelf became 
loaded with valuable publications, such as the " Rebellion 
Record ;" likewise with so-called Histories, Regimental Bio- 
graphies, Biographies proper, &c., some of which, in their hun- 
dreds of pages, have no otlier value than to establish or corro- 
borate a single fact. 

All these, all this had to be melted in the crucible of critical 
examination by the fire of patient labor, to draw off from the 
black fusion and repulsive scoriae the bright and precious metal of 
truth : — Truth which is intended to constitute the biography of the 
" Glorious Old Fighting Third Corps," which is, in fact, the his- 
tory of the Army of the Potomac, since some of the constituents 
of the Third Corps participated in the first battle of Bull Run 
and witnessed the surrender at Appomattox Court House — four 
years of war such as the world had never yet witnessed; crowned 
with a triumph such as no such a period of conflict had ever yet 
achieved; rewarded with a victory greater and more decisive 
than had ever yet been won by force of arms. 



As one of the noblest of living historians, Scherr, remarks : 
" The youthful might of Trans-Atlantic Democracy had fought 
out, in four years, a gigantic conflict for human development, 
which servile Europe could not have accomplished in an hundred 
years " by all the internal and external arguments of its states- 
craftmen and standing armies, written with steel, in blood, upon 
the ashes and ruins of civilization. 

In order to reduce the accretion of manuscript and print into 
manageable shape, the writer published a series of works and 
pamphlets which enabled him to survey his route, construct his 
road-bed and gather together materials for the superstructure. 

His " Personal and Military History of Major-General Philip 
Kearny; " his " Decisive Conflicts ; " his " Third Corps at Get- 
tysburg;" his " Fredericksburgh," " Chancellorsville," and " Get- 
tysburg," in Captain Mayne Reid's magazine Omvard^ serve as 
bridges across deep gulfs. Other minor articles in Omvard, in 
other magazines, in weeklies such as the Ledger-^ Volunteer, Era, 
and in daily papers such as the Daily Times, the Evening Mail, 
&c., were tramways for the transport of filling. 

His uninterrupted series of articles — besides previous sporadic 
biographical sketches, &c., in the New York Citizen, commencing 
2oth August, 1870, and running on continually for a period of 
nineteen months, to the 23d March, 1872, constitute a temporary 
roadway, whose sharp curves, in any event, must be shortened, 
even if the majority is not wholly rebuilt. ■ 

This pamphlet, " La Royale," Part VHI., is the station house 
and structures at the terminus, which will serve every purpose un- 
til the permanent track is relaid. It may take years to finish up 
this work, but the passengers or readers can now make their four 
years' journey, rough or smooth as it may prove, with a com- 
plete understanding what the ultimate result will be. 

The publications which have already appeared have met with 
the highest approbation of experts and competent judges. They 
will carry all the weight that can be imposed upon them, for they 
are laid on the rock of conscientious investigation, and have been 
set up with painstaking labor, without a single bolt headed with 
prejudice or nutted with personal bias. Where the timbers are 
only scored or rough hewn, it is because the architect did not 
deem it worth while to waste time in trimming them ; where they 
are planed and ornamented, it was because it was due to the 
beauty of their surroundings, their utility and the situation. 

No traveller across the continent ever heard the whistle an- 
nouncing the end of the journey attained with greater gladness 
than the author, in penning the closing tribute to Major-General 
A. A. Humphreys, last commander of the glorious old Fighting 



111. 

Third Corps, which never lost nor permitted any man or men to 
deprive it of its identity when combined with the Second Corps. 

To this great soldier, eminent engineer, admirable chief of 
staff and unsurpassed general, in every command intrusted to 
him, he was indebted for invaluable assistance, and who actually 
corrected and annotated the original edition from which this was 
printed; likewise, for many courtesies, to Major-General E. D. 
Townsend, Adj.-Gen. U. S. A. ; likewise to Major- Generals Mott 
and McAllister, U. S. V. ; and likewise to Brevet Colonel W. H. 
Paine, " the Pathfinder " of the Army of the Potomac. 

But to cite by name all who have lent him their aid would 
require too much space. Nevertheless, perhaps he cannot con- 
clude better than by quoting the words of a letter from Brig.-Gen. 
Joshua T. Owen. It was ]iis regiment, the 69th Pennsylvania 
Volunteers, who held, and held triumphantly, the most dangerous 
point of the Union line, on the third day of Gettysburg, in front 
of the famous umbrella-shaped clump of trees on Cemetery 
Ridge. General Owen's flattering communication is among the 
precious rewards of the writer's trying and exhausting labors of 
seven years. 

New York, March 22, 1872. 
My dear General : 

I have read with much pleasure and derived much valuable 
information therefrom, the articles on the " Third Corps at Get- 
tysburg," published in The Volunteer. I thank you for the loan 
of the two numbers, which I herewith return you. 

I beg to express my sense of obligation as a volunteer soldier, 
to you personally, for your efforts to rescue from unmerited ob- 
scurity the names of such officers belonging to the volunteer ser- 
vice, as were distinguished for capacity and gallantry. 

Without any desire to detract from the merits of any officer 
belonging to the regular army, or who had graduated at West 
Point Academy, I am constrained to believe that the volunteer 
officers were not treated with entire fairness or equal justice in 
the General Reports of the operations of the Army. 

I am, with great respect. 

Your Ob't Servant, 
(Signed,) Joshua T. Owen. 



LA ROYALE! 

The Last Twenty-Four Hours of the Army of Northern Virginia. 



BAYING THE STAG OF TEN. 

In my history of the Last Campaign, or Hunt of the Army 
of the Potomac, the narrative of the events and details was 
brought down (in " La Royale," Part VIL) to the afternoon ot 
the 8th of April. The last article was set up for the Citizen of 
30th March, f872, but that weekly had already ceased to exist 
with its last issue of March i6th. 

Under these circumstances, a paragraph is necessary to de- 
monstrate the relative positions of the Union and Rebel forces on 
the afternoon of that day. The Army of Northern Virginia, in 
round numbers — including infantry, artillery and cavalry, also the 
special services — about 30,000 strong, was falling back, retreat- 
ing, or flying, as the phrase pleases best or is most suitable, on the 
Richmond and Lynchburg Plank Road and Turnpike towards 
Appomattox Court House. It reached this point between after 
sundown of the 8th and some time before daybreak of the 9th, 
Gordon leading with the Rebel Second Corps ; Longstreet with the 
main body and the rear, comprising his own, the First and the 
Third (A. P. Hill's) Corps. The latter, after Hill's death before 
Petersburg, had no corps-commander, but was combined (?) with 
Longstreet's. 

Immediately on the heels of Field's Rebel Division, constitut- 
ing the rearguard, followed Humphreys with the combined 
Second-Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, clinging to it, 
harassing it, skirmishing with it, deaf to all Lee's cajoleries to let 
up the pressure. 

A few miles behind, closing up to the preceding, came the 
Sixth (Wright's) Corps. 

AAvay to the southward, from ten or twelve or even more 
miles distant, the Fifth (formerly Warren's) Corps, Army of the 
Potomac, and the Twenty-fourth Corps, two divisions, and one 
division of the Twenty-fifth Corps — these last two belonging to 
the Army of the James — were marching westward in support of 



V. 

Sheridan, who, with the cavahy cut loose was spurring towards 
the setting sun — at once the sinking orb of day, of the tempest- 
period of internecine war and of the " Slaveholders' Rebellion" — 
to head off Lee at Appomattox Court House. Between the Fifth, 
the Twenty -fourth and Twenty-fifth Corps, and the Cavalry and the 
combined Second-Third and the Sixth Corps, flowed the Appo- 
mattox and its numerous affluents, destitute of bridges. 

Thus Humphreys, with the combined Second-Third Corps, at 
this time about 12,000 effectives, was the Union general and 
troops pegging at Lee and " slambanging " into the Army of 
Northern Virginia, proper, as they alone had been — since Hum- 
phreys discovered the actual route of the Rebel retreat — on the 
6th, 7th and 8th April. 

Thus (8th April) the pursuit was kept up by the indefatigable 
Humphreys. At 5 p. m., 8th April, according to his dispatch to 
Webb, Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac (D. B. 5,39, 23), he 
had learned from the country people, and from prisoners picked 
up, that the rear of the enemy's infantry was about four miles 
ahead of him ; their cavalry less. At this hour — 5 p. M. — Wright 
informs Webb, that the head of his column — Sixth Corps — has 
reached Curdsville, about eight miles N. N. W. of Farmville, on 
the Plank Road. He was still seven miles from New Store 
where he encamped that night, which point (New Store) Hum- 
phreys had attained — still pushing on, however — in the course ot 
the afternoon. At New Store the Rebel cavalry were again in 
sight of the combined Second-Third Corps, which was, indeed, 
" close upon them." At 6.30 p. m. Humphreys' First and Second 
Divisions (old Second) were two miles beyond the hamlet styled 
" New Store," which is twelve (fifteen?) miles, if not more, from 
Cumberland Church — the scene of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia's last stricken field — by the route they had followed. 
Humphreys' Third Division (old Third Corps) Avas about one- 
third of a mile in rear of his other two. His men had marched 
seventeen miles this day, but his advance had been retarded by 
the failure of his trains to keep up with his troops. 

Humphreys was ordered to ''push on to-night (8th, 5h. 45m. 
p. M.) so as to be in the presence of the enemy," and be " up to him." 
At 6.55 p. M. he was still "pushing on." Although the men 
were somewhat exhausted by the want of their rations, Hum- 
phreys " moved forward with the First and Second Divisions (old 
Second) on the night of the 8th before their trains of rations got 
up. The Third Division's (old Third) train got up on the even- 
ing of the 8th, and Humphreys left it at the ground where 
overtaken, to get its rations and follow on afterwards." 

Humphreys' leading (First) division commander, Miles, had, 



VI. 

at this hour, just reported that the enemy were encamped on the 
first high ground in front of him, and Humphreys, as usual, on 
fire at the announcement, had ordered Miles to push forward his 
skirmishers and feel them, to try and find out from prisoners what 
force he actually had opposed to him. (Rossel, Renseignments, 
^2, 119.) 

At this point it is necessary to correct an erroneous statement 
in a previous portion of Part VII. of this work, " La Roy ale." 
The second communication from Lee to Grant (fourth sent and 
received) was not received through Humphreys until he had 
halted at dusk two miles west of (beyond) New Store. 

At 8.35 p. M. General Meade, through Webb, ordered Hum- 
phreys to encamp. He " did not intend to require a night 
march." Meade then adds the highest commendation from a 
superior to an inferior : " You have done all, in getting up to the 
enemy." 

At 9 p. M. (D. B. 5, 46, 27) Meade follows up the foregoing 
with the order : 

" The Second [combined Second-Third] and Sixth Corps will 
move at 5 A. m. to-morrow and the Second [combined Second- 
Third] Corps will attack the enemy [now in its front] at once, the 
Sixth Corps supporting." 

The relative positions of the headquarters on the night of the 
8th-9th were as follows : 

Lieutenant-General Grant and Meade on the Lynchburg 
Stage Road near Curdsville, about seven miles W. N. W. of Cum- 
berland Church. 

-Wright (Sixth Corps) at New Store, seven miles further to the 
W. N. W., at the junction of the Lynchburg Plank Road and the 
Pike. 

Humphreys (combined Second-Third Corps) about seven 
miles farther on W. at Rain's, on the now combined roads. 

At dusk Humphreys Avas skirmishing with the Rebel rear- 
guard, but it would seem as if Lee's troops kept steadily on all 
night, leaving a small force to cover their movements. Gordon's 
corps, leading, had struck a better road about midday of the 8th 
and made rapid progress till dark (Captain [Confederate] J. C. 
Gorman, p. 27), when the head of the column had reached Appo- 
mattox Court House and the rear was within four miles. (Gor- 
man is evidently all wrong here, for he says, just after it, that 
Gordon's corps was aroused and moved hurriedly at 2 o'clock 
A. M. of the 9th. When they reached Appomattox Court House 
they found their [Confederate] cavalry confronting Custer's 
cavalry.) These troops went into camp early in the evening ; the 
bands of the divisions enlivened the departing hours of the day 



Vll. 



with martial music and were applauded with the usual cheers of 
the troops. Before dark all had partaken of their food. This 
proves that the Rebels were not as destitute of food as has been 
represented, and the bands must have had considerable strength 
to play after such a march. In fact, the same authority, Captain 
Gorman, says, in his " Lee's Last Campaign," that in the vicinity 
of FarmviUe, on the morning of the yth, the haversacks of many 
of the men were replenished for the first time since leaving 
Petersburg. It has been previously established by Humphreys, 
de Trobriand and others that the country between Jetersville and 
Appomattox Court House was by no means destitute, or even, to ap- 
pearance, short of provisions. " The old spirit seemed to be return- 
ing." " We had begun to congratulate ourselves that the pursuit 
was over and felt sure that we would make the trip to Lynchburg, 
which was only twenty-four miles off" 

BUT — " before we had completed our meal the rumbling of 
distant cannonading sounded warningly in front." * * * 
" The fact was, that the enemy's cavalry, in heavy force at Appo- 
mattox, had disputed our advance — had cut off a train of wagons 
and artillery." 

This same cannonading to which the Confederate Captain 
Gorman alludes, had been heard at Humphreys' halting place in 
the early part of the night. 

The distant "diapason of the cannonade " broke in sullenly 
upon the ears of the combined Second-Third Corps about dusk 
on the evening of the 8th. This cannonade was many miles 
away, perhaps nine or even more miles off to the southwest and 
was the bellowing of Sheridan's horse-batteries, engaging with the 
thirty Rebel guns and upwards, covering the desperate eftbrt to 
break through "the Circle of the Hunt," making, and about to be 
made, in greater force, by the Rebel General Walker, with the 
leading divisions or brigades of Gordon's command. 

Thus the Union and Rebel troops were sinking down into 
their bivouacs or seeking their campinrg grounds to the porten- 
tous echoes of those "fire-throats," whose hoarse roar and duller 
echoes were for the last time reverberating amid the Blue Hills of 
ancient Virginia and breaking the early slumbers of the rebellious 
but now completely conquered dwellers in the Old Dominion. 
****** 

As some changes took place during the night, it is of interest 
to every reader to learn the relative positions of the Rebel and 
Union forces on the morning of the 9th. As is well known, 
Sheridan's cavalry had struck the enemy on the evening of the 
8th, at Appomattox Station and captured four large trains of cars 



Vlll. 

and a number of wagons and twenty-four guns. The reader 
will do well to compare Colonel Newshall's (Union) " With Gene- 
ral Sheridan," and Captain J. C. Gorman's " Lee's Last Cam- 
paign " as to incidents; also Gen. H. Edwin Tremain's War- 
Memoranda, Chapter 11. — original XII. 

Custer reports that the last train was guarded by about two 
divisions of Rebel infantry, with over thirty pieces of artillery, all 
under command of Major-General Walker, of the Third Division 
of Gordon's [Rebel Second) Corps. The main attack occurred 
about 9 P. M. The fighting was not over until between 9 and 10 
p M., when the Rebels fell back rapidly upon Appomattox Court 
House. The Union cavalry bivouacked for the night, in close 
vicinity to this centre, where dayhght of the 9th found them 
ready and eager for the work of the summa dies — " the day of 
decision " for Rebeldom. 

The Fifth Corps, following the Twenty-fourth Corps, bi- 
vouacked about 2 A. M. of the 9th, within two miles of Appo- 
mattox Court House. It moved again at 4 a. m. and about 6 a. m. 
reached General Sheridan's headquarters nearer the Court 
House and manoeuvred into position so as to support the cavalry 
who soon needed this backing. (Compare Extracts from the 
Infantry and Cavalry Reports in the Citizen^ of the i6th and 23d 
Dec, 1871.) 

The two corps, or portions of the one, the Twenty-fourth, and 
a division of the Second, Twenty-fifth, composing the Army ol 
the James, after having been, as reported, on the march from 
daylight of the 8th, till 10 a. m. on the 9th April, except three 
hours, were deployed across the outlet, through which Gordon, 
with Lee's advance, was making his desperate attempt to escape, 
and were " barely in time." Ord intimates that Gordon would 
have succeeded, " in spite of Sheridan's attempt to hold him," — 
" our cavalry were falling back in confusion before Lee's infan- 
try," — had not our " Blue Coats " developed their lines behind 
our horsemen. This was to the south and southwest of Appo- 
mattox Court House, or Clover Hill, although the writer has seen 
the latter designation given to an eminence in close vicinity to 
the left flank of Humphreys' front. Cavalry Devin would seem 
to indicate still another position for Clover Hill. (Bates, History 
of Pennsylvania, Vol II., 706.) (See his Report, V., Citizen, 23d 
Dec, 1871.) 

(This " blendi7ig" or " masking " of artillery and infantry 
with cavalry is by no means novel. It is impossible to fix any 
date when artillery, sufficiently light to accompany the move- 
ments of cavalry, was brought into the field, but a French work, 
'' Curiosites Militaires," pp. 170-172, says that the novel and 



IX. 

prompt manner of employing artillery masked hy cavalry was the 
idea of Charles Brise, a Norman naval artillerist, and it was util- 
ized by Henry IV., in 1589, in one of the engagements near 
Arques. The " Journal of the Military Service Institution," for 
September, 1885, states that the introduction of Horse Artillery, 
in the French service, was due to Lafayette after a visit to 
Prussia; but it has been asserted that his first suggestions and 
efforts in this direction were made after his return from service 
under Washington, and I have seen a picture which leads me to 
believe that the supposition of his getting the idea in America 
is correct. What is more, the Spaniards, during the Dutch War 
for Independence, were accustomed to mask the presence ot 
artillery by blindages of the other arms, and I have seen an ac- 
count of cavalry drawn aside, exactly as at Appomattox Court 
House, to reveal the startling and decisive presence of infantry. 
The fact is, such a manoeuvre has been practised again and again, 
with the same satisfactory and startling results, on a variety ot 
occasions.) 

Meanwhile the mass of Lee's army, under Longstreet, was 
entrenched across the Lynchburg Plank Road and Pike, about 
three to four miles N. W. of Appomattox Court House. Their 
left, fronting east, was in some woods which fed the head waters 
of Devil's Creek, their right on Wolf's Creek. Their centre was 
for a short space at New Hope Church. This, if significant, 
was but very short-lived, as much so as their stand there. It was 
afterwards within Humphreys' lines. 

Colonel Paine says " Wolf Creek Church or New Hope 
Church," a curious association of names, unless the New Hope 
came in after the wolves were cleared out. 

Longstreet's or Lee's headquarters was in a house at a locality 
known as Pleasant Retreat, certainly the least indicative of the 
actual condition of Rebel affairs which well could be imagined. 

According to Col. M. W. Burns, 73d N. Y. V., Longstreet's 
own headquarters were in the first small house on the combined 
plank road and pike inside the Rebel lines, designated Pleasant 
Retreat. 

According to a letter from an ofticer of high rank and the 
clearest observation, the troops in front of Humphreys were as 
follows : " On the Confederate right of the road, came first 
Heth's division, then Wilcox's, then Mahone's. (Heth's First, 
Second and Third Divisions — all Third, Rebel, Corps.) On the 
Confederate left of the road, came first Pickett's remnant (800), 
then Field's division, then Humphreys' (of Mississippi) division, 
(formerly Kershaw's). L. I., 3. 

At 9 A, M. April 9th, Humphreys informed Meade that the 



head of his column had gone into camp at midnight. At ii 
.A. M. he reported that the head of his Third Division (Old Third) 
had not been able to reach the halting place till 4 a. m. of the 
same morning. As the train with two days' rations followed this 
division, the delay in their distribution must have retarded forward 
movements till 8 a. m. ; likewise the fact of Humphreys' " push- 
forward " during the night, from the camp which Meade, 8.35 
p. M. 8th (D. B. 5, 46, 27), had ordered him to occupy, but from 
which he advanced at 8 p. m. 8th (D. B. 5, 51, 30.) About 6 a.m. 
of the 9th the supply train was up and rations were at once 
distributed (7, 4, 72), so that when Humphreys did move on 
again, he writes : " My men are marching finely, the effect of the 
rations." This shows that our men, as Avell as the rebels, were 
fatigued, indeed, almost fagged out and faint, from want of food. 
One of the officers on this pursuit said he did not eat for forty- 
eight hours. 

Humphreys was pressing Field's division, which had resumed 
its last march in retreat at midnight of the Zth. (This is taken 
from information I (Humphreys) obtained and sent in a dispatch 
to Meade — but it is in conflict with what Gorman says.) It will 
be remembered that Fields commanded a division, four or five 
thousand strong, to the very last. It was the Second of the 
Rebel First (Longstreet's) Corps. 

How could this be if Gorman is right : " Gordon's Corps 
was aroused at 2 o'clock, morning of the 9th," &c., &c. 

Immediately in front, that is, leading Fields, were Wilcox's 
(Second) and Heth's (First) divisions of the Rebel Third (prior 
April 3d, A. P. Hill's) Corps ; Mahone with the Third Division of 
the same corps was in front of these two corps and already en- 
trenching in the last defensive position occupied by the Army of 
Northern Virginia. 

Besides the troops thus indicated, Longstreet had with him 
the remnant of Pickett's Division and the remains of Kershaw's 
(or Mississippi Humphreys') Third Division of Longstreet's own 
Rebel First Corps. 

The nearest Union troops to Lee's main force, at this time, 
were undoubtedly those of Humphreys. The Sixth, following the 
combined Second-Third Corps, was not in close support, till near 
noon of the 9th. This is shown by Webb's dispatch, 10.30 a. m., 
in which he tells Humphreys, " General Wright is ordered to 
pass your train and to push up." 

Readers may have supposed that in the presentation of this 
history, incidents have been invested with rose-colored tints to 
render A. A. Humphreys' conduct more conspicuous. So far 
from this being the case, the narrative is a sober statement of 



clear facts : " You will see in my report (A. A. H.) that when on 
the 6th April I discovered Lee in retreat and had opened artillery 
on him, and had directed a brigade of Mott's to feel him, I re- 
ported what I had seen and done to General Meade, and then 
made all the dispositions to cross the whole corps at Amelia 
Springs to attack Lee, so that when the direction from Meade 
came, I was ready, and moved at once across the [Flat] creek. 
From that time forward, until late on the 8th April, my movements 
and operations were directed solely by myself, as it was proper 
they should be." It has been shown that Grant and Lee's corres- 
pondence on the 7th and 8th passed through Humphreys' lines, 
under the escort of his staff officers. It will now be seen that this 
continued to be the case on the 9th, until Grant, by a detour, had 
left the direct route followed by Humphreys, and had passed 
around to the vicinity of Appomattox Court House, which, about 
midday on the 9th, was on neutral ground, between the picket 
lines, when the flags of truce were passing. 

This is not intended to detract in the least from General Sheri- 
dan's activity, but neither he nor his troopers were in direct con- 
tact with the Array of Northern Virginia pivper, after the fights 
of the evening of the 6th, Avith the exception of Crook's repulse 
on the 7th, until the evening of the 8th and the morning of the 
9th, and then only with Lee's advance under Gordon (compris- 
ing the divisions in whole or in part of Early's old Army of the 
Shenandoah); Humphreys still confronting Lee's main force un- 
der Longstreet. 

In the Citizen, March 23d, 1872, the first four notes of the 
7th and 8th April were presented, with the circumstances of their 
transmittal and delivery. 

When Grant wrote his third communication to Lee (Note 5) 
(Reb. Rec. XL, 357) he was at his camp for the night of the 8th- 
9th at Curdsville, rather nearer NeAv Store than Cumberland 
Church, and two-thirds of the way from Farmville to New Store. 
This communication was brought to Major-General Humphreys 
while on the march on the morning of the 9th. The bearer of it 
was Major Chas. E. Pease, A. A. G., Headquarters Army of the 
Potomac. He it was (A. A. H., 6, 9, '71) who took General 
Lee's letter (Note 6) to General Grant, after it had been brought 
in by Colonel Whittier to Humphreys, on the march, between 10 
and II A. M. (9th), as is narrated by that officer in his own letter, 
yet to be quoted at length. Whittier delivered Note 6 to General 
Meade, and Meade sent it by Major Pease to General Grant, 
overtaking the latter about five miles from Appomattox Court 
House [11.50 A. M. (Cannon, 446). Midway between Ker's 



# xu. 

Church and Appomattox Court House (Greeley, ii. 744)]. Gen- 
eral Grant at once opened and read the letter, and his reply 
thereto is Note 7. 

The same staff officer of Lee, who was the bearer of Note 6, 
subsequently brought two successive messages from Lee to Hum- 
phreys, urging the latter to halt his troops and not press on the 
Confederate forces — messages which Humphreys, with whom war 
meant fighting, rejected and paid no heed to, just as a good sol- 
dier should always do and should have done. ' . 

Lee was " on the picket line " in front of Humphreys when 
he received Grant's third note (5), and while he wrote his third 
communication (Note 6) on the morning of the 9th April. The 
circumstances attending its delivery are narrated at length by Col. 
C. A. Whittier — (in April, 1865, A. A. G. on the staff of Maj.- 
Gen. A. A. Humphreys, commanding the combined Second-Third 
Corps) — as will appear from the following extracts from his letter, 
dated Boston, 8th August, 1871. 

[Colonel Whittier belongs to Boston, went out in the 20th 
Massachusetts Volunteers — " the crack regimenl " from that 
State; in the summer of 1862 became an aide to Sedgwick, then 
commanding the Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the 
Potomac; remained with the general until he was killed, going 
with him as Major A. D. C. when Sedgwick was assigned to the 
command of the Sixth Corps, in the winter of 1862-63. From 
this (Sixth) corps he came to Humphreys, in the winter of 1864- 
65, and remained with him to the last. (A. A. H. 30, 3, 72)]. 

" On the next morning, the 8th April, General Williams rode 
up, and, as he was going out on our front with a flag of truce, I 
accompanied him, each of us having an orderly. We were fired 
upon and General Wilhams' orderly (behind us) was shot in the 
leg ; the letter was delivered to one of Fitzhugh Lee's staft 
officers. General Williams saying that these letters or this commu- 
nication was in no way to interfere with the operations then being 
conducted. At noon of the same day (the 8th) it was announced 
to us that the enemy was showing a flag of truce. I was sent by 
you (A. A. H.) to meet it. I met one of Fitzhugh Lee's staff, 
whose inquiry was whether the flag, before sent, was to affect, in 
any way, impending operations. As I had already heard this 
thing provided for by General Williams, I answered, without 
communicating with higher authorities, in the negative. (It was 
at this time I sent a regiment to protect our trains of supplies 
coming up in the rear [i2-| p. m., 8, 4, 65J, A. A. H.) 

" The same night (as I remember, though I can't at all remem- 
ber any letter from the enemy being brought in — we were 
bivouacking at the time in woods just at dusk and the men 



Xlll. 

eating and resting) I was sent by you to General Meade's head- 
quarters — a ride of two or three hours — and delivered a note to 
General Meade and waited for him to go to General Grant. I 
started back to you about midnight with no answer, I think. The 
corps had moved. I overtook you about daylight * * * 
took a nap, from which I was awakened by you * * * You 
said that as I had gone out with the other flags, you would like 
me to take this one, unless I was too much fatigued — (this letter 
must have been Note 5). I started out and at last I met a per- 
son (chief of General Lee's couriers, so he said), who asked me 
if I had a letter for General Lee. ' Yes,' I replied. ' I will take 
it,' said he. ' Pardon,' said I, ' but I must deliver it to a com- 
missioned officer.' ' We will meet one if we ride on a short 
distance.' 

" We soon met Colonel Marshall, of General Lee's staff, who 
took the letter and asked me to ride up the road with him. We 
soon met General Lee, who read the note brought by me and 
commenced dictating (to Colonel Marshall) an answer. 

" Heavy firing in the direction of Appomattox was then 
heard and a Confederate officer (with but one arm) of fine ap- 
pearance, well mounted, &c., rode rapidly towards us ; after 
speaking with General Lee, the latter, apparently, hurriedly fin- 
ished his letter (Note 6, I suppose), which was handed to me by 
Colonel Marshall^ who said, ' Please say to General Grant, that 
General Lee came here expecting to meet him — that he (General 
Lee) understood that all movements were to be suspended 
— that he is just informed that a heavy engagement is taking 
place at Appomattox and he would like to know when and where 
he can meet General Grant I' 

" I at once reported back to you, thence to General Meade. 
General Grant had gone across country to Appomattox Court 
House. I returned to you. Later — at about noon — General 
Meade sent a note (which I think only stated that General Grant 
had gone to Appomattox Court House) ; this I started with and 
soon came in sight of the enemy in their last ditch — the pickets 
saw me — my flag was a large one. They fired upon me — {en 
passant, I'd like here to make this claim — that the last hostile bid- 
let fired by the Aniiy of Noi'thern Virginia was at fne.) (Combined 
Second-Third Corps.) I dismounted; being told after a short 
interval to advance, I met an officer who called himself Lieuten- 
ant Lamar of Georgia, or Alabama; to my indignant protest at 
being fired on (stating that General Williams' orderly had been 
wounded on the preceding day). Lieutenant Lamar replied, '/ 

have no instnutions not to fire upon Hags of truce.' ! me- 

thought, but said nothing. 



XIV. 

" Our line was then formed for an advance upon the enemy 
in position, and in five minutes, at least, a conflict would have 
commenced. * * General Meade joined us at about this 
time and a suspension of hostilities for an hour, either through 
his or some one else's agency, was ordered. At the expiration 
of the hour, an advance was directed, and, as we were in close 
proximity to the enemy's line, we were met by Forsyth of Gene- 
ral Sheridan's, Marshall of General Lee's staff and one or two 
others, who announced an extension of the truce." 

LE HALALI ! HABET ! 

The reader will perceive from the wording of Note 6 [(the 
third from Lee in response to the third from Grant), (Tenney, 696, 
2)], that Leemust have been "on the (Rebel) picket line," which 
our Humphreys' moving or " all alive, oh ! " skirmish line was 
pressing or feeling-to all the time. He was there on the morning 
of the 9th of April, asking for and awaiting an interview with 
General Grant, to ascertain definitely the terms of surrender 
offered by our Lieutenant-General. This was between 10 and 
1 1 o'clock A. M. Lee remained there, close to the officer of his 
staff, by whom he sent urgent requests to Humphreys for the lat- 
ter to halt; this was as late an hour as 11 o'clock a. m. This 
is all-sufficient evidence that, while Sheridan and Ord were dis- 
cussing matters, preliminary to a truce, with the Rebel Lieuten- 
ant-General Longstreet and Major-General Gordon, as related 
by "A Staff Officer" in " With General Sheridan," Major-General 
Humphreys was in direct communication with General Lee. 

Lieutenant-General Grant, however, after writing his first let- 
ter (Note 5) to Lee, on the morning of the 9th, had ridden across 
by Walker's Church towards Appomattox Court House. Before 
reaching the Court House, and while yet five or six miles from it, 
the messenger sent by Humphreys, Major Pease, overtook him 
with Lee's letter (Note 6), which was written immediately in 
Humphreys' front. 

As a " Staff Officer" inserts a copy of the same letter (Note 
6), originally sent to Grant by Major Pease, and states that Gene- 
ral Longstreet was at Appomattox Court House about the hour 
mentioned, and that he (Longstreet) bore a dispatch from Lee to 
Grant, this dispatch must have been a duplicate of the commu- 
nication (Note 6) sent first to Humphreys, and by him sent to his 
rear by Major Pease, and thence to Lieutenant-General Grant. 
This must be the letter referred to in the dispatch of Major- 
General Meade of 10 a. m., 9th April, in which he mentions an 
answer from himself to Lee, recapitulating Grant's terms, and 
advises an interview with the Rebel general. Meade was at 



XV. 

this time on Humphreys' route, and his language not only con- 
firms Humphreys' claim, but seems to clear up the matter beyond 
a doubt. 

All this time Lee was in Humphreys' front, repeatedly urging 
the halting of the latter's troops, to which Humphreys did not feel 
authorized to accede. 

About a mile beyond the last flag of truce, and about fifteen 
or twenty minutes after Humphreys had ordered Lee's staff ofti- 
cerout of his way, and just as Humphreys was about opening 
fire upon Lee, General Meade came up, and, having received a 
communication from Lee, assented to a truce. 

Meade's communication to Lee (dated Headquarters, Army 
of the Potomac, 9th April, 1865), is the first mention of his 
knowledge of any cessation of hostilities between Ord and any 
portion of Lee's command. As Meade was on Humplireys' front 
it is important to note the time, 12 m., and the information of Ord's 
truce with Longstreet was brought to Meade by General Forsyth, 
of Sheridan's staff, and was undoubtedly received by Meade 
Avitliin half an hour after it was granted by Ord and Sheridan. 

This may all seem unimportant, but it establishes several facts. 
First, where Lee was while Ord, Sheridan, Longstreet and Gor- 
don were treating — i. e. in front of Humphreys. Second, that 
Grant had not yet reached Appomattox Court House to receive, 
there, the Last letter of Lee (Note 6) which passed through Hum- 
phreys — that is, the last letter ot Lee before Grant and Lee were 
communicating with each other directly, at first wnth the lips 
(Notes 8 and 9) and then with the pen — at the Court House, at 
which time the retreat and pursuit, the attack and defense, the 
fighting was all over. To make it perfectly clear, Notes 8 and g 
folloiiied the personal interview between Grant and Lee, and 
simply put on record what had been agreed upon. Grant's own 
report establishes this curious fact. Third, that while hostilities 
were still ablaze, so to speak, all communications between Grant 
and Lee passed through Humphreys, because Humphreys with the 
combined Second-Third Corps was the nearest to Lee all the 
time and the most persistently pressing him. 

Note 6, as several times stated, was the last which passed be- 
tween Grant and Lee through Humphreys. The next (Note 7) 
is not to be found in all the histories of the war, but is given by 
Tenney, 696 (2). It undoubtedly passed through Sheridan's 
lines, as has always been admitted in these articles. 

Col. Newhall, in his "With General Sheridan, &c.," must refer 
to this not'e (No. 7) at page 216, confounding it with Note 6, 
wliich was dehvered at 11.30, when the subordinate Union and 
Rebel generals were already in conference at Appomattox Court 
House. 



XVI. 

Grant was at the time, as stated therein, four miles W. ot 
Walker's Church, that is, still six to eight miles, by the road, east 
of Appomattox Court House. This was some time before Note 
8 from Grant to Lee, and Note 9, in response, were written. 
Grant says, in his own report (Reb. Rec, XI. 357), "The inter- 
view (between Grant and Lee) was held at Appomattox Court 
House, the result of which is set forth in the following corres- 
pondence " (Notes 8 and 9). [The capitulation was signed 3.30 
p. M. (A. and N. J., 11, 545—2.)] 

Grant and Lee, however, had not yet met. A cavalry officer, 
(" A Volunteer Cavalryman ") mentioned that he had heard at 
the time, that Lee's last note passed through Whittaker of Cus- 
ter's staff, a name which might have easily been confounded with 
that of Whittier, Humphreys' staff officer. 

It would be very interesting and in some respects profitable to 
get Lee's own account of his whereabouts at different hours — a 
time-table of his movements — during this 9th of April and the 
five, particularly the three — 6th, 7th and 8th April — preceding 
days. 

Lieutenant-General Grant, when he wrote his fourth commu- 
nication (No. 7), at 11.50 A. M. of the 9th — to impress the fact — 
was four miles west of Walker's Church and still about eight or 
ten miles east of Appomattox Court House. This Walker's 
Church is on a road running south from New Store- — near which 
place Humphreys received Note 4 from Lee to Grant — through 
Planterstown by Cut Banks Ford (mentioned in his report by 
cavalry General Devin, Citizen^ 23, 12, 71), to the south 
of the Appomattox, and stands near the junction of this road 
with another east and west, about the same course as that river, 
eventually leading to Appomattox Court House. These roads 
Grant took on the morning of the 9th. 

To close up the whole matter of the correspondence, so as not 
to have to refer to it again, two last communications (Nos. 8, from 
Grant to Lee, and 9, from Lee in return) can scarely be consid- 
ered as written pending hostilities. They were written after 
Grant and Lee's personal interview. Grant's last (No. 8) is 
headed "Appomattox Court House" (no hour) ; but at 12 m. 
Meade, in a note to Lee, mentions that he had sanctioned a ces- 
sation of hostilities that had been agreed on between Ord and 
Lee's command, which suspension Meade extended for two hours, 
/. e. to 2 p. M. Lee's fourth and last note (Note 9) is headed: 
" Headquarters Army Northern Virginia." Lee was then at or 
near Appomattox Court House, and it is supposed that his head- 
quarters were wherever he was. Undoubtedly, judging from 
concurrent circumstances, the last two notes of Grant and Lee 



XVll. 

(5th of Grant, 4th of Lee) were written at the same place. Ac- 
cording to the Army and Navy 'journal, II. 545 [2], " Lee's Let- 
ter of Acceptance [Note 9 ?] was signed in the farm-house at 
Appomattox Court House, which will always be memorable as 
the place of surrender." 

Having thus disposed of this matter, which is of more impor- 
tance in its bearing than in itself, in establishing beyond question 
who was unceasingly nearest the enemy — /. e. Humphreys — the 
reader must now revert back to the antagonistic positions of 
Humphreys and Lee at the latter's " Pleasant Retreat."' It has 
been so much the fashion to underestimate the number of troops 
at Lee's disposal on the morning of the 9th and depreciate their 
physical condition that a very false impression has been created, 
and would be perpetuated were no voice or pen uplifted in de- 
fence of the truth. That this underestimation and depreciation 
should be done by Rebel writers to lessen the humihation of the 
catastrophe, is excusable, and would be almost commendable 
could the perversion of history be pardoned for any cause. 

That, however. Northern writers, calling themselves Union, 
should minister to this delusion, is a sort of treason to the brave 
army which compelled the catastrophe. 

While writing and running back through the past, how many 
cases occur where a defeated army abandoned or destroyed its 
arms, and an army about to capitulate concealed all that could 
prove trophies to the conquerors ? European armies, the French 
especially, consider this course as commendable, as well as justi- 
fiable. After Aughrim, which decided the fate of Ireland, in 1691, 
the Irish army, which had fought with distinguished pertinacity 
and valor up to a certain moment, threw away their firelocks in 
such numbers that Ginkel, the victor, lowered the price of each 
musket turned in, to twopence. After Woerth, the French tore 
off and cast aside everything that impeded retreat. Moreover, it 
is considered the acme of Bazaine's disgrace that he surrendered 
all his material intact, to the minutest article. 

Some of Napoleon's greatest successes were founded on de- 
ceptions. Among the notable, remark the stratagem by which 
Lannes and Murat and Belhard obtained possession of the Tha- 
bor bridge across the Danube, 13th November, 1805. The 
Russians are accused of a similar ruse to escape pursuit prior to, 
and towards, Austerlitz, which occasioned Napoleon's remark 
that, "if the Russian varnish is simply scratched off", the original 
Tartar will be found underneath." Even the upright [Lebrecht) 
Blucher is averred to have resorted to such " a very questionable 
military stratagem to secure his escape," after Jena, 1806, 
although this is another French story. 



XVlll. 

It is no criterion to judge ot how many men under arms con- 
fronted Humphreys on the morning of the 9th, to cite those who 
actually stacked arms when the surrender became a fact. In an 
European army the number of men in uniform would have formed 
a sure basis for calculating the magnitude of the force capitu- 
lating. But what was to determine this fact in an army whose 
costume realized the expression " un-uniformed troops ? " This 
idea recalls Macaulay's remark that, when the Irish troops op- 
posed to William's liad laid aside their firelocks, there was no 
means of distinguishing between the pitiless combatant of one 
moment and the peaceful countryman of the next. 

Histories range, as to the numbers surrendered by Lee, from 
26,000 to over 28,000; Lossing figures out 26,000; Draper (who 
wrote under the best of auspices) states 27,805 ; Harper's His- 
tory, generally very accurate, agrees. with the preceding; Cannon 
(British) says 28,078 paroled, of whom 22,000 showed upon the 
12th, the day of receiving certificates. The report of the Secre- 
tary of War sets down the number paroled at 27,805. Colonel 
Fletcher (British) reads 8,000 armed men and 18,000 too weak 
to carry their muskets. Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff, 
Army of the Potomac, in this case one of the most competent of 
critics, discussing the surrender, asked, most pertinently, how it 
was possible to recognize a soldier, with no distinctive uniform, in 
a man whose only designative tokens of a soldier were in his 
arms and accoutrements, which he had thrown away on purpose ; 
most likely in the hope of avoiding the responsibilities which their 
possession entailed. 

One of the most observant of our major-generals and expe- 
rienced division commanders, ivho kept notes, in discussing the 
matter, stated that he beUeved, if the truth could be discovered, 
tliat Lee had between 30,000 and 40,000 men of all sorts and 
descriptions with him at Appomattox Court House, but that, as 
soon as the surrender became a fixed fact, a large number " put 
for home," without standing on any of the ceremonies either of 
war or propriety. 

The following examination will expose the fallacy hitherto re- 
ceived as fact : 

In front of Humphreys, Mahone had just about 4,000 in A i 
fighting condition and more than this number is claimed for 
Fields. With them were three other divisions. Is it possible — 
is it reasonable — that even half of these were unarmed ? Besides 
these, Pickett's remnant. This accounts for many more than are 
stated to have stacked arms : men occupying entrenched lilies, re- 
sisting and determined to resist. This will be shown by the testi- 
mony of three competent witnesses. 



XIX. 

Humphreys saw these entrenchments. In a letter (6, 9, 71) 
he says that Major Pease [already referred to, who took Lee's 
letter (Note 6) through Humphreys to Grant and accompanied 
General Grant to Appomattox Court House], in returning to 
General Meade's headquarters [just after the surrender], passed 
through the enemy's lines. Their line, fronting Sheridan and 
Ord, he is understood to have reported, was not entrenched. 
" That facing the combined Second-Third Corps was entrenched 
fully breast-high, and had an abattis of felled trees in front. An 
opening had to be cut to enable him [Major Pease] to pass." 

Col. M. W. Burns (73d N. Y. V.) went into Longstreet's lines 
about the time of the surrender. He is very explicit as to what 
he saw. Some of the Rebel troops in front of Humphreys be- 
longed to their Third, formerly A. P. Hill's Corps, and he thought 
that portions of their First [Longstreet's] Corps were also on the 
same front, because Longstreet's headquarters were in the first 
small house bisecting the opposing positions — Pleasant Retreat, as 
before stated — inside of the Rebel lines. He was not able to 
furnish any data as to brigades and divisions, but was of opinion 
that one division in Humphreys' front was commanded by Gene- 
ral Mahone. This is well known to have been the case. He 
judged, from what he could see, that there were about 10,000 men 
who had stacked arms along the road. They were entrenched, as 
far as he could discern, on each side of this road. They were 
about ten minutes walk from Humphreys' headquarters. 

Colonel Fletcher [(British) HL, iii., 212-219] who mainly (?) 
derived his information from Confederate sources, implies that the 
reason why Lee gave up at last was because Gordon announced 
"thafhewas being driven back." "He [Lee] perceived that 
Longstreet with difficulty held his ground against the force ac- 
cumulating in his front" — Humphreys' combined Second-Third 
and Wright's Sixth Corps. This corroborates Burns as to where 
Longstreet was. 

NoAv for Colonel Paine. Li his diary, jotted down on the 
spot, he says : 

" Being near the enemy's pickets, I noticed they were gathering 
in knots, and seeing a negro come through their lines and towards 
us, I hailed him and asked him how he came to be allowed to 
come through. He said that they were not agoing to let him 
through, but he told them that ' Lee had done gone sur- 
rendered,' and ' they began to talk to each other and he came on 
and left them, and some throwed down their arms and went away,' 
he thought. 

" I returned to ride up through the gap and by the squad ot 
perplexed pickets, and on into their lines, where I found consider- 



XX. 

able confusion, enough to cover my movements. I let my horse 
walk, but did not stop, and, although spoken to, was not halted. 
I carefully noted the courses and distances in my memory, count- 
ing my horse's paces, and glancing at a small compass, passed 
along their lines of earthworks. 

" Took a circuitous route back and through the same gap in the 
picket line, returned, and hastily sketched my work, so that I 
could designate positions that would enfilade their lines with ar- 
tillery." 

Right immediately within lines which Paine inspected, as he 
told the writer [7, 8, 71], i. e. within the earthworks in front of 
Humphreys — the Confederate troops were in good normal con- 
dition. Outside {i. e. beyond) these lines, back and around, 
many troops were in a broken-up condition, which showed that 
while some organizations were in good order, others were com- 
paratively demoralized. 

Col. Paine said (21, 8, 71), " Holding intrenchments in Hum- 
phreys' front and vicinity were more than 8,000 men seen by me, 
and I am a pretty good judge of numbers; and yet I did not 
examine this line to any considerable distance, as it was in tim- 
ber. I was on Humphreys' front on the day of Lee's surrender." 

Colonel Whittier, in his letter previously quoted (Boston, 
8th Aug. 187 1 ), is even more pointed than Burns or Paine. He 
says: 

" Immediately after the surrender, in company with Colonel 
Bache, of General Meade's staff, I rode into the enemy's line. I 
remember Field's Division ; can't call to mind the commanders 
of any others— the force was strong for the extent of the line ; a 
breastwork of medium strength at the front for the pickets and 
two lines of stronger works in the rear — there being a continuous 
slight acclivity from their front to rear work. 

" I thought at the time this position a pretty strong one 
against any front attack — it probably could have been easily 
turned — and they seemed to have troops at that particular poiiit 
to impede us for a while." * * * 

What "particular point?" "Yes, at the point where they 
could be turned (A. A. H) there were Rebel troops (en potence) 
posted there to prevent their right from being flanked or taken in' 
reverse." 

Opposed to Sheridan were Gordon's troops, actually fighting 
till the last minute. Of these, Devin speaks as " the enemy ad- 
vancing in two heavy lines of battle." Crook reports first a " very 
heavy line \ " again, " a strong attack on my front and flanks with 
a large force of infantry, while their cavalry attacked my rear; " 
again, " overwhelming numbers." Custer mentions "two divi- 



XXI. 

sions of infantry, in addition to over thirty pieces of artillery." 
Merritt corroborates Crook with the same words, "overwhelming 
numbers." 

These are Union accounts. Cooke, the Southern historian and 
biographer of Lee, says, Gordon's " own force, less than 5,000 
muskets," which certainly must mean between 4,000 and 5,000. 

Add these to the force in front of Humphreys, and we have 
double the number of those said to have surrendered in arms. 

This aggregate, however, is not yet complete. Fitzhugh Lee 
and Rosser, with the Rebel cavalry, made their escape to the 
mountains (Fletcher, IIL, 518-19). Also, according to the author 
of "Pickett's Men" (172-3, 175), a battalion and battery of Pick- 
ett's Division got off to Lynchburg. Undoubtedly many others 
of all arms made their escape secretly when it was found that Lee 
was actually treating for a definite surrender. This they might 
have done without detection through the gap to the northward, 
Avhich was unwatched by Grant's troops. 

The writer can never be brought to believe that Lee had less 
than 25,000 veterans — infantry, cavalry and artillery — men tried 
and true, ready to execute his will down to the very minute when 
he signed the act of surrender — besides those who got off or stole 
off and very numerous stragglers. 

And this is the estimate of men Avho fought it out to the last 
against the Army of Northern Virginia, generals who kept the 
run of every day's occurrences, men who never misrepresented, 
whose statements, however disputed at the time, have been borne 
out by after-investigations and admissions. 

Take the example of Humphreys' fight on the 5th February. 
His rough estimate of the force opposed to him, and its compo- 
sition, was completely verified by Gordon's own admissions to 
Major-General McAllister; and yet subordinate Rebel ofticers 
claimed that Humphreys only fought brigades, where Gordon 
conceded divisions, with every chance in their favor. (Major- 
General McAllister's Statement, Citizen, 16, 9, 71.) 



XXll. 

LA mort! the valley of jesreel! 



" I am watching for the morning ; 
The night is long and dreary. 
I have waited for the dawning 
Till I am sad and weary." 

" An end is come, the end is come ; it watcheth for thee ; behold it 
is come. The morning is come unto thee." * * * Ezekiel vii. 6, 7. 

"And the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the 
war desolations are determined." — Daniel ix. 26. 

In consequence of the difificulty of bringing forward the train 
with rations, it was eight o'clock, 9th April, 1865, before the 
combined Second-Third Corps resumed its advance. In fact, the 
troops had been in movement pretty much the whole night, 
striving to gain ground in spite of hindrances. Humphreys ac- 
tually advanced five miles during the thick night, hoping to 
come up with the enemy; but finding his men falling out rapidly 
through fasting and fatigue, he was compelled to halt his First 
and Second Divisions about midnight. His Third, followed by 
the supply train, did not begin to arrive until about 4 a. m. (The 
[Third] Division was not up until 4 a. m., probably, and the 
supply train some considerable time later, perhaps 6 o'clock, or 
even later before it was all up. — A. A. H.) As soon as the rations 
could be issued the troops moved forward again with alacrity. 

It is broad daylight by 5 a. m. at this lime of the year, when 
the weather is clear, as the writer well knows, as he has often 
seen the morning break after a night spent in work upon this 
pamphlet. Colonel Paine notes in his diary that it was a " beau- 
tiful, fine, pleasant Sabbath morning." Richardson (483) says it 
" was damp and foggy." This involves no contradiction, for 
there is often fog on the bottom-lands, when it is perfectly clear 
upon the ridges. * * * As at Thrasimene ! 

All at once, three or four miles away to the front, a vigorous 
cannonade and interchanges of musketry, sounding to the expe- 
rienced ear like a pin drawn sharply across the teeth of a comb, 
only a thousand times louder, in thunder-crashes, nigh at hand, 
and duller and more ominous when heard at a distance. Hear- 
ing this, every one shouted, "Sheridan is there! bully for Sheri- 
dan ! " As related in a previous chapter, the combined Second- 
Third Corps had sunk down in their first bivouacs (8th-9th) to 
the rough music of the same horse-batteries. So they shouted 
with knowledge. It was the last convulsion of the Rebel Army 
in its death throe ! its condition, what a contrast to the season, 
day, and weather, and the awakening Sabbath ! 



XXlll. 



At 9 A. M. Humphreys notifies Webb : " The head of my 
column is now about (it) one and a half miles from the halting- 
place (during the night) and near to the rear of the enemy, according 
to the report of a negro who came from Lynchburg yesterday 
morning (Saturday, 8th April). Our troops were then three miles 
from Lynchburg. He passed through Appomattox Court House 
about sunset. The fighting there was .then going on. It was 
resumed this morning and is still continuing. About daylight he 
passed the last of the enemy, and then lay in the woods some 
time, coming in to us when he thought it was safe. He was told 
as he passed through Lee's army that the troops would move 
again about midnight (Sth-gth April). We are about (lo) ten 
miles from Appomattox Court House." 

Few questions caused greater trouble than the discovery ot 
what Union troops this negro could have referred to. No appli- 
cations to headquarters furnished any satisfactory clue ; but on 
turning to the Army and Navy y^ournal, of the 22d April, 1865, 
it appears from Major-General Stoneman's report that it was a 
portion of his command. "Major Wagner, after striking the 
railroad at Big Lick, pushed on toward Lynchburg, destroying on 
his way the important bridges over the Big.and Little Otter, and 
got to within four miles of Lynchburg." This is confirmed by 
Major-General Cullum in his "Biographical Register," IL 162, 
§§1304, wherein he states that Stoneman was engaged in the 
" Destruction of the Lynchburg and Bristol Railroad, April 3-7, 
1865 " (compare the " Last Ninety Days of the War," p. 197). 
This exactly corroborates the statement which the negro fugitive 
made to Humphreys. 

At 1 1 A. M. the combined Second-Third Corps came up with 
the enemy's skirmishers, in front of the entrenched position, 
hereinbefore described. Up to this hour, if not an hour later, 
Lee had been in command in Humphreys' front. When news came 
to him that Gordon's attempt had failed, Lee mounted his horse 
and started for the rear, saying, " General Longstreet, I leave 
you in charge ; I am going to hold a conference with General 
Grant." (Richardson, 483.) 

Finding the Rebels in force, in defensible positions, and 
strongly entrenched, Humphreys made immediate dispositions 
for a fight, if fight there was to be. They were as follows: 
Humphreys' right, his First (Miles') Division (old Second Corps), 
was a cheval (or astraddle) the Plank and Turnpike Road, with 
one brigade in line to the right or north of it, and one to the 
left or south of it, while the other brigade was in column to the 
north of the road, supporting Miles' right. The Second (Bar- 
low's) Division (old Second Corps) on the left, was disposed in 



XXIV. 

the same manner, having two brigades deployed in the front Hne 
and a third in reserve opposite the centre and the interval between 
them. His Third (de Trobriand's) Division (old Ihird Corps) 
also presented two brigades deployed in the front line, and one 
in support to the rear of the centre interval of the first line of 
battle of the corps. 

Accordingly (says de Trobriand, II., 481) our division was 
massed to the right and left of the road. Half an hour after- 
wards the troops were notified that the truce had been prolonged 
up till 2 p. M. As the watch hands pointed to the hour of two 
the Old Third commenced to move forward again, but the First 
Brigade, wearing the Red Diamond Badge, or "patch," had not 
advanced a hundred yards when a new order directed it to halt. 
Before the Union troops stretched a thin curtain of wood. Be- 
yond this an open space alone separated the " blue coats " from 
the " gray-backs " whose pickets remained perfectly quiet. This 
locality is known on the map which the writer has examined as 
Clover Hill. On pointing this out to Colonel Paine, he stated 
(21, 8, 71) that this name is applied to a cleared elevation to the 
left (/. e. S.) of Humphreys' front and somewhat in advance, i. e. 
W. of it — i. e. S. W. of Humphreys' left. Scarcely two maps 
agree as to the position of •' Clover Hill," and the Secretary of 
War's map makes Appomattox Court House and Clover Hill 
synonymous. (See Bates' History of the Pennsylvania Volun- 
teers, ii., 706.) 

If the map first cited and Brevet Col. W. H. Paine are correct, 
there is a curious significance in this. The official badge of the 
combined Second-Third Corps was a Trefoil, or Three-leaved 
Clover ; and now it was the badge of a commander whom the 
Third Corps honors as honest, impartial, true; in every sense one 
of themselves. That which some of them might deny to his next 
two predecessors — to the first from one motive, to the second 
from another — all would willingly concede to Humphreys. There 
are many other curious unions of the two symbols, the Diamond 
of the Third and the Trefoil of the Second Corps. Napier, in his 
" History of Florence," alludes to one, and another might be 
cited. When the Medici, especially Giuliano, the real Penseroso of 
Michael Angelo, formed two companies of youths to associate 
these Florence youths in friendly [manly] games and exercises, he 
joined those wearing the badge " il Dia;naute" (the Diamond) 
and " il Broncone '' (the Branch, or Trefoil). The last array in 
arms of the Trefoil or Three-leaved Clover (and the Diamond) 
was thus curiously made on the field of Lee's surrender, " Clover 
Hill," and in front of Lee's " peculiars " was the Diamond Badge. 
Diamonds were trumps ! 








Copyright, 1883, by J. Watts de Peyster. 



Appomattox Court House. 

Positions of the combined Second -Third Corps, under Ma j. -Gen. Andrew 
Atkinson Humphreys, 9th April (Palm Sunday), 1865, m. and p. m., 

AT THE epoch OP TEE SURRENDER OF GeN. R. E. LeE 

AND THE Army of Northern Virginia. 



XXV. 

It is another curious fact that Colonel Whittier, A. A. G. on 
Humphreys' staff, makes " this claim, that the last hostile bullet 
fired by the army of Northern Virginia was at me," an old com- 
bined Second-Third Corps man. 

LA RETRAITE PRISE ! AD LEONEM ! 

Thus the organized and more or less disorganized constituents 
of Lee's command were completely enveloped. " The once 
proud array of the Army of Northern Virginia now presented 
this sorry spectacle," &c., &c. (Swinton, 619.) It is impossible to 
comprehend why Northern writers will seek to depreciate the 
number and condition of this Rebel Army, to lessen their own 
people's triumph, and glorify the enemy, as bitter and unforgiving 
in their enmity as ever. It has been herein stated that one of our 
major-generals present at the surrender calculated that Lee still 
had, on the Sth-gth April, from 30,000 to 40,000 men. Although 
this has been gone into quite fully on previous pages, the follow- 
ing calculations from Richardson's tables (491-492), "compiled 
from the official reports," are worthy of consideration. He says 
that Lee's " effective force, on the 20th March, 1865, must have 
been fully 70,000 men." Two chiefs of staff, Army of the Poto- 
mac, and one corps commander, all three agree about as to this 
estimate. Lee lost at Fort Steedman, 25th March, 2,783, and 
from the 29th of March to the 9th April, 18,979, together 21,- 
762. This leaves 58,238. Of these, " Two brigades of his 
cavalry escaped before his surrender;" likewise, according to 
"Pickett's Men" (172-173, 175), a battalion, and certainly one 
battery of artillery, which got off to Lynchburg. How many 
more escaped ? " No one familiar with armies in the field will 
need to be told that the number of stragglers on such a campaign 
must have been very large. Ten thousand men seems to be a 
moderate estimate for the stragglers and the two brigades of 
cavalry. This leaves in round numbers 48,000 effectives. Con- 
cede 8,000 killed and wounded, and there remain 40,000. Still 
there is one element of strength which has not been credited to 
Lee. On abandoning Petersburg- Richmond, Lee dragged off 
with him every military organization, local or otherwise; so that 
our major-general, after all, may have been nearer the truth than 
any one else. But, taking the other view of the case and conced- 
ing that Lee had not over 8,000 to 10,000 men "up to the 
mark " in fighting condition, then no one possessed the right, in 
justice to the North, to accord the terms on the 9th, which were 
even too lenient for the 7th or even for the 3d April. Some men 
ought to have been made examples of, and, from the following ex- 
tracts from the Army and Navy y^ournal [ii. 545 (2)], it would 



XXVI. 

seem to the writer that the Tribune, in pubhshing the remarks in 
^ 2, must have held different views at that time from those since 
and at present held by its senior editor. 

" When, however, it was known how completely the enemy 
had been in our power, some of the troops were a little distressed 
at the magnanimity of the terms offered. 

" An Associated Press dispatch of the 12th says : 
(i.) " The final arrangements for the surrender of Lee's army 
were completed yesterday, and to-day they are at liberty to pro- 
ceed to their homes, or elsewhere, as they choose. The terms 
granted were certainly of a very liberal character. A large num- 
ber of officers, together with thousands of the men of this army, 
express their dissatisfaction, not only at the unprecedented liber- 
ality granted to the Army of Northern Virginia, but at the manner 
in which they' were paroled and allowed to go their way, without 
our men being permitted to enjoy the results of their long struggle 
in the passage through the lines of General Lee and his army ; 
but it is claimed that this would have been humiliating to General 
Lee and his officers, and that it is not the wish or desire of our 
government or commanders to act toward them in any way that 
would tend to irritate their feelings or make their position more 
intolerable than it actually is. I'he policy pursued may have been 
for the best, and our soldiers will submit, as they always do, to 
what is judged most wise. During Sunday night and Monday 
large numbers of the Rebels, as well as some of the officers, made 
their escape from the lines and scattered through the woods, 
many no doubt intending to return home. Our camps last night 
were filled with them, |^°begging something to eat, which, of 
course, was freely given. These men, when asked if they had 
been paroled, invariably replied, " No ; but we are allowed to 
go where we please. ",^^^1 

" A letter to the Tribune on the same subject says : 
(2) "The intelligence that negotiations were pending on 
Saturday for the surrender of the enemy was hailed with joyful 
demonstrations by our men, but when the terms of the capitula- 
tion became known their feelings were those of disappointment 
and chagrin. Ewell, Pickett and several other officers of dis- 
tinction, deserters from the United States service at the beginning 
of the war, it was claimed, had no right to expect the treat- 
ment accorded their more honorable brethren in Rebellion. 
l^'The brutal murder of the thirty-nine men hung by Pickett 
in North Carolina, is still remembered and still awakens a spirit 
of resentment among the men.,^^^1 No formal surrender took 
place, and our troops were consequectly not gratified with a sight 
of the ragged remnants of Lee's once great and formidable army, 



XXVll. 

except as they confronted each other in battle. Both armies lay- 
hidden from each other, for the most part in dense woods, and 
although many of our men afterward straggled into the enemy's 
camps, they were not favored by the coveted glimpse of the 
whole strength of Lee massed in a compact body." 

That the enemy were in the woods, is corroborated by Paine 
(21, 8, 71): " Humphreys' last stand was in a piece of open ground 
the enemy were sheltered [as usual] in the timber ! " " Before 
us," are de Trobriand's words (II., 382), " beyond a thin cur- 
tain of woods stretched an open space, which alone separated 
us from the enemies' pickets, which did not budge." This lo- 
cality is styled " Clover Hill." The United States F.ngineer maps 
show dense woods in every direction in front of Humphreys. 

For Lee's forces, however — were they more or less numerous 
— " the toils were set and the * Stag at Ten' (La Royale !) was 
to die at bay." Stopped in front to their left by Sheridan's 
cavalry, backed by the infantry of the Army of the James, they 
were shut in upon their right or north flank by the Fifth Corps 
(see extracts from reports. Citizen, i6th and 23d December, 1871), 
with their rear closely pressed by the combined Second-Third 
Corps, supported by the Sixth Corps, which had gradually closed 
up and was now in contact, and finally brought to a stand by the 
obstacle of the James [Appomattox] River, whose elbow put an 
effectual barrier on the W. and W. by N., the only possible 
avenue of escape \Army and Navy Journal, ii. 569 (3)] towards 
the goal of Lynchburg, now less than twenty-one miles distant 
in the same direction. 

Gordon had received imperative orders to cut his way 
through (examine a curious coincidence, II. Kings, iii., 26) 
Sheridan's cavalry by a supreme effort of despair. He made his 
desperate dash, thinking he had only cavalry in his front. His 
attack was made with all the wonted Rebel fire. The cavalry, 
who had dismounted to arrest his plunge — like that of ahull upon 
a picador in the amphitheatre — had to give ground. Then our 
troopers were drawn aside like the front-sliding-scene in a theatre, 
revealing the unexpected presence of our blue-coated infantry. 

[There are numerous instances of this masking of infantry, the 
strength of an army, with cavalry, to delude and induce an 
attack. Cassius, in the Parti lian War (^'' Militaij Ends and Moral 
Mea7is" 271, 272, &c.), having ranged his cavalry in a front line, 
with his infantry in a second line behind them; then, by the sud- 
den retiring of his cavalry, drew the Parthians into the snare 
which he had prepared for them. At Wattignies, Jourdain 
masked the presence of field pieces with infantry. The footmen 
" skillfully wheeling back portions of their line to allow the light 



XXVlll. 

battery to fire " through the intervals thus opened. The Span- 
iards used such an identical manoeuvre in street fighting against 
the Hollanders in the sixteenth century; and Henry IV., in one 
of the combats preliminary to or near Arques, in 1589, employed 
a similar strategem. Having masked two heavy couleuvrines 
(16 pounders?) with cavalry, he invited a charge of the Cheva- 
liers of the Duke de Mayenne, who, when they expected to en- 
counter only horsemen, like themselves, were astonished to see the 
opposing ranks open and found themselves overwhelmed with an 
artillery fire. This new and prompt method of employing heavy 
artillery is said to have been the idea of a Norman naval gunner, 
named Charles Brise, who, after long service at sea, brought his 
varied experience to the aid of the King of Navarre.] 

The result was a perfect theatrical winding-up. It paralyzed 
the Rebels. They caved in at once! The end had come ! Mean- 
while Sheridan's troopers, with uplifted sabres, were only awaiting 
the trumpet-blast to spur in and drown out the Rebellion in its 
own best blood. Each horseman grasped his sabre with the de- 
termination of Custer, or of Alp in Byron's " Siege of Corinth." 

It is a pity, perhaps, for the peace of the country, the re- 
organization of society down South and a warning to treason for 
the future, that every arm had not been permitted to realize 
Byron's simile throughout : 

" Swifter to smite and never to spare." 

The writer has always thought it an error of judgment that 
Sheridan was not allowed to " go in," as he is said to have wished 
to do, and "finish up those people." Fiery Phil in such matters, 
if reported correctly, had common sense and honest enthusiasm ; — 
red blood, not white blood ; such seldom, if ever, make mistakes. 

All this is mightily well told by " A (Union) Staff Officer," in 
" With General Sheridan " (pages 210-217), ^■nd by (Confederate) 
Captain J- C. Gorman, in " Lee's Last Campaign " (page 21, &c.) 

As to the influence of the cavalry upon this decisive result, 
there is much to be said for and against. 

For instance, " An officer in the Sixth Corps" [Army and 
Navy yoiirnal, 29th April, 1865, IL, 562, 3) " writes that he is a 
little disgusted at the cheeky way in which the cavalry assumes 
to have accomplished so much. For example, after the fight at 
Little Sailors' Creek, Sheridan reports that he ' went in ' with two 
divisions of the Sixth Corps, &c., &c. But he omits to state the 
not unimportant fact, that, before the arrival of the Sixth Corps, 
he had ' gone in ' and been whipped off the ground in the very 
quickest sort of way. Indeed, the same thing usually happens 
when the cavalry attempts to carry works without infantry. The 



XXIX. 

very last action — the final skirmish in which Lee's army was en- 
gaged — was with McKenzie's cavalry division, and it was just 
sent kiting, with the loss of two guns. Such trifles as these it is 
sometimes convenient not to report." * * * 

" But, with regard to the capture of Ewell and Custis Lee at 
Sailor's Creek, the former has stated over his own signature that 
he surrendered to the Sixth Corps, in a paper on file at the head- 
quarters of the corps." 

Let us loyal men fervently pray that the mistaken magnan- 
imity shown this day towards an adversary even more wickedly 
inexcusable than Ben Hadad, may not be brought^ home to us 
through the shortsightedness of those in authority on this occa- 
sion, and the North realize in the near future the ominous warning 
spoken by the prophet to the victorious but mistaken Ahab. 
(i Kings, XX. 42.) '■'■Because tJioii hast let go out of thy hand a 
man whom I appointed to utter destruction, thereiore thy life shall 
go forhis life, and thy people for his people." (1884 !) (Compare 
II. Kings, xiii., 14-19, and 22; also Jeremiah, L., 2, 13, 14, 15.) 
"Some of the troops (Union) were a little distressed at the mag- 
nanimity (?) of the terms off"ered." \Army and Navy journal, 
II., 445 (2.)] It is a pity that those who had the control gave 
occasion to this "distress" at the time and to greater distress, at 
the consequences, soon after, and thenceforward until now, April, 
1872. (November, 1884.) 

There was one man in the Army of the Potomac who saw all 
this clearly, and spoke out in trumpet tones — Maj.-Gen. Horatio 
G. Wright. He has not been mentioned in the course of this 
corps-biography more than was idispensably necessary, because 
the writer was desirous of avoiding any side issues, but by no 
means because the noble commander of the Sixth Corps was not 
appreciated at his full and great value. Were it necessary to cite 
proofs of the nobility of soul possessed by the " Burster into 
Petersburg," one would be almost sufficient to demonstrate the 
man, viz.: his dispatch to Maj.-Gen. A. S. Webb, Chief of Staff, 
Army of the Potomac, of the 15th April, 1865, in connection with 
the death of Lincoln : 



Headquarters Sixth Army Corps. 
April 15 th, 1865. 
" Major-General Webb, Chief of Staff": 

" With deepest sorrow the dispatch announcing the assas- 
sination of the President of the United States, and the Secretary 
and Assistant Secretary of State, is received, and I advise that 



XXX. 

every officer of the Rebel army, within control of the Army ot 
the Potomac, be at once closely confined, with a view to retali- 
ation upon their persons for so horrible an outrage. 

H. G. Wright, Major-General." 
********* 

Any one who takes a sufficient interest in the truth and will 
compare Paine's Field Map, as reduced in Harper's " History ot 
the Great Rebellion," and several other narratives of the Union 
Civil War, will be convinced — despite all the mystification, inten- 
tional or unintentional, with which partial, interested or preju- 
diced pens have invested or involved the story — that Humphreys, 
with his combined Second-Third Corps, was the chief agent in 
the happy result of this festival. They, it was, and his " tried 
and true," who all the time clung to Lee's army, proper, and 
while suffering as much, if not more, than any other corps or 
arm, so impeded his retreat by their very weight — as a sail tow- 
ing behind a clipper frigate clogs her way and enables a duller 
squadron to overhaul her — and hourly harassed it, so as to enable 
the cavalry, the Fifth Corps, the Twenty-fourth Corps and 
Twenty-fifth Corps to finally head off" the enemy at Appomattox 
Station and Court House. It maybe argued that the part which 
fell to Humphreys was the result of luck. The writer does not 
believe in luck as affecting great events. With him, luck is God, 
who puts the right man in the right place— when something is to 
be achieved which affects human rights and human progress. 
(See J. Fennimore Cooper's " Oak Openings, or the Bee Hunter," 
Chap. XXVni., p. 425). Other men had equal opportunities 
with Humphreys, and were never up to time, could never be 
brought up to time ; morally, could never be made to face the 
music — in a word, with far greater means accomplished compara- 
tively nothing. When Humphreys found the trace ; when he 
struck the scent; he was like the sleuth or lime hound, as vividly 
described by Somerville. (Book I., pp. 21 and 23.) 

Following Lee step by step, never losing trace of him, even 
if temporarily losing sight of him, hitting him, pressing him with 
bayonet in his reins ; thus, for seventy-six hours, and a distance 
of sixty to seventy miles, Humphreys never let him slip away. 
Finally, where do we find Humphreys on the morning of the 9th 
April ? At New Hope Church, near Appomattox Court House, 
confronting on this sunny — sunny in every point of view — Sab- 
batlr morning, the bone and sinew of the remaining organizations 
of Lee's old army. New Hope Church ! — title of happy omen 
for us — " Devil's Creek," to the north, overcome dXi^ passed "by 
queer coincidence " of nomenclature) — and " Pleasant Retreat!" 



XXXI. 

about as inappropriate a term for Lee's situation at this time as 
well could be imagined. These he, Humphreys, now supported 
by Wright, held so tightly, pressed so closely, that Lee could not 
have strengthened Gordon to operate against the Fifth Corps, 
the Army of the James and the cavalry, however much he might 
have been so minded. 

Without exaggeration, was there anything like Humphreys' 
prescient advance, persistent pressure, unrelaxing pursuit or in- 
cessant combat, exemplified on any other previous occasion dur- 
ing the war? Did he not utilize "the golden hours" and the 
"diamond minutes" so often lost, so frequently thrown away? 
" Ask me," exclaimed Napoleon, " for anything but time ! " 
There is nothing like the fighting of the 6th April in our records. 
It comes up to the pursuit after Ulm ; after Jena. Not a mo- 
ment lost, not an opportunity neglected. And then at Cumber- 
land Church, what perfect tactics ! Butting an inexpugnable 
front, how admirable his flanking ! Even although the first at- 
tempts were unsuccessful, where, after being reinforced, does the 
critic find Humphreys when night set in? Ready for the renewal 
of the enveloping assault of the morrow, menacing the enemy's 
sole line of retreat, his sole avenue of escape. No glancing off, 
as day after day, from the Rapidan to the James, allowing the 
foe to fall back from one strong position to another, to renew the 
same unsatisfactory sacrifices ; but a " rubbing out " as unremit- 
ting as the regular succession of the hours, and of the sunrise and 
the sunset. And so it went on, from Amelia Salt Sulphur Springs, 
on the morning of the 6th, until the noon of Lee's surrender. 

Why the popular mind has been so beclouded, and why the 
conspicuous merits of the man and his men have been so lost 
sight of, is one or those curious questions affecting the popular 
distribution of military credit in this country, that can only be 
explained by the willingness of the general public to accept the 
flowery in diction, and the superficial in examination, for the less 
elegant, but infinitely more precious results of investigation and 
close comparison of facts; which last are absolutely inseparable 
from true military criticism and the enduring commentaries of 
war. 



XXXll. 



LA RETRAITE PRISE ! SURRENDER ! 



" Sweet April, many a thought 

Is wedded unto thee, as hearts are wed ; 
Nor shall they fail." — Longfellow. 

" The hounds of war shall turn from our fair tields, 
The cannon shall become a trump of praise. 
" Napoleon Fallen : a Lyrical Drama," bv Egbert Buchanan, Lon- 
don, 1871. 

The Army of Northern Virgmia surrendered! 

The white flag appeared ! General Grant received a mes- 
sage from Lee requesting an interview, which was granted, and 
the two generals repaired to the neat brick dwelling of William or 
Wilmer McLean, at Appomattox Court House. 

The memorable interview between Generals Grant and Lee 
took place at a little after 2 p. m., in the " town " of Appomattox 
Court House. The town, according to description, had little in- 
deed to recommend it for the scene of so great an event as the 
pacification of a' continent. It might boast, indeed, its public 
building, the Court House, but it consisted solely of one street, 
and one end of that was boarded up to keep the cattle out. Such 
was the little place upon which fame, for centuries to come, was 
suddenly thrust, this Sunday afternoon, 9th April, 1865. The 
best house in the street was lent for the occasion by its owner, 
Mr. Wilmer McLean. It is an old-fashioned structure, with a 
long verandah in its front and a flight of steps leading up to the 
entrance thereon. " Appomattox Court House boasted five 
dwellings. The largest — a square building of brick, with a yard 
smiling with roses, violets and daffodils — belonging to one Wilmer 
McLean." 

Lossing states that this McLean resided in a dwelling on a 
portion of the first battlefield of the war, between the Confeder- 
ate " Army of Northern Virginia," under Beauregard, and the 
Union " Army of North-eastern Virginia " — under the accom- 
plished but unlucky McDowell — which was the nucleus or embryo 
of the " Army of the Potomac." Beauregard had his head- 
quarters in McLean's house, which was situated to the right or 
south of the Centreville road, about equidistant from Mitchell's, 
Blackburn's and McLean's Fords. McLean, having seen enough, 
as he thought, of war, removed to a spot whereto he was confi- 
dent war could never come, but whither the fighting did come, 
after a lapse of three years and nearly nine months, in its circle 
of blood and fire. And now, on this bright Sunday, 9th April, 



XXXlll. 

1865, his household gods were tottering to the roar of the same 
fire-throats which had shaken them on that other sultry battle 
Sabbath, 21st July, 1861. 

If McLean had ever delved into the earliest Enghsh drama- 
tists, he may have had the lines of worthy Christopher Marlow 
on his lips : 

" The northern borderers, seeing their houses burned, 
* * * Run up and down cursing " 

the hour " he lent " his house, " the best on the street," " for the 
occasion ; " for, if Richardson (484) is correct, he " was moving 
wildly about, nearly driven out of his senses by the great events 
of the day " and the subsequent forcible purchase of his furni- 
ture. {Ibid.^ 485-6.) 

This " circle of events " presents a curious coincidence, but 
more curious than many others which incontestably prove that 
there is no escaping Schicksal, " the inevitable " — the " Fortune 
or Chance " of Catherine de Medici, Turenne and Suworrow; 
the " chance or good luck " of the astute observer, Montaigne ; 
the " lot " and " chance " of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes ; the 
" Fate " of the Romans and the Greeks ; the "Accident " of the 
scoffer and unbeliever; the " Providence" of the devout; but, in 
very /r?^///, " immutable (or ' unflexible ') Law," the unalterable de- 
cree of the God of Battles and the Lord of Hosts. As Sir 
Walter Scott observed : " Fortune will fly her flight, let man 
haUo himself hoarse." Indeed, it is true, '-'■Man dejikt, Gott 
leiikt^ 'Man proposes and God disposes;'" or, as the Tuscan 
reads, '•'■ L'uoino tepe, e la Fortuna trama^ ' Man sets the woof and 
Fortune throws the warp.' " This acknowledged fact runs 
through all time and teaching. Lord Kames says, " a delusive 
sense of liberty is wisely implanted in the mind of man, which 
fits him to fulfil the ends of action to bettei" advantage than he 
could do, if he knew the necessity which really attends him." 

Some of the names of the iDattlefields, even, are significant, 
and not the least so is the fact that this surrender occurred on 
Palm Sunday. Palm Sunday is the next before Easter, the beginning 
of the " Great Week," the " Holy Week," when the " Prince of 
Peace " made his triumphant- entry into the "possession or inheri- 
tance of peace," for such is the translation of the word Jerusalem, 
the multitude strewing his path with palm branches. How appro- 
priate the surrender on this Palm Sunday, 9th April, 1865, when 
a " chosen people," in arms, entered through the gate of victory 
into the possession of peace, which they had purchased with 
half a million of lives and an expenditure of money almost appal- 
ling in its aggregate of public outlay and private rnunificenceo 



XXXI 7. 

As soon as General Grant accorded this meeting to Lee, an 
order was promulgated (Paine's Diary), suspending hostilities for 
an hour. 

" Our skirmishers are within range of the rearguard of the 
enemy. The enemy has developed a picket line, which indicates 
a stand." 

"Sunday, 9th April, 12.20. A cessation of hostilities pro- 
posed by General Lee was rejected by General Meade, who was 
still pressing on, when word came that a truce of one hour was 
granted by General Sheridan, to which General Meade submitted. 

General Forsythe came from General L , through the enemy's 

lines, under a flag of truce." 

It will be remembered that Colonel Paine was on Humphreys' 
front on the eventful day up to noon ; Lee himself had been with 
the troops confronting the combined Second-Third Corps — all 
that remained of the Army of Northern Virginia, except Gor- 
don's command, in contact with Sheridan, Ord and Griftin — 
nearly or fully up to the same hour, 12 m. 

When, in the course of the morning (gth), Humphreys' troops 
began to overtake Lee, the Rebel general sent to Humphreys at 
least two earnest requests (verbal) by a staff officer and flag of 
truce, not to press forward upon him but to halt ; that negotia- 
tions were going on for a surrender. Humphreys did not deem 
himself authorized to comply with Lee's requests, since he had 
not received such information and authority from General Meade 
or from General Grant as would sanction it, and so replied to 
General Lee, and continued to press forward. Humphreys was 
at the head of the column. When the request was made the 
last time, Lee's staff officer was very urgent, so urgent that Hum- 
phreys had to send him word twice that the request could not be 
complied with, and that he must withdraw from the ground at 
once. He was in full sight on the road, a hundred yards distant 
from Humphreys. (The ground was wooded.) As soon as 
Humphreys' staff officer reached him, Humphreys himself began 
to ride forward. A mile beyond this, as the skirmishers of the 
combined Second-Third Corps were closing in on Lee's — the 
Union troops being within fighting distance — Meade overtook 
Humphreys, and soon after informed him that a truce had been 
granted until a certain hour of the day. (2 p.m., Reb. Rec. XL, 
643, I.) At this time, according to Meade's report, the combined 
Second-Third Corps were within three miles of Appomattox Court 
House, to the eastward. Humphreys remained on the line of 
battle near the road with his staff about him, and as the hour for 
the termination of the truce approached, he took out his watch 
and held it in his hand. Exactly as the hands pointed to the 



XXXV. 

hour of 2 p. M., Humphreys mounted and gave the order to 
advance; but his troops had scarcely moved " twenty paces," or 
" one hundred yards," when a message from General Meade in- 
formed him that the truce had been extended '^ until further 
orders," and he halted the corps in the position marked on the 
United States Engineer Map, " Appomattox Court House," close 
up against Lee. Before long the notice of the surrender of Lee 
was received, and he had to issue orders at once to the skirmish- 
ers, now become pickets, to prevent his officers and men from 
passing over into Lee's camps. 

" General Humphreys' engagement on the night of the 7th 
(at Cumberland Church) was the last fighting of any importance " 
— said Brevet Col. W. H. Paine, (26, 6, 71) — " if I recollect 
aright, and 1 think General HuDiphrcys %vas only prevented fj-oni 
almost annihilati7ig the enemy ^ by the truce on the day of surrender. 
(9th April.) I was on his front at that time." 

* * * * -X- * -X- * -X- 

While the conditions of the surrender were under discussion, 
the troops became impatient, and impatience grew to a fever heat. 
The soldiers — who, as a rule, always saw farther than the run of 
the leaders, whom policy, not propriety, had given them — deemed 
that the delay was only another Confederate stratagem to throw 
us off our guard ; that underneath the color of treating, Lee in- 
tended to play us an Antietam trick. " Let us fijiish up the 
matter," they cried, " before night comes on again. If they do 
not intend to surrender, let us go m at once." 

LA CUREE ! SPOLIARIUM ! 



" C'est moins que la guerre, c'est la CHASSE, c'est la CUREE."— Michelet. 

" Our troops were just commencing to advance again (reads 
Paine's Diary), when they were again halted by authority from 
General Grant. It was during this truce that General Lee sur- 
rendered, of which we were soon apprised (a memento of which 
I secured by tearing a strip from the lower edge of the white 
cloth which served as a flag of truce, which the bearer allowed 
to trail while he was resting, partially asleep). General Meade, 
not feeling well to-day, was in his carriage at the front, but was 
obliged to return on horseback, the road was so crowded with 
troops. An officer had just passed down the road announcing the 
surrender, as General Meade passed, followed by his staff; everyone 
crowded forward, leaving scarcely room for the horses to pass, 
jeopardizing their lives and limbs, cheering, and making the most 
frantic demonstrations of joy." 



XXXVl. 

All at once a tempest of hurrahs shivered the air along our 
front. "Lee has surrendered!" Without having actually dis- 
tinguished the words, the whole Union army, present, compre- 
hended their import. The wildest acclamations rolled like peals 
of thunder over the field, through the woods, along the road, 
echoed and re-echoed, prolonged in solemn mutterings of hur- 
rahs among the trains which followed, at a distance, the Sixth 
Corps. Hats and caps filled the air. The flags waved and 
saluted, unfurling to the caresses of the winds their tattered frag- 
ments, glorious attestations and relics of nearly four years of 
battle, of over a hundred first-class stricken fields — 

" Flag of the brave ! thy folds shall fly. 
The sign of Hope and Triumph, high ! " 



" There shall thy Victor glances glow. 
And cowering foes shall sink beneath 

Each gallant arm that strikes below 
The lovely Messenger of Death ! " 

and all the bands poured forth to heaven — which answered with 
the sympathetic smile of unclouded sunshine — their accompani- 
ments of rejoicing, either in the lively notes of " Yankee Doodle " 
or the majestic strains of " Hail Columbia." 

"The wildest excitement prevailed (Paine's Diary again); 
everyone was cheering to the extent of his power. Every band 
was playing its loudest, drum corps vieing with each other, while 
artillery lent its aid. The very horses entered into the spirit of 
the occasion and pranced proudly. Flags waved, hats, haver- 
sacks and canteens were raised on muskets or thrown along the 
route of the general and staff. Trees and fences were climbed 
along the route, and in the most perilous positions were soldiers 
and, even on horseback, ofticers were seen embracing each other 
in delirium of joy ; nor did this decrease in intensity until the 
general had passed through the whole line and gone to his camp, 
when the demonstration became less concentrated, but still per- 
vaded the whole army, and was lost only in the darkness of the 
night." 

" On the evening of the 8th April and morning of the 9th," 
to quote a letter (29, 8, '71) of Lieutenant-Colonel Schoonover, 
commanding the nth New Jersey Volunteers — "the air was full 
of rumors about the surrender of Lee and his army. Flags of 
truce had been passed back and forth. We were moving slowly 
along on the morning of the 9th, when the column was suddenly 



XXX Vll. 

halted. This looked favorable and strengthened the reports won- 
derfully. Every one put on a significant look. The men took it 
for granted, and, as if they could not wait for the announcement 
of the news, shouts were heard on every side. How anxiously 
we waited and how eagerly we listened. We caught up every- 
thing. Nothing was too good nor too great. About noon it was 
known that the generals of the two armies were in conference and 
the result was impatiently awaited. About four o'clock in the 
afternoon General Meade and staff came in from the front. His 
Chief of Staff, General Webb, preceded him, and announced to 
the troops that lined the road on either side, that General Lee and 
his army had surrendered. It is useless to attempt to describe the 
scene that followed. The very ground seemed to shake with the 
cheers and yells of triumph that burst forth from that memor- 
able field. A thousand hats went up at once. The men seemed 
almost wild with joy. General Meade and staff rode through 
the dense mass and imagination would now tell me that he was 
obscured from sight with the shouts of a thousand mouths and 
the waving and hurling of as many hats." 

[Major-General McAllister at this point makes an observa- 
tion which would seem to imply that the old Third cheered rather 
the event than any one man. " The men cheered him (General 
Meade) as they never did before."] 

" Officers and men grasped each others hands in wild delight. 
The old war-worn and battle-stained colors seemed to wave ex- 
pressions of joy. Our men gathered around General McAllister, 
who spoke to them amidst continuous cheers. America never 
saw such a scene before, and I never expect to witness another. 
That day the fate of the Rebellion was sealed and the soldier 
knew and felt that the shot and shell from that army would never 
again sweep a comrade from their side. All who were there felt 
proud of it, and rejoiced that they had been participators in the 
grand closing scene." 

The writer's " labor of love " is finished with the war, for the 
war terminated with the surrender of Lee. Every succeeding 
shot was nothing more than the distant and dying echoes of the 
thunderbolt which burst between the Appomattox and the James. 
There, as when the clouds first gathered, the rattle of the Third 
Corps musketry and the roar of their guns blent with the awful 
uproar which ushered in and which terminated the great American 
Conflict. Oh, glorious body of heroes ! how grateful the duty of 
commemorating your achievements, which demonstrated in fire 
and attested in blood the truth of your claim of having ever 
been 



XXXVlll. 

" FIRST IN ATTACK, LAST IN RETREAT, THIRD ONLY IN 
NAME ! " 

About seven years [this was originally published in 187 2 J 
have elapsed since the last organized Confederate force submitted 
to the Union administration. Not only has Nature healed the 
scars inflicted by the struggle ; not only has industry eftaced the 
damages occasioned by the most terrible engines of war; but 
even the bones of the fallen — whether washed out of their shal- 
low graves by the rain, or thrown up by the frost, or uprooted by 
the beasts of prey — have disintegrated and dissolved, mingling 
with their kindred clay, until not a vestige remains of the san- 
guinary convulsions upon the various battlefields, moistened with 
the blood of hundreds of thousands of victims, and fattened with 
the corpses of half as many thousands of the slain. Under these 
circumstances, since nature, art and industry are so rapidly effacing 
every memento of our civil war, it behooves the government and 
the historian not to lose a single moment in their endeavors to 
rescue from the darkness of oblivion the achievements of those 
gallant men consigned to the gloom of the grave by their unsel- 
fish patriotism and voluntary immolation for the preservation of 
their country and its institutions. 

As it has been observed by one of our most popular writers, 
Longfellow, in his " Gleam of Sunshine," 

" Let me review the scene. 

And summon from the shadowy past 

The forms that once had been." 

Even so, let the pen of the poet and the historian plant their 
own peculiar flowers over the tombs of the fallen, to grow, bud, 
blossom and flourish in amaranthine beauty and freshnes's, that 
their odor and charms may keep in everlasting remembrance the 
devotion and the glory of the illustrious dead, and perpetuate the 
remembrance of the living who emulated their virtues, partook of 
their labors, shared their sufferings and participated in their dan- 
gers. Among these last the prominent figure in this little Memo- 
rial is the commander of the combined Second-Third Corps, 
Maj.-Gen. Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, the best soldier, 
according to the Greek understanding, of the "\^'ar : " Thus every- 
body who commands a [large] force [of armed and disciplined! 
men, is indeed commonly called a ^^w/^nr/y yet, he who is able, 
in a crisis, to collect himself and see his way through, he is the 
REAL general; the other is a mere general-officer^ 

Lecourbe, the faithful lieutenant of Massena at Zurich, and 



of Moreau upon the Rhine, was " an incomparable general, at 
once an intrepid soldier and a highly enlightened officer, who 
united to a rare sagacity in regard to the knowledge of localities, 
very uncommon audacity and an admirable tact." How aptly 
these attestations apply to Humphre)'S, wonderful in his power 
of seeing what had to be done and in doing it promptly — 
a consummate handler of troops. Colonel Paine, " the Path- 
finder of the Army of the Potomac," who served beside and 
under Humphreys while the latter was chief of its staff, said a 
very handsome thing of his superior, in making the following 
analysis of his character, which tallies exactly with Dumas' esti- 
mate of the upright Lecourbe : " For general, as well as inti- 
mate, acquaintance with the country in which he [Humphreys] 
was operating, and the troops against whom he was engaged — 
in fact, the general relative situation of affairs — Humphreys was 
second to no other Union general. * * From his usual 
quiescent suavity he was metamorphosed into the impersonation 
of enthusiasm, in action." 

[Note. — After the consolidation or combination of the Third 
Corps with the Second (one of the most flagrant injustices of the 
war) Birney's Division (First of the old Third, and now Third of 
the combined Second -Third Corps) headquarter flag was lahite, 
with a RED (Kearny, original) diamond in the centre. Mott's 
Division (Second of the old Third, and now Fourth of the com- 
bined Second-Third Corps) flag was blue, with a white (Hooker, 
original) diamond in the centre. The flag of the consolidated 
divisions (First and Second of the Third Corps, and Third of the 
combined Second-Third Corps) — at the close of the war com- 
manded by Mott, and finally by De Trobriand — was a swallow- 
tail, blue, with, in the centre, a combined red and white diamond: 
or a white diamond within a red diamond, to recall both the 
former First and Second Divisions (Kearny's and Hooker's) of 
the original old Third Corps. The inner diamond was white, 
upon a larger diamond red, so that the latter should show like a 
red border around the former; in the centre of the inner, the 
white diamond, was a small blue trefoil, the badge of the Second 
Corps. This is the statement of Major-General Mott (4, 5, 72), 
correcting the previous description of his Aid, Captain Demarest, 
published as note f, in the Citizen of 17th February, 1872.] 



FARMVILLE, BRIDGING AND FORDING. 

The Battle of the Heights of Farmviile, or at Cumberland 
Church, yth April, 1865. 



In a series of articles, which comprise reproductions of diaries, 
reports, &c., pubHshed in the New York Citizen and Round Table, 
and in a series of pamphlets (I. to VI., VII. and VIII.), were pre- 
sented the gist of the labors of about three years, and a great deal 
of additional information interwoven. The latter appeared between 
1872 and 1874, and met with the full approbation of Major-Gene- 
ral A. A. Humphreys and other officers, prominent actors. The 
first-named, on page VI. of the Preface to his " Virginia Campaign 
of 1864-65," makes this allusion : " I am also indebted to Major- 
General de Peyster for the valuable information contained in his 
elaborate work, " La Royale," published at his own expense for 
private circulation, and for the aid I have derived from his cor- 
respondence with Confederate officers." 

Of all the men esteemed great whom I have met in quite a 
long life, the two who made the strongest impression of unquali- 
fied superiority were Major-General George H. Thomas and 
Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys. None others ap- 
proached them; Thomas was the grandest and Humphreys was 
the most learned or scientific. Greater intimacy than existed 
between Humphreys and the writer could scarcely be. Again, 
and again, and again, in discussion, Humphreys expressed the 
strongest indignation in regard to his not having been reinforced 
on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865, and he indorsed, in the 
completes! degree, the utterances and decided judgments pub- 
lished in " La Royale," No. VIII. 

Nothing could surpass the astonishment felt on reading in 
Humphrey's book a concession that the river was " not fordable 
for the infantry," was " impassable." He had not visited tie spot 
in the meanwhile, /. e. since he had fought there, and he must 
have relied on the statements of others. I have had the river ex- 
amined, and if a regiment of generals were to rise up and main- 
tain the contrary, it would not shake my belief that it could have 
been rendered passable for any Arm, for all the Arms in about 



xli. 

two hours. I have seen too much of the wonderful resuks of the 
apphcation of practical labor in the case of railroad accidents and 
private enterprise not to feel perfectly certain on the subject. An 
attempt will now be made to prove the correctness of the opinion 
that any stream about one hundred feet wide and from three to 
six feet deep, without a violent current and with abundance of 
material handy, should be bridged so that troops could be passing, 
platoon front, in about two hours. The object of this article or 
chapter is to prove such to be the fact. 

It would, perhaps, be no exaggeration to claim that no writer 
on military subjects ever devoted more thought, time, labor and 
even personal expense to the consideration of an operation in war 
than the writer bestowed upon the pursuit of Lee from Petersburg 
to Appomattox Court House. Every incident of the flight and 
chase was investigated with the greatest care, with the assistance 
of every available authority in manuscript or print, and the help 
and advice of Colonel W. H. Paine, " the Pathfinder of the Army 
of the Potomac," Major-General Alexander S. Webb, and Major- 
General A. A. Humphreys, who commanded the combined Second 
and Third Corps, which did the bulk of the fighting, and persist- 
ently clung to and impeded or prevented the escape of the enemy. 
In the course of this pursuit a problem presented itself which 
proved unsolvable, and now must ever remain so, because the only 
one who could have furnished the solution is in his grave. It has 
always seemed incomprehensible why Grant did not reinforce 
Humphreys at Cumberland Church or Heights of Farmville, send 
across the Twenty-fourth and Sixth Corps, and keep Crook's cavalry 
on the north side of the Ap]:iomattox and finish up the business before 
the night of the 7th April, 1865, instead of continuing the pur- 
suit forty to fifty miles as the roads run, and thirty-six to forty hours. 
Even if Lee had got away in fragments from Cumberland Church 
on the night of the yth-Sth April, 1865 — that is supposing the 
Sixtli and Twenty-fourth Corps had crossed to the north side to 
the assistance of Humphreys — there were still the Fifth Corps and 
Sheridan's cavalry on the south side to head him off— as they after- 
wards did at Appomattox Court House. One of the excuses 
made for not reinforcing Humphreys was that the Appomattox 
was "impassable" at Farmville. The answer to this is clear; 
Crook's cavalry did get across by fording or wading, belly deep, 
and, according to Gen. Tremain, of Crook's staff, when across they 
got into a muddle, were roughly handled, repulsed, and repassed 
the river, fording or wading the stream a second time. No in- 
fantry attempted to cross until late at night, when they could be 
of no use. 

In this article it is proposed to show that the Appomattox was 



xlii. 

NOT " impassable " at Farmville ; that it could have been bridged 
with ordinary diligence within about two hours, and that the only 
reason it was not crossed or bridged was because the will was 
wanting; on whose part who shall, or rather, can say; "shall," 
as a matter at this moment of sentimental excitement in favor of 
a far too highly estimated man ; " can," because it is impossible 
to enter into the heart and brain of an impassive and reticent in- 
dividual, there to discover reasons or motives. An opinion I 
have ; and if any one, who has the right, asks me that opinion the 
answer is ready : no one has a right to publish an opiriion as a 
fact when only circumstantial evidence, indirect, however simi- 
larly corroborated, can be presented. 

When Gustavus found some military works which he had 
ordered to be made had been delayed, and among other excuses 
brought forward for the tardiness was the frost in the ground; 
the King answered : " The harder the ground the harder they 
should have worked," and that " A good will would have sur- 
mounted all obstacles ; " and then, to show what good will can 
effect, a few days afterwards cow-cribs and stable-racks, obtained 
from the neighboring farms, supplied the want of scaling ladders. 
On these they mounted to the assault and took a fortress (Frank- 
fort-on-the-Oder), within whose walls there was an army rather 
than a garrison. (Exact parallel. Larpent, L, 5-6. Welling- 
ton's novel scaling ladders.) The Thirty Year's War is the best 
horn-book for a soldier wherein to learn what energy, courage, 
capacity and real cavalry can effect. 

There is a very curious parallel to the operations of the 7th, 
8th and 9th April, 1865, in those narrated by Koch, in his " His- 
tory of the German Empire during the reign of Ferdinand III.," 
Vienna, 1865. II., 261-263. Baner was retreating after his 
attempt to surprise Ratisbon, with the sole thought of saving his 
army. Fighting was continuous between the pursuers and pur- 
sued, and Baner only escaped destruction by being a half-hour 
ahead. He got through the Pressnitz Pass just sufficiently in advance 
to avoid the ruinous effects of a very smart and energetic attempt 
. to outflank him and cut him off on the part of the Imperial com- 
mander-in-chief, Piccolomini, who was at the head of forces far 
superior in efficiency to those of the Swedes. The circumstances, 
if duly examined and weighed, were very similar to those at Farm- 
ville on the afternoon of the 7th April, 1865. The Swedes had 
suffered a great loss (similar to that experienced by the Rebels 
on Sailor's Creek, Proper, and " Little ; " the latter where Wright's 
Sixth Corps and Sheridan fought) and were sharply pressed and 
clung to by the Imperial General Geleen, playing the very part 
of Humphreys during Lee's retreat. 



xliii. 

Now comes the point, Geleen was doing all that man could 
do and hammering at the Swedish rear-guard, holding and delay- 
ing, so to speak, the retreating forces at Pressnitz, as I am con- 
vinced was the case at Farmville. Piccolomini, in our case Grant, 
could have finished Baner (Lee) there. By some writers Picco- 
lomini's action was excused as an error ; by others it was imputed 
to intention. The latter held that Piccolomini was determined 
that no one but himself should enjoy the honor of capturing 
Baner. Those who take the part of Piccolomini explain his con- 
duct on the plea that he found Baner in such a strong position 
that he turned aside to Kaden. This is exactly equivalent to 
Grant's not reinforcing and assisting Humphreys, and, instead, 
pushing on to Appomattox Court House where Sheridan was to 
reap the greater part of the glory ; whereas, if Grant had reinforced 
and assisted Humphreys at Cumberland Church, the lion's share 
of the credit must have fallen to that officer. In our case, in 
April, 1865, Humphreys was roughly handling the enemy all the 
time, and pressing him at Cumberland Church, just exactly as an 
Imperial corps commander was giving no respite to Baner; and 
roughly handled the Swedes at Mies, in the same way that 
Humphreys, at the very least, might have inflicted a defeat on 
Lee on the Heights of Farmville. Humphreys never got over 
the temporary suppression or withholding of his telegrams on the 
6th-7th, by which the credit which belonged to him remained 
unknown to the public and inured to the glory of others. I have 
always maintained, and nothing can convince me to the contrary, 
that a close examination of the facts will show, that if opportuni- 
ties had been utilized as they had been on other occasions, but 
as they only were to the full, and as advantage was taken of 
them only once, and then by Thomas after Nashville, under far 
more difficult circumstances, Lee's fate would have been decided 
on the 7th April, p. m., 1865, and not unnecessarily postponed to 
the gth m., forty miles farther on. 

[Note. — In Note 1 to pages 53 and 54, Lieutenant Owen, 
in his " In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery 
of New Orleans," states that " Colonel Walton was at once 
appointed by General Beauregard Chief of Artillery of the 'Army 
of the Potomac' (as the Confederate Army in Virginia was then 
called." This afterwards was Lee's "Army of Northern Virginia." 
At that time the embryo Union grand army of the Atlantic zone 
was styled the " Army of North-eastern Virginia," which became 
the famous " Army of the Potomac," and as such, alone, will live 
in history. This statement of Lieutenant Owen is new to almost 
everyone ; but it is not more novel that there were two Third 



xliv. 

Corps in the Union Armies in Virginia in 1862, although there 
was only one, in unique grandeur, the Third iVrmy Corps, Army 
of the Potomac. There were two corps recognized as Third in 
the summer of 1862; one " the Old Fighting Third Corps as we 
understand it" of which the First and Second Divisions (in 
reality all that remained of the original Third Corps, commanded 
by Heintzleman under McClellan on the Peninsula, and after- 
wards under Pope) were consolidated with the Second Corps, and 
the Third Division, an entire stranger to the old Third and added 
to it after Gettysburg, which was consolidated in the spring of 
1864 with the Sixth. This disruption or assassination of the Third 
Corps was one of the most unjust and morally unauthorized actions 
of tyranny done during the war. The other Third Corps, in the 
Army of Virginia under Pope, was commanded by McDowell, 
who previously had what was known as the First Corps of the 
x\rmy of the Potomac. This double enumeration has led to mis- 
apprehensions, because, in the summer of 1862, there were two 
corps known as the Third, one under Heintzleman, one under 
McDowell, the latter entirely distinct, serving under Pope.] 

Over three years (repeating to emphasize) was occupied in 
collecting information in connection with the last six months of 
the career of the two armies of the Potomac. At that time no 
idea was entertained that the Official Records of the Rebellion 
would ever be collected, collated and published. At the rate 
they are printed, it will be years before the transactions of the 
spring of 1865 can be expected to appear. Consequently, with- 
out them, any narrative must be based on what is accessible; the 
inaccessible cannot be taken into account. The plans which 
appear with this battle were prepared with great care, under the 
supervision of Major-General A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engi- 
neers, U. S. A., for a work which was published in eight parts 
in 1872 and 1873, entitled "La Royale;" or "the Grand 
Hunt of the Army of the [Union] Potomac." To this General 
Humphreys alludes, and cites it as an authority in the Preface of 
his " Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865," pubhshed in 1883, is- 
sued by Charles Scribner's Sons, as the concluding number of their 
War Series. No expense nor labor was spared in preparing " La 
Royale," and the author is greatly indebted to a number of 
individuals for assistance in the shape of communications, state- 
ments, diaries and reports, and likewise the loan of pamphlets and 
rare books which he was not able to purchase or even to hear of 
except by accident. If any errors have occurred they are the 
result, NOT of prejudice, but of accident. 

The other two maps or plans likewise appearing in this con- 



xlv. 

nection were prepared under the supervision of General Humph- 
reys. The writer is also in possession of the, or an original, 
map of Colonel W. H. Paine, " Pathfinder of the Army of the 
Potomac." It is on a very large scale and all the movements or 
marches of the Union or loyal columns were marked upon it by 
Colonel Paine. The writer had also a number of small maps or 
diagrams, as well as those published in rough or in detail. The 
dispatches and telegrams were copied from the collection made 
for and in the possession of Major-General Alexander S. Webb, 
during the winter and spring of 1864-5, Chief of Staff of the 
Army of the Potomac, or from copies furnished from Washington. 
The reports cited are from copies made at Washington. All 
possible assistance to render the result correct was furnished by 
different officers of the combined Second-Third Corps, and other 
friends and accquaintances who participated in the events under 
consideration. 

Why Lee made any stand at all at Cumberland Church, or the 
Heights of Farmville, seems inexplicable. The only troops har- 
assing him after he had got across the /Appomattox were the 
combined Second-Third Corps, under Humphreys, which had 
followed him across High Bridge, and Crook's cavalry, which had 
fired into his stragglers ; but this cavalry had been stopped by 
the burning of the bridges at Farmville, which occurred under their 
noses [Tremain]. A time-table of events would be very instructive. 
Adjutant Owen, in his book, "In Camp and Battle" (page 377), 
says that Longstreet's command, including that formerly under 
Hill, reached Farmville early this morning, and the Washington 
Artillery '' went into park to rest." " Provisions were distributed 
for the first time." 

, [A comparatively small stiffening of infantry, such as both 
Pleasonton and J. E. B. Stuart had at Brandy Station, would have 
either made Gregg's charge effective or else saved him from the 
panic which ensued, as Tremain admits, and have enabled him to 
hold his ground. To get this infantry across, if they were unable 
to imitate the fording by Humphreys troops through Flat Creek, 
just about as wide as the Appomattox at Farmville, eighty to one 
hundred feet (376), with the water up to their arm-pits (378), 
while bridges were built in an incredibly short space of time for 
the passage of the rest of the infantry and of the artillery and 
ambulances, " a temporary bridge might have been improvised 
with wagons loaded with stones at intervals instead of trestles." 
When the militia under General Robert van Rensalaer, in October, 
1780, in pursuit of Sir John Johnson, refused to ford the Mohawk 
River, " the wagons were driven into the river, behind each other, 
and the troops passed from one to the other by wading on the 



xlvi. 

tongues." The Mohawk is great deal wider, fuUy as deep, if not 
much deeper in the channel near Fort Rensalaer, and much more 
rapid than the Appomattox at Farmville. This method of fording 
is quoted from the proceedings of a court martial and the testi- 
mony of Major Lewis R. Morris.] 

Owen is brevity itself, but he seems to refer to Lee's general's dis- 
positions to make a stand. Lee had gained sufficient upon Humph- 
reys '' to intrench strongly." This looks like as if hours had been 
thrown away and the gain of a few hours would have brought his 
van to Appomattox Station in time for his infantry to have saved the 
train of cars which were captured by Custer. About 1.20 p. m. 
Humphreys again struck Lee, and made such an impression that 
he claims to have got in among the Rebel batteries, which were 
afterwards silenced by his own. About the same time the head of 
the Twenty-fourth Corps, to which a pontoon train was attached, 
was at Farmville. At 2.20 p. m. Wright's Sixth Corps was in 
Farmville. Humphreys had asked the direct support of the Fifth 
Corps, which was most handy and v/hich might have followed him 
straight, without delay or difficulty, across High Bridge. 

Consider the situation. The Army of Northern Virginia, 
whatever was its real strength, was at Cumberland Church in a 
strong position, strongly entrenched, with every apparent inten- 
tion of making a decided stand. Humphreys had two divisions, 
twelve thousand nominally, and, within three miles, Barlow's 
division, six thousand men. Deducting stragglers, &c., he may 
not have had two-thirds of that number in hand. At Farmville, 
four miles away, was the Twenty-fourth Corps, say ten thou- 
sand, allowing for stragghng, besides a portion of the Twenty- 
fifth Corps ; in fact, Ord's Army of the James, immediately with 
him, over fifteen thousand men ; the Sixth Corps, eighteen thou.- 
sand men, and Crook's division of cavalry, five thousand men. 
The Fifth Corps numbered about seventeen thousand ; it is im- 
possible to arrive at actual strength, for very large allowances 
must be made for stragglers and malingerers and honestly used 
up men. Deduct one-quarter or more from the returns on paper 
and there were forty to forty-five thousand effectives, gradually 
piling up and piled up in Farmville before, at, and after noon, 7th 
April, 1865. 

Lee, according to Humphreys, was in his presence until 8 p. m., 
and how much longer he could not tell. What was being done, 
except by Humphreys, between i p. m. and whatever hour Lee 
moved off in the darkness, by the Union i],ifantry — nothing. 
Meade, to his credit be it chronicled, was urging energetic action 
and promising support and assistance to Humphreys, which was 
not given. The cavalry forded belly-deep; no hour is given. Adju- 



xlvii. 

tant Owen (378), says it was in the afternoon, which may mean 
any hour after midday. At 2 p. M. the Twenty-fourth Corps ought 
to have been marching across the river ; the Sixth Corps at 4 
p. M., on improvised bridges. That Lee had not budged, is 
plainly shown that late in the afternoon (4.30 p. M., A. A. H.) 
Miles undertook to make a flank attack in reverse and was bloodily 
repulsed, although the Rebel attempt to follow up their success 
also came to grief 

Now turn to the maps. The mahi road to Lynchburg crosses 
the Appomattox at Farmville, and runs from a mile to a mile and 
a half in the rear of Lee's position — that is to the west of Cum- 
berland Church. Adjutant Owen admits that, if the Union 
cavalry had not been repulsed, Lee might have been taken 
prisoner. These are his words (379) : " It was fortunate that we 
were there just on the nick of time, for had Gregg obtained pos- 
session of the road, he stood a good chance of cutting off General 
Lee and staff and capturing them. 

If any of the cavalry and infantry who were on the south 
of the Appomattox had crossed it further up, west of Farm- 
ville, and there were several fords in that direction and a bridge 
at Sand's, they could have struck the Lynchburg road in the 
direction of Concord Church (Court House ?) or certainly at 
New Store, which was i-eached by the Rebel forces in the course 
of the night of the 7th-8th. For this inaction, inertion, Meade 
certainly does not seem to have been to blame in the least until 
towards night, when he appears to have given up in despair ; for 
he telegraphed to Humphreys : " You will have to take care of 
yourself" Meade had been right and Grant wrong at Amelia Salt 
Sulphur Springs on the early morning of the 6th. Grant him- 
self was at Farmville somewhere between four and five o'clock 
on the 7 th, because Wright telegraphs the fact at the latter hour. 

It may be sacrilege to the masses to criticise Lee in this 
retreat, or Grant in following him up, but Lt. Mangold of the 
Prussian Artillery, in his consideration of the Army of Virginia in 
August, 1862, makes use of an expression in regard to Pope 
which is not inapplicable to whoever is responsible for what was 
done and what was not done at Farmville on the 7th April after 
twelve o'clock. " He did not appear to have had the ability to 
think himself into the situation." In regard to Pope, far be it 
from the writer, who is his friend, to endorse the opinion that 
that this remark applies, or is just, to Pope. 

When the great object of a three years' struggle, the destruction 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the opportunity was so 
promising and near at hand at Cumberland Church, what was the 
use of postponing it a day and half or two days, and thirty to fifty 



xlviii. 

miles (according to writers) farther on, to occur at Appomattox 
Court House. 

Quite an able, bold, highly educated soldier and author wrote 
an article for the Galaxy, entitled " Broken Idols," and he 
certainly proved his case if correct in his facts, and as facts are 
yet established, he was right and did so. Lee was one of the 
" Broken Idols," and he proved himself so by losing so many 
precious hours at Cumberland Church. It is true that Humphreys 
was close upon his heels, and had torn him sorely and bled him 
severely on the preceding day, never relaxing the pressure. Lee 
was in a very bad spot at Antietam when McClellan let him go. 
although McClellan can shift a portion of the blame on the 
shoulders of very bad counselors. Lee Avas in a worse place at 
WiUiamsport and Falling Waters. Meade let him escape, although 
it has been asserted that Lincoln telegraphed to him to attack, 
and if failure resulted to show that the President's orders as his 
complete exoneration, and if he triumphed to destroy the dis- 
patch and assume all the glory. In other words, Lincoln was 
willing to assume the whole responsibility of failure and to relin- 
quish every claim of credit for success. 

Compare the pursuit by Thomas after Nashville with that 
made by any other Union general after a victory. Thomas had to 
get everything ready to profit by a success to follow up a victory. 
He had to mount his cavalry as well as to organize his troops; to 
gather up the reins after he had harnessed the team. To make 
his own command complete Sherman had depleted Thomas, and 
yet, when the army Avhich fronted Thomas before Nashville had 
been defeated, the following it up left nothing but scattered 
wrecks, resembling the shattered timbers of a mighty ship which 
had struck a mightier rock, and the sea is covered with fragments 
to reward the bold wrecker who amid the tempest puts forth to 
harvest them. Had Sherman left Thomas the pontoon train 
which the latter asserted belonged to him, he could have crossed 
Duck River once, and then there Avould have been nothing left of 
Hood but chips. 

It is all true. Lee broke away on the 2d-3d April, 1865, and 
the casting about, search and pursuit, in many senses, began on 
the 3d ; but the real hunt, the chase, with all the excitement of 
catching sight of the magnificent game and again losing sight of 
it, and following the tracks and droppings and scent, did not begin 
until the 6th, when Humphreys, alwa\s vigilant, alacritous and 
ready, took in the whole revelation of Lee's apparition and move- 
ments at a glance, and never lost track or hold, more or less 
strong, until noon of the 9th, when nothing but orders prevented 
the combined Second-Third Corps, supported by the Sixth, 



xlix. 

from settling the question, as it should have been settled, not by 
/nuchas palabras, but vi et armis — destruction, as it should have 
been. '■'■Paiua verba, Sir John;" or '■'■pauca paUabris^'' as Shakes- 
peare reads in divers places. 

So much eulogy has been expended on the following up of 
Lee, and Grant has been declared a greater general than Frede- 
ric the Great, or Hannibal, and that perhaps he equalled a 
Julius Csesar, it may seem like sacrilege to question the sagacity 
of even his most insignificant movements. Why, however, JuHus 
Ctesar was placed ahead of Hannibal is difficult to conceive, since 
Frederic the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, and a number of other 
competent judges unite in the decision that Hannibal — Montes- 
quieu's "Colossus of Antiquity" — was the greatest captain that 
ever appeared on this planet. 

General Humphreys, the soul of energy or strength and 
despatch, was always of the opinion that, after the victory of 
Miles, if he had continued his march in force towards Suther- 
land's Station, pursuing the enemy by the Claiborne Road, instead, 
as ordered, of leaving the work to Miles' Division alone, it is 
probable that the whole Rebel force would have been captured 
on the morning of the 2d April. As it was, Miles gained a bril- 
hant little victory; but the majority of the enemy retreated and 
moved up the Appomattox toward Amelia Court House, where 
they arrived about midday on the 4th April. As it was, the com- 
bined Second-Third Corps was recalled towards Petersburg, 
and in the unnecessary movements to and fro Lee gained a start 
of twenty hours. Sheridan seems to have coincided in this view. 

Lee's second loss of time was on the 5th, when he actually 
made a movement towards Jetersville ^vith a view of attacking 
Sheridan. This involved another of those night marches which 
were more wearing on his tired troops than even thcAvant of pro- 
visions, on which so much stress has been laid. It is utterly im- 
possible in this summary to go into anything like details, but the 
facts will be found on pages 374-90. — Owen's " In Camp and 
Battle." 

Thus it will be seen that Lee's tergivisations or delays were 
as suicidal and fatal to his escape as any retarding was to the 
other side, whoever may have been to blame." Still, as the chief 
got the glory, he ought to bear it; at all events, it is easy enough 
to add and subtract. Lee lost hours of inestimable value on 
the 5th, and again on the 7th. To compensate for this in- 
volved night-work — most telling on well-fed men and absolutely 
killing to fasting mortals, when no rest was afforded on an en- 
suing day. Without the delays which can safely be set down as 
at least equivalent to a day's march, if Lee had kept straight on 



1. 

he would have reached Appomattox Court House by noon of the 
8th, at latest. From Petersburg to that point id not over one 
hundred miles by the longest route; which, to get over, certainly 
does not require more than three days of forced march, equal to 
that made by the Sixth Corps hurrying on to Gettysburg, or of 
the Fifth Corps and of , the Ninth Corps hastening to Appomat- 
tox Court House. 

[Note. Marching. — Simply to exhibit what infantry can do 
with their legs. General Crawford brought up "3000 fresh troops" 
to join Wellington on the battlefield of Taleveira, 29th July, i8og, 
" having passed over, in regular order, sixty-two English miles in the 
preceding twenty-six hours" (Alison, III., 321 [2]); and Lord 
Lake, with the English cavalry, ist April, 1805, made a forced 
march to surprise the Mahratta horse, came upon them unawares, 
utterly routed them, dispersed them, slew one thousand, and re- 
turned to his camp the same day, after a march, in twelve hours, 
of fifty miles (A., III., 169 [i]). Even this was exceeded by 
Lord Lake's pursuit and defeat of Holkar at Furrackabad, when 
the greater part of the English cavalry had ridden seventy miles 
within twenty-four hours, besides fighting and routing the whole 
of those horsemen which had been the terror of that region. 
{Ibid, 166 (2).] 

" Nicholson's Indian Mutiny" (374-5) : "The splendid, admir- 
able and effective Punjab Guards, says Wilson in his 'Zanskar, or 
the Abode of Man,' half foot, half horsemen, marched (at the 
outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny) from Mudan six hours after 
it got the order, and was at Attok (thirty miles off) next morning, 
fully equipped for service. This legion was pushed on to Delhi, 
a distance of 580 miles or thirty regular marches, which they ac- 
complished in twenty-one regular marches. After thus marching 
twenty-seven miles a day for three weeks, the Guards reached 
Delhi on 9th June, and three hours afterwards engaged the 
enemy hand to hand, every officer being more or less wounded." 

Lynchburg is one hundred and twenty miles W. S. W. of 
Richmond; Appomattox Court House, as stated, less than one 
hundred. In view of the tremendous marches made at different 
times by troops, and kept up day after day, six days of energetic 
progresswould havecarried Lee to Lynchburg without necessitating 
any of the fighting to which he was subjected. [Farmville to Appo- 
mattox Court House twenty-five miles in a bee-line, Petersburg to 
Jetersville forty miles, Jetersville to Farmville about twenty.] 
On the 6th the combined Second-Third Corps marched and 
fought from Jetersville to the mouth of Sailor's Creek, 6th. They 



li. 

were on the move from early morning to dark night, fighting all 
the time over fourteen miles, having already moved from their 
camps in the morning three or four miles before they struck the 
enemy. It has been called one hundred miles in round numbers 
from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House by the routes 
followed. Perhaps the most direct march would have greatly 
shortened the distance, but, at all events, Lee had from the night 
of the 2d-3d to the early afternoon of the 8th to do the distance, 
and at that time no Union troops whatever were there to annoy 
him, to stop him or to gobble his trains of provisions. 

" Livre de Guerre Moderne a I'usage des Mihtaires de toutes 
les Armes et de tons les Pays, par Cesar L. D'Albeca, ancien 
ofiftcier superieur d'etat-major, ingenieur civil, &c. Londres : 
Berlin: La Haye: Paris: St. Petersbourg : Rome: Turin: 1872." 

In the above work, pages 261, &c.. Section " Military Bridges," 
a great deal of information will be found pertinent to the circum- 
stances under treatment. M. D'Albeca, speaking of the em- 
ployment of casks as floats, omits to mention that large [tobacco] 
hogsheads [of which there were plenty in Farmville] might have 
been used instead of trestles, filled with stones or any rubbish, as 
piers ; as we have seen that the Appomattox is not over one hun- 
dred and twenty feet wide, five such piers would have permitted the 
use of beams from houses of the most ordinary size. Perhaps 
this would have been the handiest and most substantial way of 
building a strong temporary bridge, to give strength to the piers 
which would have required the placing of the hogsheads in tiers. 
They might have been simply girded with ropes, with no use of 
anchors, because there was no freshet in the river at the time. In 
fact I received a letter from Farmville, in answer to questions in 
regard to Ford, stating that, owing to the dam above the rail- 
road bridge, the water does not deepen in the spring. 

General Humphreys perfectly agreed with me as long as I 
continued to write and publish on this subject, and I was as- 
tonished to find in his "Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865" 
(page 388) the following paragraph : " The bridges were burnt 
and our troops concentrated about Farmville during the day 
were, with the exception of Crook's cavalry, prevented from cross- 
ing, as the river was not fordable for infantry, and barely for 
cavalry." 

[There seems to be little use, then, of discussing the matter 
of Fording and Bridging the Appomattox, 7th April, 1865. Troops 
recruited from brave peoples or races, disciplined, and well offi- 
cered, have never failed to respond to the will and wishes of a chief 
in whom they have confidence. Ever since the noted day on 
which Perdiccas forded the Nile to attack Ptolemy Soter, and his 



Hi. 

brave troops fought breast deep in that river, B. C. 321, no stream 
four to four and a half feet deep has ever stopped troops deter- 
mined to get across. According to Tremain, Crook's battery 
animals forded with their owners ; under such circumstances infan- 
try sufficient to stiffen the cavalry could have waded or have been 
carried across, " en croupe^'' behind the troopers. Much as I have 
studied and talked upon this matter, one fact has been overlooked 
uiitil this very day (17. 3, 'Zd) which disproves the impassability 
of the Appomattox by infantry and cavalry. — At page 17 of his 
"War Memoranda," part II, published herewith, Tremain w^'/z/Z^/^.y 
Lord's Battery as being with the cavalry that waded or forded, 
and among the "Errata" noted by Tremain himself, under date 
17th December, 1885, he says "this line [that is a new line of 
battle to meet the victorious rebels] was formed, and Reade's 
Battery put in position under his [Tremain's] personal direction, 
while Crook was rallying Gregg's brigade." General Tremain is 
a lawyer of high standing and experience, and therefore perfectly 
acquainted with the force and effect of language and testimony, 
and until anyone can disprove his personal evidence, the fact re- 
mains incontrovertible that the Appomattox at Farniville was not 
" impassable," but was passable for cavalry and their pack trains a?id 
artillery, and therefore fordable for infantry. Here rests MY 
case as to Fording at Farmville, 7th April, 1865.] 

Why General Humphreys altered his opinion I could never 
understand. His book was published in 1883, and he died in the 
ensuing winter, so that there was no opportunity of discovering 
his reasons for the above paragraph. We were in constant 
correspondence, exchanging letters once a week as a rule, some- 
times oftener, much oftener. Humphreys was a very affectionate 
man, very determined at the moment, none more so; but very 
easily influenced by those that he loved, and he was particularly fond 
of Wright, who (the latter) was worthy of any man's love. Although 
an immense amount of information had been accumulated, I was 
determined to obtain facts which could not be controverted, and 
Mr. C. M. Bissell, Superintendent of the Hudson R. R. R., 
wrote to the Superintendent of the Norfolk and Western R. R., 
and the latter kindly sent, not only a plan, but answers to various 
queries. 

Between the piers of the railroad bridge at Farmville the 
distance is one hundred and four to one> hundred and eight feet, 
and the length of the wagon-bridge one hundred and nineteen 
feet, out to out. The banks of the river are low about six to 
eight feet over ordinary water, soil sandy, and the depth of the 
stream at ordinary stage of water two and one half to three feet. 
It will be remembered that Mr. Hooper stated that the water, if 



liii. 

not affected by freshets below the dam, and there was no freshet 
in the river at the time now treated of. Superintendant Sands, N. 
& W. R. R., says there is no ford near the town. Does this 
mean at this date, 1885? because the statement directly contra- 
dicts several letters written from the spot by other parties twelve 
to twenty years ago. Maps and facts. One of the facts is, Crook's 
division of cavalry forded belly-deep, five-thousand strong, heavily 
laden battery animals, and batteries; some of the Sixth (?) Corps ar- 
tillery forded, also infantry. While dictating this very paragraph 
a neighbor, who served in the Nineteenth Corps, told me that this 
very day he drove a loaded wagon through a ford two feet and 
nine inches deep, clay-bottom and rutted, and that for personal 
and peculiar reasons he measured the depth. Thirty-three inches 
is more than belly-deep ordinary horses. 

Conceding that the Appomattox is one hundred and twenty 
feet wide wide out and out, and thirty to thirty-six inches deep, 
these measurements exactly accord with the conditions estabHshed 
by the work — "The Book of Modern War" — in regard to military 
trestle bridges, which says that they are proper for rivers less than 
fifty yards across, between twelve and thirteen feet deep, with 
a current equivalent to about four miles an hour; maximum 
height of trestles twelve to fifteen feet; the bottom ought to be 
firm and comparatively level. In extreme cases a depth of ten 
to twelve feet justifies the use of trestles if the current is not strong. 
In river of little depth and not rapid the body of the bridge 
supports may be constituted of wagons and gun-carriages. 

When General van Renselaer was following up Sir John 
Johnson, in the autumn of 1780, he improvised a bridge with 
ordinary country wagons across the Mohawk, near Ft. Renselaer, 
and the Mohawk, except after long droughts, is a wider and more 
rapid and difficult stream to ford than the Appomattox, or at all 
events was so over one hundred years ago — yes, forty years ago ; 
hut since the piers of the railroad bridge were standing, and 
there were any quantity of large trees and buildings in close 
vicinity to furnish material, a cantilever bridge, even supposing 
that there had to be a single support or pier in the centre, could 
have been immediately thrown. 

William H. Spanburgh, now Superintendent of the Hudson 
Bridge Works, has done a great deal of work in the region around 
my home. He enlistened as private in the 159th Regiment N. 
Y. V. I., was wounded five times, four times in one battle, and 
was promoted to a lieutenancy. He is a practical man, prompt 
boss, and able mechanic. He came on a place with five men 
and, with ordinary lumber, in half a day — about four hours work- 
ing time — built a temporary bridge across a ravine eighty-four feet 



liv. 

wide, sufficiently strong to bear the transportation of the iron- 
work for the permanent structure. Some of the supports had to 
be about twenty feet high. With such an example the matter 
can be reduced down to a simple rule of three. If five men with 
material brought to them as they worked could put up a viaduct 
which would enable men to cross with very heavy weights in four 
or five hours, how long ought it to have taken veteran engineers, 
after several years of active service, with an unlimited supply of 
practiced laborers and adequate material, to bridge the Appo- 
mattox at Farmville so that a couple of corps, with their guns and 
trains, could cross ? 

The feasibility, or impossibility, of Bridging or Fording the 
Appomattox was not an insoluble problem, but one based on 
facts demonstrable then, as now; the ordinary depth of water is 
given by scientific testimony. 

A resident, an eye-witness, wrote there was no freshet in the 
stream at that date. Crook's cavalry, wading or fording it back- 
wards and forwards, verifies these statements. Over and above 
this fording by the cavalry, certain localities are designated on 
the maps as fords. 

If infantry and artillery could not ford, the river was not so 
deep but that workmen could wade in and place trestles. 

The span of the railroad bridge is 109 feet ; that of the wagon- 
bridge 119 feet. There are five hundred buildings in the town. 
There are few buildings which will not furnish beams 20 feet 
long. Concede the greatest width of the stream 120 feet. Five 
very strong, ten strong trestles would have been sufficient, and they 
could have been put together, placed, ballasted and secured in an 
hour. Meanwhile the rest of the material could have been 
selected and brought to the spot, and another hour would have 
more than sufficed to have completed a bridge over which fifteen 
men could have marched abreast, eight mounted men, or two 
equipages. A division of cavalry, however, did pass to and fro, 
having forded belly deep — this is incontrovertible proof of depth 
and condition of stream, and therefore it could have been forded 
again by other troops. 

Four or five mechanics came on my place under a boss who 
had been an old soldier. One team brought the materials, and 
in half a day they built a structure in some places twenty feet 
high, over which they were enabled to carry with safety the iron 
for a permanent bridge strong enough to permit the passage of 
heavily-loaded teams; a bridge which was guaranteed to permit 
the passage of 33 cwt., and they said that they made tlie guaran- 
tee far below the actual carrying power. 



Iv. 

Reduce these facts to a simple rule of three. If one team and 
five men could construct a temporary viaduct in half a day, what 
ought not the thousands under the direction of military authority 
and scientific proficiency, with ample materials at hand, have 
accomphshed in one hour. My bridge was 84 feet long; the 
bridge of Farmville would have been less than half longer ; the 
supports of my bridge had to be twice as high. The fact that the 
men at Farmville had to work in water up to their waists is a 
consideration not worthy of being taken into account ; railroad rails 
would have answered for beams and ties, simple boards cris- 
crossed would have constituted a roadway capable of sustaining 
any weight. All the difficulty would have been the trestles, or 
cob-piers. Ingenuity Avould have found no difficulty in making 
and placing them. The will and the directing mind was want- 
ing. Why ? Echo answers, why ! and the echo would be repeated 
by every effort at investigation. 

In regard to bridging. Captain James Chester, Third United 
States Artillery, in " Correspondence," page 276, September, 1855, 
number of the J^imriial of the U. S. Military Service Institution, 
says that yesterday [23d June, 1885], I attended the Military 
Exhibition in Agricultural Hall. " I saw two trestle bays of a 
bridge laid by pontooiiiers, and a piece of ai'tillery driven over it in- 
side five mijmtes.^^ As no figures are given it is impossible to be 
definite, but in the Aide Afenioire, published in England, 22 feet is 
given as the length of the main beam, and thus five trestle bays 
would have sufficed to bridge the. Appomattox at Farmville, and 
if two bays — all the appliances prepared and ready at hand — 
were laid and artillery passed in five minutes, certainly five bays 
ought to have been improvised with all kinds of material in abun- 
dance, and any amount of labor disposable. There was no abso- 
lute need, however, of constructing a trestle bridge. It appears 
the railroad bridge piers were there, plenty of trees, lumber, (S:c., 
for a cantilever bridge. If Suworrow, when the arch of the 
Devil's Bridge on the St. Gothard's route was destroyed, leaving 
a chasm 30 feet wide, and Suworrow was able to improvise a 
bridge out of trunks of trees lashed together with the sashes of 
his officers, practical Americans ought to have been able to 
bridge the Appomattox without a moment's delay. I am not 
engineer enough to use technical terms, but educated officers 
ought to know that there is exactly such a method of laying a 
bridge described as would have been precisely applicable to the 
case of Farmville. Prolonges spliced would have been amply 
sufficient for hauling and for lashing, shoving out long timbers 
from either pier with what it would seem are termed " end-ties" 
in the centre. 



Ivi. 

[In England they hold what are called Royal Military tourna- 
ments, in which all the different Arms exhibit their efficiency. In 
the " Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine " for October, 
1885, Vol. 3, No. 16, are two illustrations: i. "Royal Engineer 
Bridge Equipment, or Field Wagon ; " 2. " Royal Engineers 
Constructing a Flying Bridge over a River protected by Artillery 
and Infantry," with a text in explanation which is hereinafter 
presented. If a bridge could be thrown "over a stream fifteen 
feet wide in four minutes, a bridge at that rate ought to have 
been thrown over a stream one hundred and five feet wide in 
twenty-eight minutes ; allowing for ignorance of the depth and 
bottom double the time, and then it would take fifty-six minutes; 
this with a simple detachment just sufficient to handle the 
material. Take into consideration, as on the 7th April, 1865, no 
necessity of any preparations for protection, a redundancy of 
materials, close at hand, and a positive superfluity of disciplined 
labor ; and double that time, two hours, ought to have sufficed 
for the construction of means of crossing a stream one hundred 
and five feet wide and fordable by cavalry, " belly deep," in less 
than two hours. 

" A fairly representative stream being laid down, fordable by 
infantry, but impassable for guns, a mixed force essayed to cross 
with artillery, and storm a work on the other side. For the first 
time, a body of Royal engineers and infantry had a chance of 
showing their ability before an audience at the Royal Military 
Tournament. Covered by the fire of artillery and infantry, 
the Royal engineers threw a bridge over a stream fifteen 
feet wide in less than four minutes. The infantry, having 
first topped a twelve-foot wall "like birds," kept down the fire 
of the fort until the bridge Avas completed, then rushed the bridge, 
followed by the guns, and escaladed a " practicable " wall with great 
dash and vigor. Of course, many things were taken for granted. 
Real rivers, real enemies, and real bullets are not to be found in 
the arena at Islington, but, as a military spectacle, the infantry 
display of 1885 marks a fresh advance in the work of the Royal 
Military Tournament. The gymnastic training of the infantry, 
the technical skill and speed of the Royal Engineers, and the 
protective and covering work of the fire of infantry and artillery, 
were as well illustrated as was possible in their space available. 
All branches of the service are having a fair turn, and all efforts 
are in the direction of persistent and continuous improvement."] 

What makes me dwell upon this subject and repeat with so 
much emphasis, is the incapability of understanding how it was 
that when there was every chance of ending a terrible struggle of 
four years within three or four miles and with amply sufficient 



Ivii. 

numbers to make the attempt then and there ahnost a certainty, 
and a surplus of numbers to send ahead to make the matter a cer- 
tainty somewhere else, Grant did not see it. Grant never saw 
anything he did not choose to see. These facts, which appear to 
be susceptible of perfectly clear proof, have always awakened 
questions as to the Why no really strenuous effort was made 
to finish on the afternoon of the 7th, and Why the tremendous 
strain was kept up for the further distance of thirty or forty miles 
and forty-four hours. 

Imagine the scene and the idea of a large army collected on 
the south shore of a small stream, watching the smoke and hear- 
ing the rattle and roar of a battle which could decide and ter- 
minate a long contest, not crossing or being allowed to cross to 
the assistance of their comrades engaged within three or four 
miles. It was almost the same aggravating case as that of the 
battle of Prague, 6th May, 1657, when the whole division or 
column of Prince Maurice were prevented from crossing by the 
want of sufficient pontoons to bridge the Moldau. The famous 
cavalry General SedUtz was so excited that he attempted to ford 
or swim to the assistance of his comrades. He spurred his horse 
into the Moldau, became entangled in a quicksand, and Avas with 
difficulty extricated. There is a vast difference between the Mol- 
dau and the Appomattox; and in the latter case there was a 
ponton train present, and if it had been absent plenty of ma- 
terials to build a bridge. Moreover, there was a ford by which 
cavalry crossed " belly deep," with their pack-teams and artillery. 
(Study up Alexander on the Hydaspes, B. C. 326, and his method 
of crossing in the face of the army of Porus.) 

All military histories, as a rule, are perfectly unsatisfactory on 
the subject of Bridging and Fording. They deal in generalities, 
and not in details. They are as blank in this respect as Caesar in 
regard to the hygeine of his camps, or sanitary measures, which 
led almost every writer to declare that there was no medical pro- 
visions or organizations in the Roman armies. 

Under practical, energetic and audacious generals, with in- 
telligent troops, improvised bridges have been thrown, which 
render the usual excuses almost ridiculous. Throughout read- 
ing and study, most extensive and careful, sufficient examples 
were discovered to prove that in ninety-nine cases out of one 
hundred, where a stream proved any obstacle, it did not exist in 
nature, but in the general which it stopped. If the curious reader 
takes up a book to learn the rules of fording, he will find set 
down : " A ford should not be more than thirty to thirty-six 
inches in depth for infantry, and forty inches for artillery ; though 
there are many examples of fords having been crossed, which 



Iviii. 

were four feet in depth ; but, in such cases, there must be hardly 
any current." (Jervis' " Manual of Field Operations," page 381.) 
Forty inches never stopped any one whose personal interest 
beckoned him across. Captain Leopold von Orhch, Prussian 
Army, in his " Notes in India," speaking of the Ravee River, 
gives its breadth as 200 feet, " with a depth of three and-a-half 
feet, so that it is fordable at many places." I know a farmer who 
is accustomed to ford with loaded team through a measured depth 
of three and-a-half feet, and never considered it a matter of any 
more than inconvenience. 

How often have troops forded up to the waist, up to the arm- 
pits, up to the shoulders, up to the chin. Humphreys' infantry 
forded Flat Creek arm-pit deep on the morning of the 6th April, 
1865. 

It is very remarkable, and almost unaccountable, how little 
is related in detail of many extraordinary cases of improvising 
bridges and fording of streams and rivers. Even technical works 
are strangely silent on such important subjects, dealing in gener- 
alities when and where they should be most attentive to par- 
ticulars. One of the best examples of bold and successful Ford- 
ing is related in H. B. McClellan's " Campaigns of Stuart's 
Cavalry," at pages 323, 324. " It had been necessary to halt the 
command several times since the 25th June, 1863, to graze the 
horses, for the country was destitute of provisions, and Stuart had 
brought no vehicles with him, save ambulances. Upon reaching 
Dranesville, Hampton's Brigade was sent to Roivser's Ford, 
and made the passage early in the night ; but the Potomac was 
so wide, the water so deep, and the current so strong, that the 
ford was reported impracticable for the artillery and ambulances. 
Another ford in the vicinity Avas examined, under circumstances 
of great danger, by Captain R. B. Kennon of Stuart's staff, but it 
was found to offer no better prospect of success, and Stuart de- 
termined to cross at Rowser's, if it were within the limits of 
possibility. The caissons mid limber-chests were emptied on the 
Virginia sho7-e, and the ammunition tvas canied ov^r by the cavalry- 
men in their hands. The guns and caissons, although entirely sub- 
merged during nearly the whole crossing, were safely dragged 
through the river and up the steep and slippery bank, and by 
three o'clock on the morning of the 28th the rear-guard had 
crossed, and the whole command was established upon Maryland 
soil. No more difficult achievement was accomplished by the 
cavalry during the war. The night was calm and without a 
moon. No prominent object marked the entrance to the ford on 
either side, but horse followed horse through nearly a mile of 
water, which often covered the saddles of the riders. When the 



Ivix. 

current was strong the line would unconsciously be borne down 
the river, sometimes so far as to cause danger of missing the ford, 
when some bold rider would advance from the opposite shore 
and correct the alignment. Energy, endurance and skill were 
taxed to the utmost ; but the crossing was effected, and so silently 
that the nearest neighbors were not aware of it until daylight." 
Extract from pages 323 and 324 of McClellan's " Life and Cam- 
paigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart." Boston, 1885. 

" When the cavalry reached Columbia [middle of March, 
1862] the bridge over Duck River was found in flames and the 
river at flood stage " [bridges were constructed and thrown and 
completed on the 30th]. On the same day the river became 
fordable. " General Nelson succeeded in getting part of his di- 
vision across by fording on the 29th." Most of his troops crossed 
by fording on the 30th. Buell was up at Shiloh, 6 p. m., dis- 
tance ninety miles from Columbia ; say eighteen miles a day. 
— Major General Don Carlos Buell in Century, March, 1886 
(pages 751-2), "Shiloh Reviewed." 

[" His (Wellington's) clearness of judgment in military matters 
was wonderful. It was shown once by his observation that two 
villages stood directly opposite each other on either side of a 
river, and consequently some means of communication must exist 
between them. His guides declared there was no ford, but his 
determined will told him to look for himself; he found a ford, 
crossed, and won the decisive battle of Assye. Wellington was a 
typical Enghshman in his tenacity of purpose." — Page 105. "The 
Win Power," by J. Milner FothergiU, M.D. London, 1885.] 

Pertinent to fording where there was no opposition, as at 
FarmviUe, according to Note from my Knapsack, " Putnam's 
Magazine," vol. 4, April, 1854, page 372, 374, the United States 
dragoons found no difficulty in fording the Rio Grande, where 
the river was 272 yards wide and 51 inches deep, with a rapid 
current; it is true the bottom was hard. 

" When the Mail in which I [Godfrey T. Vigne, who traveled 
in the United States in 1831, and wrote ' Six Months in 
America,' pubhshed in America in 1833, page 100] was travel- 
ing, arrived at the North Branch of the Potomac, we found it 
so swollen by the late rains that a passage seemed not only 
dangerous but impracticable. The coachman, however, a cool 
and determined fellow, crossed over on horseback ; he then re- 
turned, placed one of the passengers on the near leader, and re- 
solutely drove his four horses into the running torrent, which 
was sixty or seventy yards in width, running like a mill-race, and 
so deep that it reached nearly up to the backs of the horses. I 
was with him on the box. The inside passengers pulled off their 



Ix. 

coats and prepared to swim. The water forced itself into the 
coach ; but we reached the opposite bank without disaster. On 
the preceding evening the coachman had only prevented the mail 
from being entirely carried away, by turning the horses' heads 
down the stream, so that the coach and horses were swimming 
for nearly thirty yards." — Page 107. " Six Months in America," by 
Godfrey T. Vigne, Eng. Philadelphia, 1833. 

As to fording arm-pit deep, shoulder or neck deep, and even 
chin-deep, by infantry, there are plenty of examples. EAvell's 
corps, or division, escaped in that way on the night of i3th-i4th 
July, 1863. 

Parkman, in his " Montcalm and Wolfe, "1,4 12, states, August, 
1756: "Early in the morning Montcalm had ordered Rigaud 
to cross the river with the Canadians and Indians. There was a 
ford three-quarters of a league above the forts, and here they 
passed over unopposed, the English not having discovered the 
movement. The only danger was from the river. Some of the 
men were forced to swim, others waded to the waist, and others 
to the neck ; but they all crossed safely, and presently showed 
themselves at the edge of the woods, yelling and firing their guns, 
too far for much execution, but not too far to discourage the 
garrison." 

Another remarkable case of fording was that of the Elbe, near 
Tangermund, by the Swedish cavalry and artillery, under Gus- 
tavus. (" Harte," L, 363). "The bare recital of this act of 
intrepedity, for nothing was lost, but here and there an empty 
wagon, amazed Tihy beyond measure, as the stream in that 
part was not supposed to be fordable." 

"A few days after, when the Swedes took Havelburg by 
assault, Winkel's Blue Brigade advanced to the attack through 
the Havel, though the water reached up to the men's shoulders 
(" Harte," I., 364). When Gustavus captured Frankfort-on-the- 
Oder, on Palm Sunday, 1631 (Festival of the surrender of Lee, 
1865), Monroe's regiment, assaulting, crossed the wet ditch among 
mud and water, which came up to their gorgets " [throat deep, 
and won the bastion]. 

In 1572, during the war fought against Spain for the in- 
dependence of the United States of Holland (Watson's " Philip 
II.," New York Society Library copy, i-3i5-'i6) " Tergoes was 
relieved by Fording the Hondt or Western Scheldt, seven miles 
across, by the Spanish, German and Walloon troops." 

" On 28th of September, 1575, as soon as it was dark, and 
the tide had begun to retire, Ulloa entered the water [the Ford 
between the islet of Philipsland and Duveland] at the head " 
of his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were fol- 



ixi. 

lowed by two hundred pioneers ; and the rear-guard was formed 
by a company of Walloons, commanded by an officer of the 
name of Peralta. They could march only three men abreast, 
on the top of a ridge of earth or sand, and were often obliged 
to wade up to the shoulders, and to bear their muskets on 
their heads to preserve them from the water. They had ad- 
vanced but a little way when the Dutch and Zealanders ap- 
proached, and began a furious discharge of their small arms 
and artillery. And not satisfied with this, many of them leaped 
into the water, and with hooks fastened to the ends of long poles 
laid hold of the soldiers oppressed with the weight of the elements 
through which they toiled ; massacring some, and plunging 
others in the waves. Nothing but the darkness of the night, 
which prevented the two squadrons of the enemy's ships from 
acting in concert, could have saved theroyahsts from destruction. 
But, notwithstanding the difficulties under which they labored, 
they persisted, bold and dauntless, in their course, exhorting and 
assisting one anodier ; and without quitting their ranks, repelling 
the enemy, and defending themselves as well as their desperate 
circumstances would allow. Their calamities increased as they 
approached to the opposite shore. For besides that their vigor 
was impaired, they had deeper water to pass, and the enemy's 
ships could come nearer to the ford. At last, however, they reached 
the land in time to save themselves from destruction. The banks 
were lined with a numerous body of troops, and if these troops 
had behaved with an ordinary degree of resolution, it is impossible 
that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water, 
and exhausted with fatigue, could have stood before them. But 
unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their commander 
was killed by an accidental shot of one of his own men. Con- 
sternation seized his troops and they fled in a most dastardly 
manner before an enemy unable to pursue." — ("Watson's" His- 
tory Reign Philip II. of Spain, Vol. XL, page 164. London, 1813.) 
In October, 1651, Admiral Blake, in the service of the Com- 
monwealth, was ordered to make a descent upon the Island of 
Jersey (Dixon's "Blake," 148). * * * # 

"At eleven o'clock at night, Carteret, the Royal Governor, could 
no longer keep his men together. They had been under arms 
three days and two nights, during which time the rain had 
fallen without intermission ; they had made several marches 
and counter-marches over bad roads and broken ground ; and 
they stood the fierce though intermittent fire from the enemy's 
ships. At sunset he allowed them to depart for the neighboring 
villages in search of refreshment and repose; he himself with a 
few dragoons alone remaining on the beach, along which, how- 



Ixii. 

ever, he had all the camp fires lighted. The weather changed in 
the night. The rain ceased, the wind died away, and the swell 
of the sea abated ; but not a star was visible, no moon arose to 
tell the tale of preparation; for years, the pitchy darkness of 
the sky that night was recollected as the omen of disaster. The 
fires along the shore appeared to warn the Admiral that his en- 
deavor to throw Hayne's regiment on shore at that point would 
be attended with other difficulties than a threatening sea and 
a rocky coast on a dark night. Yet nothing could check his 
ardor. So long familiar with success, he despised obstacles; 
and towards the close of the Civil War even the Roundhead 
soldiers had learned to feel that contempt for Cavalier prowess, 
which at an earlier period the Cavaliers had affected to feel for 
the valor of tailors and serving-men. At eleven o'clock at night 
the boats were again lowered, and by a desperate and gallant 
effort were run ashore. Holding their arms above their heads, 
the men leaped into the surf, many of them up to the neck in 
water, and pushed for land. While struggling to obtain firm 
footing and to free themselves from the returning surges, Carteret 
rode down furiously with the hope of forcing them back into the 
sea, but, forming his men in the dark midnight, Haynes led them 
to the charge, and after a conflict of half an hour, he drove the 
Cavalier horse from the field, and pursued them inland more than 
a mile." — Page 148. " Robert Blake," by W. H. Dixon. London, 

^855- 

In 1812, 8th November, Colonel Delfante with his grenadiers 

forded the Wop, waist-deep, and wagons followed, and even 
artillery. This was a very difficult ford, because the channel was 
far below the neighboring ground, and the banks were steep ; 
moreover the river was half frozen and full of accumulated ice. 
Nevertheless the troops did pass. Waist-deep is equal to from forty 
to fifty inches, which is more than belly-deep for horses. Crook's 
cavalry forded or waded belly-deep, and as this fact is admitted, 
and the Rebel infantry did ford the river below Farmville, every- 
thing seems to demonstrate that the existing impediments did 
not depend upon natural obstacles and causes. 

As to prompt bridging there is no end of examples, and with 
the most incongruous, and apparently the most incompatible 
material. It was not until a question arose which aroused feel- 
ing that the writer in reading began to note down examples of 
improvised or rapid bridging, and referred to various accessible 
works. Unfortunately he had given away to different institutions 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of mihtary works in which illustra- 
tions of this subject occurred. On turning to Major-General J. 
G. Barnard, U. S. A., article on Bridges, published in "Johnson's 



Ixiii. 

Cyclopaedia, some very interesting information Avill be found. 
One remarkable exainiDle of rapid construction is first worthy of 
citation : 

" In the month of February, 1862, a pontoon bridge, composed 
of about sixty boats of the reserve train, was thrown across the 
Potomac at Harper's Ferry. The river was then a perfect 
torrent, the water iDeing fifteen feet above the summer level, and 
filled with drift wood and floating ice. The greatest difficulty 
was experienced in pulling the pontoons into position, and it was 
necessary to make use of ship anchors and chain cables to hold 
them in place. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances 
the bridge was completed in about eight hours, and the corps 
commanded by General Banks, with all its trains and artillery, 
passed over it without accident or delay." — "Johnson's Cyclo- 
paedia," 1,626, I and 2. 

The famous bridge across the Chickahominy cannot come 
under the head of improvised bridges, but when its magnitude is 
considered in connection with the time occupied in its construc- 
tion, it becomes apposite in this connection. It was begun dur- 
ing the forenoon of the 14th June, 1864, and was completed by 
midnight. Brigadier-General Weitzel located the position and 
prepared the approaches. Brigadier-General Benham laid the 
bridge, and the following is a description of it : 

Johnson 1,626-4. "On reaching the James River, a bridge was 
laid opposite Charles City Court House (at a point selected by 
the writer of this article) about two thousand feet in length. 
The water was so deep and rapid that the pontoons could not be 
held by their own anchors, and it was found necessary to attach 
their cables to schooners anchored above and below the bridge. 

" For the next forty hours a continuous stream of wagons 
passed over the bridge, from 4,000 to 6,000 vvagons, some said 
fifty miles of wagons, and nearly all the artillery of this Army, 
and by far the larger portion of the infantry and all its cavalry 
present, and even to its heads of 3,000 or more of beef cattle 
— the most injurious of all — without an accident to n:ian or 
beast." — Rep07-t of General Benham. 

"The length of the bridge was made up of 200 feet in trestle 
work and 2,000 feet in pontoons (one hundred in all); depth of 
the river, 85 feet." — "Johnson," 1,626-2. 

Now, do a simple rule of three. If a bridge 2,200 feet in 
length, capable of any strain, was thrown across- a rapid river 
85 feet deep within the hours of a long working day— say between 
sunrise and sunset, fifteen hours, — how long ought it to have 
taken to have thrown on a mild April day, one or even two or 
three bridges adequate for the passage of a corps and its ma- 



Ixiv. 

terial, or several corps, across a stream from loo to 120 feet 
wide, and not deeper than the Berisina, where the pontoniers had 
to work up to their shoulders in freezing Avater with a rapid current 
buffeting them with continual fields of ice brought down by that 
rapid current. 

To the possible objection of inadequate materials the answer 
is pertinent, in accordance with the motto of a Scotch family of 
note, '■'■ Fortinon deficit teiuj/i," which, without perverting the mean- 
ing, might be thus paraphrased: " Materials are never wanting to 
resolute or energetic men." This recalls the anecdote of the great 
painter who, when a young artist, regretted that he could not pro- 
duce an effect without proper materials, caught up a stick and 
dashed off a very effective head with some dark-colored filth on a 
shutter or the wall. 

Major-General Barnard gives the following illustrations (John- 
son, 1,625): 

" The Austrians, after satisfactory trials in the passage of the 
broad, deep and rapid current of the Daniibe, adopted in 1841 a 
system named from its inventor, Colonel Birago, of the Austrian 
Imperial Engineers. 

" This equipage has fixed and floating bridge-supports, the 
former consisting of abutments and trestles, and the latter of 
pontoons of one to six pieces, assembled together according to 
the requirements of the bridge for the passage of infantry, cavalry 
or artillery, and whether designed for one, two or three distinct 
roadwa3'S. 

" The Birago trestle is composed of a cap and two legs, to the 
lower ends of which shoes are attached to increase their bearing 
surface, and to give greater stability to the trestle. 

'■'Each poiitooti division is complete in itself, containing all the 
material necessary for constructing a bridge of eleven bays, or 
225 feet in length." — "Johnson," 1,627. 

" During the campaign of 1864, trains composed of fourteen 
pontoons and two trestles accompanied each of the three army 
corps of the Army of the Potomac."— "Johnson," 1,626 (3). 

" Previous to the battle of Gettysburg, a ponton bridge over 
the Potomac at Harper's Ferry was destroyed, the pontons being 
scuttled and set adrift above the rapids. About three weeks after, 
the water having fallen, the boats were recovered, ^p^ repaired 
wnth pieces of hard-bread boxes obtained from the commis- 
sary, ^^^1 and used in constructing a bridge at Berlin, over 
which the entire army passed into Virginia." — "Johnson, 1,626. 

Substitute for hard-bread boxes, hogsheads, wagons, timber 
and lumber of buildings at hand which could have been torn 
down, large trees standing close at hand, and what becomes of 



Ixv. 

every excuse for inaction. Oh wise Bible, wisest of common- 
sense books ! See verses as to shigi^ish or half hearted action ! 

" Very few citizens who have not served with an army in the 
field have an adequate idea of its ivipedimenta. On February 
13th, 1863, there were with the army of the Potomac two (2) 
bridge trains of forty-four (44) boats, in charge of four (4) com- 
panies of the Fifteenth New York Engineers, located abo4.it two 
miles from Falmouth, one-half mile west from Falmouth to Staf- 
ford Court House, and four miles from Headquarters of the 
Army. To this train were attached 551 animals, two bridge 
trains of forty-four boats iri charge of six companies of the Fiftieth 
New York Engineers, in the same locality, with 591 animals. 
One train of thirty-two boats mounted, but without teams, was 
on its way to a place on the right hand of Muddy Creek, about 
three miles from Seddon's place, and two miles from Head- 
quarters; one bridge of twenty-two boats, without wagons or 
teams, and at Belle Plaine thirty boats afloat. A requisition had 
been made for 226 more animals. These wooden boats weighed 
1,570 pounds each. The ponton and trestle wagons had eight 
animals and two teamsters each ; the other wagons six animals 
and one teamster each. The canvas ponton boats laid by Cap- 
tain Comstock at Kelly's Ford, came afterwards, twenty from 
Washington and sixty from New York, and weighed 640 pounds 
each." — Note in Ai?ierican Magazine (page 377), April, 1886, 
" History of Chancellorsville," by William Howard Mills, late 
Major U. S. A. 

In using the expression improvised bridges^ the term may 
almost be considered technical, scientific, " L' Encylopedie (1751) 
C. Suppt." styles bridges such as are thrown over water-courses 
or streams from ten to twenty metres in breadth, " Ponts-a-coiip- 
de mai?i" A metre is 39.368 American inches, or about i 1-12 
yards, so that twenty metres about accords with the breadth of 
the Appomattox at Farmville, between the piers or abutments of 
the railroad viaduct. Bardin, in his Military Dictionary, admits 
that as late as 1779 there was, as yet, no treatise on Military 
Bridges and their apphcation. The digested " Dictionary of the 
Sciences " shows how circumscribed were even the theories of 
throwing bridges. Only a single work had been conceived on 
the subject, due to a M. de Guille, a French general of brigade 
who served in the war of 1741 under Marshal Saxe; but this 
treatise was never printed. Nevertheless, in spite of instruction, 
pontoneering works were ably done during this war. In 1745 
three bridges of boats were thro\vn opposite Piacenza, across the 
Po, where it is 1,200 to 1.500 feet wide (wide as the Rhine at 
Mannheim), and very deep in places, and in spite of the rapid 



Ixvi. 

current the work was finished hi seven hours. In 1757 Brigadier 
de Guille rapidly estabhshed two bridges over the Rhine, opposite 
Wesel, some 2,000 feet in width. 

If there is any truth in the statement accepted as trustworthy, 
of the restoration of the Devil's Bridge by the Russians of 
Suworrow, on 26th September, 1799, there is no excuse for not 
bridging the Appomattox at Farmville, 7th April, 1865 ; and 
farther, it is totally unsusceptible of explanation why the pontoon 
trains were not up simultaneously with the artillery of the pur- 
suing columns. One pontoon train, that of the Twenty-fourth 
Corps, was up, and that it was not thrown in time cannot be under- 
stood except by those who know the secrets of the war. Accept- 
ing, however, as the supposition that the pontoon train was delayed, 
that was no reason for not bridging the Appomattox at once, 
conceding (simply for argument sake) that it was not fordable, 
although the contrary was demonstrated both by the Union 
cavalry and by the Rebel infantry, and by the testimony of those 
who were acquainted with the stream. 

Where there is a will there is a way. If there were no other 
ropes t6 be had, there were sufficient prolonges at hand to drag 
large and handy trees to the abutments of the old railroad via- 
duct and haul them into position to form a cantilever bridge 
strong enough for elephants to cross ; because those same pro- 
longes could have been used as lashings for the main tim- 
bers and neighboring buildings would haye furnished ample 
supplies of ties or cross-beams, braces and flooring stuff. 
Any practical mechanic who was not devoid of positive 
comprehension of the most common details of his trade could, 
by utilizing the natural and manufactured material within a 
few hundred yards have constructed a bridge all-sufficient for the 
heaviest wheel-carriages and the loads that they would carry. It 
is utterly useless to argue to the contrary, and it may be em- 
phatically asserted that the failure to construct a bridge all- 
sufficient, if not elegant, wide as the piers of the old railroad via- 
duct, or for two or even three equipages to cross abreast, or a 
column at least twelve men front, was due to some unknown 
reason or invisible cause. 

No ! the plum — the ruin of Lee — was not to fall into the 
mouth of Humphreys, and if all the theorists on the face of this 
earth were to argue to the contrary, practical mechanics suffi- 
ciently numerous to outweigh their book-knowledge could be 
readily found to establish the feasibility of adequately bridging 
the Appomattox for the passage of an army, its guns and its 
trains, within two hours. There is too much corroboration of this 
fact in military history to disprove this positive charge. The 



Ixvii. 

same spirit which ruled the course of the whole operation, 
beginning with the miss-moves of the 3rd, left Humphreys un- 
supported on the yth, and deferred the culmination and left 
it doubtful until midday on the 9th. After consultation with a 
scientific officer who has built bridges with comparatively very 
feeble means, it was decided that two thousand men, such as our 
troops, ought, under existing circumstances, to have bridged the 
Appomattox " in about two hours." 

" General P. B. Porter, of Black Rock, to whom the public 
are indebted for the construction of this bridge [across the Rapids 
above Niagara Falls to Bath Island], informed me that its erection 
was not effected without considerable danger. Two large trees, 
hewed to correspond with their shape, were first constructed into 
a temporary bridge, the butts fastened to the shore, with the 
lightest ends projecting over the rapids. At the extremity of the 
projection, a small butment of stone was first placed in the river, 
and when this became secure, logs were sunk around it, locked 
in such a manner as to form a frame, which was filled with stone. 
A bridge was then made to this butment, the temporary bridge 
shoved farther out and forward, and another butment formed, 
until the whole was completed. One man fell into the Rapids 
during the work. At first, owing to the velocity with which he 
was carried forward, he was unable to hold upon the projecting 
rocks ; but through great bodily exertions, to lessen the motion 
by swimming against the current, he was enabled to seize upon a 
rock, from which he was taken by means of ropes." — Extract 
from "The Journal of a Tour in the State of New York in 1830," 
by John Fowler, at page 145. (Notes). (London, 1831.) 

Any reader who has the slightest conception of military mat- 
ters, who will take the trouble of examining, with care, the maps 
accompanying this little work, Avill at once perceive how strongly 
Humphreys had hold of the Army of Northern Virginia at Cum- 
berland Church ; how easily he might have been supported, and 
if so, in time, how the whole affair might have been ended then 
and there with augmented glory ; — that is, if any one from Grant 
down, in command at Farmville, had acted with energy and 
celerity. Humphrey's hold was that of the bull dog; the clutch 
of the eagle's talons with which Humphreys held the enemy in 
his front. He kept pressed up close against him, feeling his 
rapier, ready to thrust or parry ; the position of the experienced 
master-at-arms, attent and with eye, ear and hand ready for every 
movement. Humphreys was the completest general, except 
Geo. H. Thomas, the war evolved. He would have crushed Lee 
in the fall of 1863 had he been Commander of the Army of the 
Potomac (instead of Chief of Staff, with a temporary superior 



Ixviii. 

unequal to comprehending his plans or act upon them). Colonel 
Fletcher, the British historian of the Rebellion, is the only writer 
who ever alluded to this understandingly. 

From Farmville two roads led almost directly north, slightly 
diverging. The easterly one to the Cumberland Court House 
road, bisected the Rebel position (at Cumberland Church), 
which, in miniature, exactly resembled the Union dispositions at 
Gettysburg — strangely so — the other, the Old Plank Road, which, 
some two miles away, bifurcated, both forks continuing on for a 
mile and a quarter to a mile and a half in the rear of Mahone's 
(afterwards Lee's) headquarters at Cumberland Church, on 
this occasion located about the same, relatively, as those of 
Meade on Powers' Hill, 3d July, 1863. The road from Farm- 
ville to Cumberland Court House fullfiUed about the same re- 
lation to Lee's lines 7th April, 1865. as the Taneytown road did 
to Meade's 3d July, 1863, and the Old Plank Road nearly the 
same as the Baltimore Pike to the Union position at Gettysburg. 
After Humphreys' fight at dark at Perkinson's Mills at the mouth 
of Sailors' Creek, Wright and Sheridan's engagement on Little 
Sailors' Creek, late on the afternoon of the 6th, the Rebels fell 
back during the night and early morning of the 7th across the Ap- 
pomattox. The only remaining direct viaduct across that stream 
was High Bridge, which, after they had taken advantage of it, the 
Rebels fired. Humphreys' celerity and audacity saved this structure, 
so that it was soon made available. Gordon had crossed it, but 
Fields' division forded the river, perhaps, at Venable's Ford, some 
three miles below Farmville, where Longstreet passed over the 
bridge at that place, and then burned it. 

One fact which will hereafter be more strongly emphasized was 
proved. The Appomattox was fordable for infantry at more than 
one ponit between High Bridge and a mile above Farmville. 

Humphreys with his first division, Miles, and his third, deTro- 
briand, followed up the enemy on the dirt roads from High 
Bridge over five miles to Cumberland Church. He had about 
9,500 men. He found the Rebels already entrenched iii a strong 
position and their forces concentrated, amounting to about 25,000 
men, not including the cavalry (La R., vii., 76). Mahone was 
on the left, thrown back, and thence their lines curved, present- 
ing a convex front continuously on the crest of elevations (from 
which the ground sloped E., like a glacis), for about two miles from 
their extreme right, over two miles, to opposite Farmville. Their 
line was not solid, but was occupied. Humphreys' Second Divi- 
sion, Barlow's, 5,000 strong, pursued along the railroad from 
High Bridge towards Farmville. 

Humphreys' Chief of Artillery claims to have succeeded in 



r.i/<.' .Tolin 




Copyright, 1885, by J. Watts de Peyster. 

Battle of Cumberland Church, or the Heights of Farmville. 

The combined Second -Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, under Maj.-Gen. 

A. A. Humphreys, pitted against the Army of Northern 

Virginia, under Gen. Robert E. Lee. 

7th April, 1865, p. m. 



I ' Ixix. 

silencing the battery, Poague's, on the Rebel extreme left-centre, 
and that the leading Union troops acquired temporary possession 
of the guns. Mahone's veterans, aided by a portion of Gordon's 
division under Grimes, recovered the cannon and drove out the 
Unionists. A second attack likewise failed. Humphreys be- 
coming satisfied that the Army of Northern A^irginia, entire, was 
in his front, felt that he was altogether too weak to do more than 
hold the attention of the enemy until he was reinforced, and he 
recalled Barlow, who had found a strong force in his front about 
a mile and a half to the south. When Barlow got up, and late 
in the day (4.30 P. M.), Miles tried to flank the Rebel wing under 
Mahone, and was repulsed with loss. The attack failed on 
account of the difficult nature of the ground, broken by numerous 
sharp ravines, which prevented an orderly advance. The enemy 
undertook to make a counter attack, but were quickly repulsed. 

William Swinton, the first in point of time of the historians of 
the war, makes Lee come off with flying colors as victorious, whereas 
he simply held his own, and inflicted upon Humphreys a loss of 
571, not 671. This general, who was truth itself, says that these 
figures are erroneous ; that his First Division lost 424, the Second 
121, and the Third 16—571. (B. S. B., 189). 

All day long Humphreys was anxiously expecting reinforce- 
ments from Farmville, where Union troops had been piling up 
all the day. If two corps had crossed they could have taken the 
road to the Coal Pits, got in Lee's rear and settled the matter 
then and there. The excuse alleged for not doing so is that the 
bridge was burned and the Appomattox not fordable. All this has 
been distinctly stated and argued out in " La Royale," part VII., 
and the whole demonstration would be reproduced in this pam- 
phlet if it did not require too much space. An analysis of the 
telegrams and despatches will settle the truth of all this. As an 
excuse for not crossing troops to the assistance of Humphreys, it 
was alleged that the Appomattox was not fordable, and that a 
bridge could not be built in time. Immediately after the war 
General Humphreys was decidedly of the opinion that the 
Appomattox could not only have been forded (Crook's cavalry 
proved the fact), \)\x'i peremptorily bridged. 

There is a boss-carpenter, in the neighborhood of the study in 
which this was prepared, who was once in railroad employ and 
lost his situation from bad temper and habits, whose services 
were invaluable at crises. That man with an ordinary powerful 
wrecking-gang would have bridged the Appomattox in an hour, 
with the physical force disposable to handle his materials. He 
would have laughed at such an obstacle arresting progress nearly 
ten hours, a day's working time. Col. W. H. Paine, U. S. Vol. 



Ixx. 

Engineers, agrees with me in these opinions. I know from my 
personal experience with material and mechanics, that if I had un- 
limited command of human labor and teams with timber close at 
hand, as it was on the 7th April, I could have constructed a 
bridge over the Appomattox all-sufficient for the heaviest artillery 
and trains within two hours. It might not have been an elegant 
or even a respectable piece of work as to appearance, but for 
practical purposes the troops, horse and foot, artillery and wagons 
could have marched and rolled over it with safety and ex- 
peditiousness. 

".Woodsworth in his sonnet, " In the Pass of Killicranky," 
considering the victorious effects of audacity, celerity and address, 
due to the hero, Claverhouse, Viscount of Dundee, concludes 
with these stirring lines : 

" Oh for a single hotir of that Dimdee^ 
Who on that day the word of 07iset gave I 
Like conquest would the Men of England see, 
And her Foes find a like inglorious grave." 

Humphreys might justly have groaned out, on the after- 
noon of the 7th April, 1865, " Oh for one hour of Blucher," 
" Marshal Forwarts," that nothing stopped. General Von Muffling, 
in his " Passages from my Life," states, page 377, that during the 
battle of Leipzig, 18 13, Blucher resolved to force the Parthe. 
" The first portion of infantry encountered no other difficulties 
in crossing at Mockau than having to wade through the 
water up to the waist. A very imperfect flying-bridge was sub- 
sequently formed of barn doors, gates, &c." Again, during the 
pursuit after Leipzig, Blucher was in reality hunting (not es- 
corting — as was Lee escorted out of Pennsylvania in 1863) — 
the French out of Germany when he came to the S.'iale (Von 
Muffling, 384), he " summoned the carpenters of the town to con- 
struct, with the utmost speed, a bridge of boats or rafts to enable 
him to cross over before evening. There was no lack of wood — 
the whole river was covered with rafts and planks. There was an 
old master carpenter in the place, who, as apprentice in 1757, had 
helped to build the bridge by which Frederic the Great had 
crossed at Weissenfels before the battle of Rossbach. He pro- 
posed to place the bridge on the same 'sr^oX.^ promising that it shoidd 
be ready in a few hours. The man kept his word, and the whole 
army was [across] on the left bank of the Saale in the evening." 

A cantilever bridge might easily have been engineered with 
the great trees, of which there were plenty in the vicinity, and 
the cross timbers and planking derived from the buildings of 
the neighboring town. When Gustavus was preparing for his 



Ixxi. 

bridge over the Leek he found himself compelled to pull donn 
all the gentlemen's houses, farm and village buildings around him 
in order to procure useful and solid timber. The same determi- 
nation, not sparing even consecrated buildings, saved the French 
forces under d'Oyssel in Scotland, in January, 1560, when from 
Leith they crossed the Firth and made a raid on the north shore 
of the Firth, and burned and wasted to their hearts' content. The 
arrival of the English Admiral Winter deprived the French of 
their provision ships, and the country afforded nothing but drink- 
ing water. They seemed in extremity. " Queen's Ferry was 
commanded by Winter [with his English fleet]. There was a 
bridge at Alloa, across the River Firth (thirty miles W. N. W. of 
Edinburgh), but William Kirkaldy promptly broke it; and so 
satisfied were the congregation that d'Oyssel could not escape, 
that they left him, as they believed, to starve, and proceeded at 
their utmost leisure to call their men about them to receive his 
surrender." 

The Gazetteer oi Scotland (1856) tells this story somewhat 
differently. " It was in the month of January, and at the break- 
ing up of a great storm, William Kirkcaldy, of Grange, attentive to 
the circumstances in which the French were caught, took ad- 
vantage of their situation, marched with great expedition towards 
Stirling, and cut the Bridge of Tullibody, which is over the Devon 
[a furious torrent after storms] [" f of a mile north of its con- 
fluence with the Firth], to prevent their retreat. The French, 
finding no other means of escape, took the roof off the church, 
and laid it along the bridge, where it was cut, and got safe to 
Stirling. It is generally believed that this church remained in 
the same dismantled state till some years ago " [about 1850]. 

'■^The Freuch had now an oppojiuniiy of showing what disciplined 
troops could do hi the face of tremendous difficidties. They were 
beyond the Leven [outlet of Loch Leven ?] when they discovered 
their situation. In their first consternation they rested for a 
night in the field. In the morning, wet, chilled, and hungry, 
they commenced their rapid retreat. Not a loaf of bread could 
they hope to touch till they crossed the water. The tempest 
broke again, and the western gale drove the rain i;ito their faces 
as they struggled across those melancholy moors. On the even- 
ing of the third day, they reached Alloa to find the bridge gone 
and the river, it is likely, pouring down in a [as well known it 
would after a great storm] winter flood. 

D'Oyssel was a man of prompt expedients. In an instant the 
nearest parish church was unroofed; the timbers were dragged to 
the water-side and laid across the piers of the broken arches. 
The army itself brought the ncAvs of its escape to Stirling, and 



Ixxii. 

once there, they were safe. The Congregation were loitering at 
Glasgow, congratulating themselves over a victory which they 
had allowed to slip through their hands. D'Oyssel refreshed his 
famished but gallant little force, and fell back at his leisure into 
Leith." (Froude, vii., 192-3.) 

People, superficial as a rule, even thinkers, prattle a great 
deal about the efficiency of Napoleonic and Frederician ad- 
ministration, but there was more practical soldiership, engineer- 
ing and generalship evinced during the Thirty Years' War than 
in any since, except in our great conflict, in which the rank and 
file could always supply mechanics fit for every occasion. It is 
pretty certain that more valuable lessons can be learned from the 
details of the operations of the Thirty Years' War than any other 
of which authentic details are known. x\gain and again were 
impetuous rivers crossed, and retreating and flying armies saved by 
improvised bridges. One of the most remarkable of the achieve- 
ments of Gustavus Adolphus was the passage of the Lech, a 
very furious stream (so violent no dam can be made to stand 
its fury) during freshets as at no time, 5th April, 1632, in the 
face of an entrenched veteran army equal in numbers to the assail- 
ants. This torrent, rather than river, was one hundred and ninety 
feet across, with very high, steep banks with bad ground beyond, 
and very deep ; of different depths. What is more, the bridge 
was constructed under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry 
(" Harte," II., 197). In the space of a few hours the bridge was 
fixed, trestles with legs of an unequal length i^Ibid^ 198-202), the 
surface planked and roughened and the sides guarded, which 
happened to be effected the more speedily as the king's Fin- 
landers could all exercise the business of carpenters, as in their 
native country each man Avas his own mechanic." Doubtless, if 
detailed reports were accessible, there would be numerous in- 
stances found of the successful peremptory bridging and fording 
of rivers and the particulars of the methods by which success was 
achieved. The fact that such things were done, and well done, 
is indisputable, but of very few among them are any of the 
measures dwelt upon. 

Chapman (308) describing the Bridging of the Lech by Gus- 
tavus Adolphus in 1632, says the trestles had stones and other 
weights attached to their legs to sink them and keep them in po- 
sition, and the length of the legs varied (bridge-floor just above 
surface) from a maximum of 4 yards, 12 feet. The Finnish horse 
forded, not swam, just above bridge. 

[Note. — In the course of very extensive military reading, 
numerous instanceswere found of Fording by large bodies of troops 
at such depths that an increase of an inch or twawould have render- 



Ixxiii. 

ed it impossible for men of ordinary stature. These memoranda 
were carefully noted at the time, but, now, when it has become ne- 
cessary to use them, the note-books are not accessible. The re- 
marks upon Fording, and even upon Bridges in Military Treatises, 
are inexplicably meagre.] 

In order to relieve Tergoes, the Spanish general actually 
marched 3,000 picked troops, Germans, Spaniards and Walloons, 
loaded with food and military stores, over six miles through an 
estuary considered unfordable at low water, on account of the miry 
bottom and the channels of several rivulets, and in spite of every 
danger and difficulty absolutely succeeded through the very audac- 
ity of the attempt. On the night of the 28th-29th September, 1575 
[Ibid 11., 163. 165), the Spanish General, Requesens, authorized a 
still more audacious enterprise for the purpose of subduing Zealand. 

The English army determined to make a desperate attempt 
to retrieve their affairs in France in 1450. About 6,000 strong 
had been collected for a vigorous attempt to relieve the be- 
leaguered town of Caen, and were opposed by superior forces 
of veteran French. They landed on the peninsula of Cotentin,so 
famous for the fortified port of Cherbourg, and took the town of 
Valognes. The most difficult task, however, was forcing the dan- 
gerous fords of the River Douve, and afterwards those of the Vire. 
Nevertheless they succeeded. Like Perdiccas (B. C. 321), they 
fought even in the water, but with better fortune, for they drove 
back the French and established themselves on the right bank, 
and, in spite of their fatigues, fought the battle of Formigny (i8th 
April, 1450), a town about twelve miles from Bayeux, and nearly 
inflicted upon the French a defeat which, ending in a slaughter, 
was such a complete disaster that, although small in comparison 
to numbers engaged, it deserves to rank with the greatest of the 
English reverses on the soil of France. — Oman's "Art of War in 
the Middle Ages," pages 113, 114, Von Kausler's "Wortenbuch 
der Schlacten aller Volker," IV. (2), 1146-7. 

At Aughrim, 1691, the British had to struggle through a marsh 
waist deep to get at the enemy behind defences ; and at Blen- 
heim, 1744, the English cavalry had to flounder through the 
Nebelbach and its morasses to reach the French on firm ground ; 
yet in both cases the bold assailants were victorious. 

In November, 1645 (i8th October?), the British General 
Cust states that Turenne, not finding the River Rhine fordable 
near Wimpfen, the whole army swam across it — the horses carrv- 
ing the foot on their cruppers. Such examples might be multi- 
plied, but the whole question could be summed up in a very few 
words. Troops in force should have been crossed to the assist- 
ance of Humphreys, since the Appomattox was fordable. Meade's 



Ixxiv. 

telegram (i6) states that "the cavalry has forded belly-deep," 
which is not too deep for infantry, and Tremain confirms this in his 
narrative ("War Memoranda"), pages 14, 15 and 18, supra. 

If there had been no ford, a perfectly sufficient bridge should 
have been constructed in two hours. A collection of dispatches 
between Generals Humphreys, Wright, Meade and Grant fur- 
nishes a basis for a time-table, and also confirmation. The secret 
history of the war has never been told, and may never be told. 
It is not the interest of those who won the prizes to have it told. 
I had to stop writing my history for fear of injuring the prospects 
of the living by quoting the revelations and documents furnished 
for it, by friends since deceased. During the pursuit of Lee, 
Humphreys and Wright have never received the credit due to 
them. Humphreys never could get over the suppression of one 
of his telegrams or dispatches which, even when it was allowed 
to become public, he claimed, did not appear as he sent it. It 
seems as if it was predetermined to whom the glory of the last days 
should inure, and it was so. On the 6th, the day of the Sailor 
Creek and Little Sailor Creek fights, Humphreys and Wright 
deserve the credit; on the 7th all the credit belongs to Hum- 
phreys; on the 8th Humphreys did more than any one ; on the 
9th he did as much as any other, and might have done more, and 
marvellously, if he had been let alone. All the opinions hereby 
presented are founded on consultations with General Humphreys, 
my dearest friend, his letters, and evidence of other officers. 



COPIES OF DESPATCHES BETWEEN GENERALS HUMPHREYS, WRIGHT, 
MEADE AND GRANT, FRIDAY, 7TH APRIL, 1865. 

High Bridge, Hd. Qrs. A. P. ( 
1. April 7, 1865. S 

Lieut. -Gen. U. S. Grant: 

Major-Gen. Humphreys about 9 a. m. crossed the Appomattox 
at this point driving in the enemy's rear-guard-skirmishers. The 
enemy abandoned (8) eight guns on this side of the river and (10) 
ten [guns] are reported as left on the other side. Humphreys 
has advanced four miles on the railroad towards Farmville and 
will continue to press them on that road. Wright is moving to- 
wards Farmville on this |the south] side of the river. I under- 
stand Mahone's Division is between him [Humphreys] and Farm- 
ville, and that he is after him. Griffin is moving rapidly [south 
side of river] to Prince Edward's Court House. He will pass 
through Rice's Station. You will find him on the road if neces- 
sary to leave him orders. Geo. G. Meade, Major-General. 



Ixxv. 

2. April 7 [1865J, 12 m. 

Major-Gen. Meade : 

So far as my information goes Wright, at Farmville, woicld be 
in supporting distance. I have sent Barlow up the railroad to 
Farmville. He is quite close to it and is skirmishing with the 
enemy there. Supposing the enerliy would attempt to reach 
Lynchburg by the road from Farmville on the north side of the 
Appomattox, I have moved Miles and de Trobriand and the 
artillery to that road. They will strike it about three miles from 
[north of I Farmville. I^^A column of our cavalry [Crook's] 071 
the south side of Appomattox.^ which I am moving., zvill reach Farm- 
ville about the same time as Barloiv [on the north side].,^^| Ar- 
tillery cannot move along Barlow's route. 

A. A. Humphreys, M. G. 
I will advise you promptly of any further information or 
change of condition. A. A. H. 



Hd. Qrs. 6th a. C., Sandy River, ) 
3. April 7, 12.15 Noon. ) 

Maj.-Gen. Webb : 

The officer sent toward Farmville has returned, and reports 
that that place is not taken. I shall therefore move at once to- 
wards that point. General Griffin [5//; Corps\ is noiv here, and 
the head of his column nearly up. He is going to Prince Ed- 
ward's C. H. H. G. Wright, Maj.-Genl. Comdg. 



Hd. Qr. 2D. A. C., 1.20 p. M. ) 
4. April 7th. ] 

Gen. Meade : 

I have come up to Mahone's Division. I am with Miles and 
deTrobriand's Divisions, about four miles [north] from Farmville, 
and shall attack. ^^If Griffin or some one else can strike Farm- 
ville \i. e. cross to my support] they will ctit off Mahone's line of re- 
treat. ^^ A. A. Humphreys, M. G. 



Hd. Qrs. 6th A. C. Farmville, 
5. April 7, 2.20 p. m. 

Brevet Maj.-Gen'l Webb: 

I am at Farmville., ivhich is occupied by the 2/^th Corps, and, 
from all I can learn, the Rebel forces on this side of the Ap- 
pomattox passed through the place. If this be true, it would 
seem the enemy is moving on Lynchburg, where it is possible 
he might intend forming a junction with Johnson, instead of 
effecting it at Danville, as I have hitherto supposed he intended 



Ixxvi. 

to do. l^'There are so many troops and trains now here in my 
front, that it would be impossible for me to advance now, even if 
it were desirable to do so. I will therefore await instructions. 
H. G. Wright, Maj.-Gen'l. Command'g. 



6. Hd. Qrs., a. p., April 7, 2.30 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen'l Humphreys : , 

Wright is moving on Farmville. I have sent him your dis- 
patch and urged him forward. Do you think the enemy is 
making for Lynchburg or Danville ? G. G. M. 



7. Hd. Qrs. A. P., April 7, 1865, 2.30 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen'l Wright: 

I send you a dispatch just received from Maj.-Gen. Hum- 
phreys. I^^You will see the necessity of pushing vigorously for 
Farmville. If there are any troops on your left communicate 
with them and urge them forward. G. G. M. 



Hd. Qrs. 2D A. Corps, } 

8. April 7, 3 o'clock p. m. [ 

Maj.-Gen'l Meade : 

From the prisoners I have, it appears that Lee's army is 
moving from Farmville to Lynchburg, and l^^ Wright- and Griffin 
should come up to the front near the Farmville and Lyiichhirg road, 
at a distance four miles [north] from Farmville \i. e. attack Lee in 
reverse and cut off his retreat]. I have but two divisions here, but 
have sent for Barlow, who is on the railroad near [north of] Farm- 
ville. A. A. Humphreys, Maj.-Gen'l Comd'g. 



9. Hd. Qrs. 2d A. C, April 7, 3.20 p. m. 

Brt. Maj.-Gen'l Webb, Chief of Staff: 

We have Heth, Mahone and, I believe, the rest of Lee's army 
here in my front, moving towards Lynchburg. They are intrenched 
in too strong a position iox me to attack them in front, and their 
flanks extend further than mine. They are extending their flank 
to my right. I have sent for Barlow, but I don't know at what 
time he will be up. ^^ I have just received a dispatch dated 1.20, 
saying that Farmville was in our possession, that the cavalry was 
moving through it. 

A. A. Humphreys, Maj.-Gen'l Command'g. 



10. High Bridge, April 7th, 3.40 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen'l Wright, commanding 6th Corps: 

The Major-Gen'l commanding directs that, in case you are 
not called upon by Gen'l Humphreys for assistance, you halt at 



Ixxvii. 

Farmville and endeavor to hurry up your trains. I^^In that 
case, or in any case, put yourself in communication with the 
commanding officer of the 24th Corps troops, and let him know 
Gen'l Meade's views and intentions as urged by your movements, 
and that you are retarded by his being in your road.^^^l 

Alex. S. Webb, B. M. Gen'l, C. of Staff. 



High Bridge, Hd. Qrs. A. Potomac, 
11. April 7, 3.50 p. M. 

Maj.-Gen'l Wright : 

Gen. Humphreys reports that he is confronted by Lee^s whole 
army. They are moving to outflank him. |^°If you cannot 
move at once to his assistance order up the 24th Corps in Gen'l 
Meade's name. Gen. Lee is intrenched. 

Alex. S. Webb, B. M. G. & C. of Staff 



Hd. Qrs. Army Potomac, ) 
12. . April 7th, 4 p. M. ] 

Maj.-Gen'l Humphreys, Comd'g 2d Corps: 

I informed you this morning your movements should be 
governed by your own security with your own forces. I have 
made every effort to get the 6th Corps forward, but ^^the road 
has been blocked by the Cavalry and 2i\th Corps. ,^^% ^WI have 
noiv sent 07-ders to the 2\th Corps, who occupy Farmville, to move 
up \i. e. cross] to your suppo7-t. If you are pressed you must with- 
draw to this position. (Sgd.) Geo. G. Meade, M. Gen'l. 



13. 3 p. M. Received (4.40 p. m.) 
Maj.-Gen'l Webb: 

Your dispatch of 2.30 p. m. by Major Bache is just received. 
l^' I reached Farmville at 2 p. m. and immediately sent the dis- 
patch to you by Major Farrar. I^^Gen'l Grant passed here a 
short time since, and is now in the town. He has directed me to 
remain massed until further orders. 

(Signed.) Gen. Wpjght. 

Hdqrs. a. p., 4.30 p. M., \ 

14. April 7, '65. f 
Maj.-Gen. Humphreys : 

I^^I have sent orders to Gen. Wright to order forward in my 
name the 24th Corps from Farmville and to iollow it with the 
6th. B^^I fully indicated your position and the necessity of 
support being given you. Before my dispatch could have reached 
Gen. Wright I received one from him stating the Lieut. -Gen. was 
at Farmville. I^^/ have no doubt, therefore, troops will be hur- 



Ixxviii. 

ried forward if not already moving. We hear artillery and 
musketry in a westerly (condition) direction from here, which is 
more to the left than your position, which I take to be about 
northwest. This may be the 24th Corps [it was Crook's cavalry- 
fightj. When Barlow comes up if you hear firing on the left I 
would attack with the whole force, but of course I leave this 
entirely to your own judgment, giving you the best information I 
can get. G. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen'l Comd'g. 

15. April, 7, 5.10 p. m. 

To Gen. Webb : 

I^^Your dispatch of 3.50 p. m. ordering me to assist Gen. Hum- 
phreys in reference to affairs in front of Second Corps is received 
and I have shown it to Gen. Grant, who is here and who will 
direct in the absence of Gen. Meade. The pontoon train of the 
Twenty-fourth Corps has been ordered up [why not sooner ?] and 
as soon as it is thrown I will cross and come promptly to the sup- 
port of the Second Corps. Yours of 4.30 just received. 

(Signed.) Gen. Wright. 

16. April 7, 6.15 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. Humphreys : 

I have just learned that there is no bridge at Farmville and 

that THE CAVALRY HAS FORDED BELLY-DEEP. YoU will have to 

take care of yourself . Geo. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen. 

April 7, 6.30 p. m. [ 

17. Hd. Qrs. 2D. A. C. j 
Maj.-Gen. Meade, Commanding Army Potomac : 

iJ^^ Barlow is up and taking position on the right, so as to 
be ready to attack their left flank at the instant an attack is covi- 
vienced from the direction of Farviville. The firing you heard was 
Crook's attempt from the direction of Farmville. Immediately 
upon hearing it I moved Miles and de Trobriand to the right to 
attack (Barlow was not up then), but the firing soon ceased. 
Miles attacked from his right, but without success. Tlie position 
they have is strong and it is ijitrenched. We are across the State 
road from Farmville to Lynchburg, and firom our right see a train 
of wagons moving about the West ; some troops with it. It is so 
late that neither the Twenty-fourth Corps nor Wright can get up 
in time to attack this evening. B^^To-morrow the enemy will 
be gone. If they are not, I will attack understandingly with the 
troops from "Farmville. 

My position is about N.W. from High Bridge. 

A. A. Humphreys, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 



Ixxix. 



Headquarters A. P 
18. April 7th, 7 p. M. 



Lt.-Gen. Grant : 

There has been heavy firmg in the direction of Humphreys, 
but no report as yet. I send the bearer for any orders you may 
have for to-morrow. The Fifth Corps is at or near Prince Ed- 
Avard C. H., the Sixth at Farmville, and the Second across the 
Appomattox, across the road from FarmviUe to Lynchburg. 

As far as I can judge the enemy is making for Lyncliburg. 
Perhaps only making a greater detour than he originally designed 
to get around us, and he yet meditates going to Danville. 

Since writing the foregoing the following dispatch has been 
received from General Humphreys : [Dispatch evidently omitted.] 

il^^jiytrrt' / been advised of the state of affairs at Farmville I 
would either have crossed the Sixth after the Second, or retained 
the Fifth for that purpose. I never knew till 4 p. m. that the 
enemy had destroyed the bridge there ; nor did I know till late this 
afternoon the causes of the delay in the advance of the Sixth 
Corps. Resp'y, &c., Geo. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen. 



[Duplicate.] 
Headquarters 2d A. Corps, ) 
19. April 7, 7.30 p. [a. ?J m. ] 

Bvt. Maj-Gen. H. S. Webb, Chief of Staff : 

Our last fight, just before dark [6th] at Sailors' Creek, gave 
us two guns, three (3) flags and considerable No. of prisoners, 
200 wagons, 70 ambulances, with mules and horses to almost 
one-half wagons and ambulances. There are between 30 and 50 
wagons in addition abandoned and destroyed along the road, 
some battery wagons, forges and limbers. I have already reported 
the capture of one gun, two flags and some prisoners, and the 
fact that the road for nearly two miles is strewn with tents, bag- 
gage, cooking utensils, some ammunition and material of all 
kinds. The wagons are in a great mass across the approach to 
the bridge, and it will take some time to clear it. The enemy is 
in position on the heights beyond with artillery. The bridge is 
partially destroyed, and the approaches to it on either side are 
soft bottom land. We can't advance to-night [6th-7th] in the 
same manner that we have been to-day. As soon as I get straight- 
ened up my troops a little (they are considerably mixed) I might 
push a column down the road and deploy it, but it is evident that 
I cannot follow rapidly during the night. 

P. S. — I find that we have 850 prisoners this morning, in all 
960 men, 30 officers. A. A. Humphreys, M. G. 



Ixxx. 

20. Hd. Qrs. 6th Army Corps, April 7 [no hour], '65. 
Maj .-General Webb : 

I have the honor to report that B^^the mfantry of the Corps 
has crossed the river^^^^J and are now in camp, but oiving to the 
difficulty in fording the stream the artillery and trains are obliged 
to wait imtil the pontoon bridge is laid. [Crook's artillery and 
baggage animals had crossed and re-crossed fording Avith his 
troops]. My Hdqrs. are near a small house in the vicinity of 
the Burnt Bridge [Farmville], and near the road. 

H. G. Wright, Maj. -Gen. Comd'g. 



21. Farmville, 9.30 p. m., April 7, 1865. 
Major-Gen'l Meade : 

I enclose you a copy of a dispatch sent to you this evening 
by signal. The Fifth Corps is here. I will send copy of dispatch 
to Gens. Griffin and Wright. Sheridan with the cavalry is at 
Prospect Station. The enemy cannot go to Lynchburg possibly. 
I think there is no doubt but that Stoneman entered that city 
this morning. I will move my headquarters up with the troops 
in the morning, probably to Prospect Hill Station. Have the 
prisoners been sent to City Point yet ? If not they should go at 
once under strong escort. U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen'l. 

Hdqrs. Armies U. S., Farmville, 

22. ' April 7th, '65. 
Gen'I Meade : 

Order the 5th Corps to follow the 24th at 6 a. m. up the 
Lynchburg road. The 2d and 6th to follow the enemy north of 
the river. U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen'l. 

N. B. — 12^^, Italics, and^^^% and ^ ^ [ ], inserted^ by the 
copyist and editor to attract the attention of the reader. 



It is a somewhat remarkable fact that, notwithstanding the 
importance of the subject, so little attention has been paid to 
digested statistical information in connection with the Marching 
of troops, especially extraordinary or exemplary marches ; the 
length of road or extent of route occupied by a given force with 
its appro]n-iate artillery and train, ordinary complement, and the 
time required by such an organization to pass from column of 
route into proper disposition for an engagement or deployment 
into line of battle. Sir Edward Gust, a general in the British 
army, who served and distinguished himself in the Spanish 
Peninsula, a voluminous writer of distinction on military subjects, 



Ixxxi, 

remarks in his " Annals of the Wars of the i8th and 19th Cen- 
turies," that WelHngton stated that he had one rule by which he 
was always guided in regard to the moving of troops; that 5,000 
men in the ordinary formation of two ranks — the regular inter- 
vals, &c., being understood — occupied one mile of front and, 
averaging time, it took exactly one hour to move 5,000 men one 
mile and get them into a new position, or the proper formation 
for a fight or into line of battle." These are not the exact words ; 
but as a clearer presentation of the idea, when the question was 
presented to Major-General A. A. Humphreys, as to how long 
columns strung out, and what constituted a day's march, he re- 
plied : " The body of troops you mention, ten thousand men 
with thirty guns, with ammunition, subsistence and ambulance 
trains and medical wagons, such as are essential in our wooded 
and sparsely settled country [United States, speaking particularly of 
Virginia] should not, at the very most, stretch out a greater distance 
than five miles, and might be limited to three. The roads are sup- 
posed to be ordinarily good country roads. They could easily 
get over eighteen miles a day. In pursuit, from Petersburg to 
Appomattox Court House, Avhich distance, putting it at one 
hundred miles (which is sufficiently correct), we [combined 
Second and Third Corps] were delayed the first day out (the 3d 
April, 1865,) materially by the necessity of bridging streams that 
were not fordable. On the 4th I made but a short march, owing 
to the cavalry coming in on the road and having precedence. 
My troops were put to working on the roads while the cavalry 
stopped us, to insure the trains following. We had but very few 
wagons with us; only some ammunition, ambulance and surgical 
wagons." I fouo^ht over fourteen miles on the 6th April, having 
marched four miles at least before coming into contact with the 
enemy ; then had to cross Flat Creek, build two bridges over it, and 
repair the 7'oad bridge before I could get at the enemy. On the 
7th, marched some twelve miles to Heights of Farmville in pur- 
suit, encountering the whole of Lee's force there at i o'clock p. M. 
On the 8th, marched twenty-six miles, halting at midnight. On 
the 9th, by midday, was up with Lee at Appomattox. By look- 
ing at Appendix L. [XH. Scribner's Military Series] you will find 
the [combined] Second [Third] Corps, on the 31st March, had 
eighteen thousand five hundred and seven enlisted men of in- 
fantry present for duty equipped. Lost in action during the 
operations, about two thousand ; straggled or fell out, between 
one and two thousand. [Major-General John Mitchell, British 
Army, calculates the proportion of stragglers as equal to about 
one-fifth, 20,000, out of 110,000, or, deducting casualties, 98,000. 



Humphreys makes the ratio much less, Marmont says one-fifth, 
but Bonaparte mcreased it to one-quarter, including the honestly 
sick and otherwise actually temporarily disabled.] 

" I see the [my] number of guns is put down at seventy, four of 
which were mortars, and therefore were not taken with us on the 
march. We had, therefore, eleven batteries, or sixty-six guns. I 
do not recollect the number of wagons that belonged to the 
corps, and I could only get at it by diving into a great mass of 
papers. With the exception of the fighting trains, the trains 
followed us at some considerable distance. From Fredericksburg 
to Gettysburg [Third Corps] there were so many halts for two, 
three, or more days, that they can give no average per day. The 
Sixth Corps marched over thirty miles continuously, getting to 
Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d July. The Second Division, 
Third Corps, marched from Rappahannock River (part of it were 
covering railroad crossing ofthat river), eveningof 14th June, 1863, 
and reached Manassas Junction night of 15th, a march of twenty- 
nine miles, 15th, an excessively oppressive day. Again, on the 
25th June, marched twenty-five miles to mouth of Monocacy, 
part of it in night, under a heavy rain on the canal towpath." 

With all this and other instances before me, I repeat that 
with a most extensive military library in English, German and 
French, nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the works which 
pretend to treat on Marching. General Mitchell, B. A., already 
referred to, here again comes to the front with facts, not theories, in 
his " Fall of Napoleon." London, 1846, Vol. III. He says : 
" On comparing a great number of marches it appears that an 
army of 40,000 men requires about eight hours to traverse in 
average weather a distance of fifteen miles, which may be called 
an average military march. And if we make the necessary allow- 
ance for the length of cavalry columns — which are endless — for the 
lumbering trains of artillery, for the intervals between the corps 
and divisions, as well as for the openings that owing to the most 
trifling obstacles are constantly taking place, such an army will 
need thirteen hours before it can be formed into position, ready 
for battle — that is if it has been marching upon a single, 
moderately good road. Marshal Ney's corps [on the day of 
Quatre Bras] formed the left of an army [Napoleon's] of about 
130,000 men, which divided into three columns, had performed 
two marches. Each column might be about 40,000 strong, but 
the centre column alone had traversed a good high road ; the 
left and right columns had followed by-roads, one of which is 
described as having been very bad, while for the march of armies 
such roads are seldom very good. It is, therefore, no very un- 
reasonable supposition to say that Ney's troops could not have 
reached Quatre Bras before the time specified." 



Ixxxiii. 

The distances covered by troops infected by panic, flying 
from a lost field, seem almost incredible. Extracting from the 
exaggerated general statements to be found in various military 
works, the following are too well authenticated to be questioned; 
although, if investigation was carried back to the Thirty Years' 
War, the number might be greatly augmented. As, for instance, 
the flight of the Imperialists after the defeat of Tilly by Gustavus 
in 1 631; that of the Duke of Lorraine from the field, back across 
the Rhine (" Harte's Gustavus," II., 76) in 1631; thatof the troops 
ofWallenstein from Lutzen to Prague, over 100 miles, in 1632. One 
of the most disgraceful flights of a leader was that of James II. 
from the Boyne, 20th June, 1690, even across sea to France. Its 
effect justified the stress laid upon such a defection in the Bible, 
where the prophet Isaiah (X., 18) declares, 'they [soul and bodyj 
shall be as when a standard bearer fainteth.' From the battle 
field, Avhich he watched from a safe distance, the bigoted Romanist, 
without faith in his own bigotry, spurred, without drawing rein, 
to Dublin, rested one night, and ' next morning he fled, though 
no man pursued him, and never rested till the ship, his [cowardly] 
foresight had provided, bore him in safety to France.' After the 
engagement at Prestonpans, 21st September, 1745, the English 
general. Sir John Cope, and his officers and fugitives reached 
Coldstream, forty to fifty miles, the same night, and after some 
repose continued their flight to Berwick, some twenty miles 
further. After Rosbach, 5th November, 1757, the Allies did not 
stop until they found refuge in Freyburg, and had put the 
Unstrut, ten or twelve miles distant, between them and immediate 
pursuit ; many regiments not halting until they reached the Rhine, 
200 miles away.' " Nor let there be forgotten the flight and pur- 
suit to the Waxhaws, in South Carolina, in 1780 (Tarleton covered 
over 100 miles in about 48 hours), or from Bull Run, first, in 1861. 
" When, in 1758, the rapacious Duke of Richeheu was recalled, 
a churchman, the Count de Clermont, took his place at the 
head of 80,000 French. Clermont arrived at Hanover on the 
14th February. At once Prince Ferdinand fell upon him and the 
French 'fled without pause or intermission (Gust, 2,2,45) across the 
snow-covered plains of Westphalia,' and ' by the end of the month ' 
were all across the Weser, thirty mUes to the S. and W. Bruns- 
wick and. Hanover were successively evacuated, and within two 
months he was back 200 miles across the Rhine. The French 
abandoned their magazines, forgot, and thus lost a complete train 
of battering artillery and some 11,000 prisoners. It was like the 
breaking up of a rotten ice-dam in the spring — a complete dis- 
solution.^ The Austrians had not done very much better after 
Leuthen or Lissa, 5th December, 1757, where Frederic with about 



Ixxxiv. 

30,000 men defeated their 90,000, and hunted them out from 
Breslau in Silesia over the Giant mountains back upon their 
strongholds and fortresses in northeastern Bohemia, where it is 
claimed that, with difficulty, one-third of the numbers which had 
assumed the aggressive in November could again be reassembled 
after less than a few weeks' campaign of disappointed hopes." 

" During the American Revolution, the presum])tuous Gates, 
advancing, boasted he would crush Cornwallis at Camden, i6th 
August, 1780, with what he styled his " Grand Army," It was so 
completely shattered that it ceased to exist. Gates himself went 
off among the first runaways, and with almost the speed of an 
express rider, and 'scarcely halted till he reached Hillsborough [in N . 
E. North Carolina, 180 miles from the field of battle.'] ("Mercy 
Warren," II., 245.) Generals Smallwood and Gist, with a few of 
the regulars, succeeded in reaching Charlotte, N. C, 80 to 90 miles 
in 36 to 48 hours. The mifitia scattered and ran wildly, never 
stopping until they reached their homes, however distant. Never 
was anything more disgraceful, except the flight of some of the 
English troops during what was styled the " Castlebar Races," 
after their abandonment of a good position at Castlebar before an 
inferior number of French. Gordon (III., 390) states that some 
of the riflemen did not bring up until they reached Athlone, fear 
having given them such potent wings that they fled eighty miles 
in twenty-seven hours, as the roads ran." 

But all these evidences of the influence of terror on what 
might be styled inexperienced troops is transcended by the flight 
of the veteran French from Waterloo. The British General 
Mitchell, in his " Fall of Napoleon," Vol. 3, page 153, furnishes 
a statement which is positively astounding. It was dusk, or, at 
earliest, just after sundown, when the French broke away, i8th 
June, 1815. "Between four and five o'clock in the morning 
[19th] we find the Emperor at Charleroi endeavoring to rally 
fugitives who had already reached that point, though twenty 
miles from the field of battle. Failing in his efforts to collect 
these men, he proceeded to Philipville, where fugitives again 
appeared, but as little inclined for resistance as before. He 
therefore proceeds to Laon, and on the following-day [20th] is 
again haunted by the shadows of his vanquished host. Informed 
that a body of troops was seen advancing towards the town, he 
sent an aide-de-camp to ascertain what the appearance could 
mean, and learned that it was his brother Jerome, with Generals 
Soult, Morand, Colbert, Pelet de Movans and about 3,000 men, 
cavalry and infantry, who had gathered round them. Were it 
not attested beyond a doubt, the fact would seem almost in- 
credible; for this was on the 20th, and Laon is nearly a hun- 



lxxx\^. 

dred miles from the field of battle — a space which these fugitives 
must have traversed in less than forty-eight hours. Like the 
sufferings of the retreat from Moscow, the speed of the flight 
from Waterloo stands altogether without parallel in history." 

IJ^ One thing is certain, the rebels, during the retreat from 
Petersburg, were never stampeded. Stupid from want of sleep, 
beat out through fatigue, exhausted from want of food, staggered 
by constant driving and defeated at every stand they may have 
been — but stampeded, never. ^^^ 

[This concluding chapter is nothing more than facts th'own 
together. It was intended to be much more comprehensive, but 
I became too much disgusted with the blindness of mortals as to 
facts and with their subservience to assertions to deem it worthy 
the trouble of re-writing and digesting. The list of testimony 
might be swelled into a large volume, but with what good result ? 
Very few would take the trouble to investigate and reflect. It is 
impossible to overcome the ingrained effects of ignorance backed 
by self-conceit and prejudice, the latter founded on caste, weak- 
ness, interest, or public opinion, the most fallacious of guides. 
The Bible, wisest of books, says : " The prophet is not without 
honor, save in his own country and house," and " truth upon the 
scaffold," is one of the proverbs which cannot be gainsaid. Had 
this article been subjected to the file, a great many of the opinions 
might have been modified, but not a fact. " The evolution of to- 
day " has come to the conclusion, " It was in mind, not in body, 
that God made man in His own image," but this must be qualified 
by the pregnant remark of the wisest of kings, " God hath made 
man upright; but they have sought out many inventions," and 
the Love of Truth is certainly not one of the inventions they have 
sought after or out. J 

Experts speak of the art of carrying on war. War is an art 
and a science, but there is something reqiiisite in and far above it. 
A campaign, an operation, or a battle is not a matter of the 
application of mathematical rules, always keeping in mind a most 
important element, the qualities and courage of the troops, but of 
magnetism, the personal influence of the general commanding and 
his lieutenants. There is something in War far above all acquired 
knowledge. — Inspiration, Genius, that something which at once 
bridges the chasm that arrests Talent ; before which Talent stands 
helpless, stupified or aghast. War depends on the physical and 
material, but far more upon the mental or moral ; the first requires 
preparation, study, labor, and thought. It is a very great mistake 
to imagine that generalship was not perfectly comprehended in 
antiquity. Solomon certainly understood the basis of it, when he 
indited the proverb, " For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy 



Ixxxvi. 

War." " Every purpose is established by counsel ; and with good 
advice make war." " Where no counsel is, the people fall." The 
administrative services of the ancients were far better arranged 
than the vast majority can conceive, and its discipline perfect. 
Modern times know nothing like it, because they would not per- 
mit its savage application. Generalship, as far as it depends 
upon science and art, is^not so very uncommon. Take one in- 
stance; the Duke of Berwick was a consummate "practical 
strategist" — expert in the art of carrying on war. Nevertheless he 
is scarcely ever cited as an exemplar. Inspiration is a direct 
effect through the individual upon the masses, especially in battle, 
from the God of Hosts and of Battles. Lucullus, a sensualist, 
in antiquity, cited by Frederic the Great, and Vendome, the same 
kind of a man, in modern times, were thus gifted; Spinola, the 
banker or merchant; Cavalier, the baker's apprentice; Suwor- 
row, the Cossack ; Blucher, the liberator of Germany ; — Turenne 
was talent incarnate ; Conde, genius. Genius has never been 
restricted to any time or place. It is the child of circumstances 
and the mood. The six greatest generals of all time, those 
generally conceded as the " big sixes," Alexander, the Strategist ; 
Hannibal, " the Collosus of Antiquity ; Csesar, the Expert ; Gus- 
tavus, the Restorer; Frederic, the Non-paroeil ; Bonaparte, the 
Child of Destiny or Fortune : these six have been arbitrarily 
selected. Nunc pro tunc, there are others who are worthy to rank 
with them. — Epaminondas, Timoleon, Torstenson, Marlborough, 
Traun. The list might be greatly enlarged, but it would be 
piping to deaf ears to mention their names or allude to their 
deeds. " The; world knows nothing of its greatest men." This 
country has produced three men who are regarded as the embodi,- 
ment of the genius of war, whereas they were simply creatures of 
accident. Neither of them had the genius that bridges unexpected 
and unforseen gulfs. They were what Kleber justly styled Bona- 
parte, " generals at six thousand lives a day." For instance. 
Grant did not display any genius in the Wilderness campaign. He 
did not do as well as Sherman, with Thomas as his inspiration 
and balance-wheel, did in the Atlanta campaign, or as Thomas, 
alone, at Nashville. And it would seem as if at Farmville, 7 th 
April, 1865, he demonstrated his want of genius or perception in 
not reinforcing Humphreys as much as he did at Shiloh in 
neglecting to make the most of his position and provide against 
surprise and accidents. " Defensive battles [Lee's strong point] 
may be looked upon as professional battles. Offensive battles, 
well prepcwed and delivered, are [when so] the emanations of 
genius." — Marmont's "Spirit of Military Institutions." 



Ixxxvii. 

[Note. — The question of Bridging or Fording the x'^ppomattox 
to reinforce Humphreys, on the afternoon, 6th April, 1865, is a very 
curious one, and its comprehension involves a great deal of study 
and practical observation. Finally, it resolves itself into the sim- 
pler question rather of the exertion of will power than of physical 
ability. The proverb, " Where there is a will there is a way," holds 
good on almost every occasion in war. The Appomattox at Farm- 
ville is a comparatively small stream and it would not have taken 
very long to tear down a number of neighboring buildings and 
construct a temporary bridge, amply strong enough and enduring 
enough for the occasion. Besides being a railroad station, there 
were lots of material that could be utilized and there were woods 
in close vicinity. No enemy on the north bank was present or 
at hand to molest the work, which could have been prosecuted 
on both sides simultaneously, and the only difficulty in bridging 
the much broader and deeper Rappahannock in December, 
1862, ceased the moment the rebel sharpshooters, on the right 
bank and under cover, were dislodged. Again, where was the pon- 
toon train which should have moved with each corps and have been 
in readiness for instant use? Humphreys had shown, 6th, a. m., 
how rapidly bridges could be restored or constructed. On the 
morning of the 6th his men forded armpit deep and also bridged 
Flat Creek, about one hundred feet wide. It is no pedantry to 
instance examples in former days, because they always hold good 
from the first development of modern war, as when Gustavus Adol- 
phus crossed the Rhine on a barn door, and Bernard of Saxe 
Weimar, imitating Maximin, A. D. 238, and imitated by the 
Germans in 1870, substituted hogsheads or beer barrels for pon- 
toons, and threw bridges sufficient for all practical purposes in 
an almost incredibly short space of time. There are a great many 
curious examples of spontaneous engineering which demonstrate 
what energy or despair will effect. In 1560 D'Oysell made a raid 
into Fife, on the north side of the Firth of Forth, and found him- 
self beset by superior forces. Before him lay a deep and broad 
stream, the bridge across which had been destroyed. His enemies 
thought he was entrapped. The experienced French commander 
did not hesitate a moment; he caused a church and other neigh- 
boring buildings to be torn down, and with the timbers, &c:, he 
constructed a bridge, to the astonishment of -the Scotch, who 
thought they had him sure. As to fording, practice sets rules at 
defiance. Near, or at Farraville, Col. W. H. Paine, " Pathfinder 
of the Army of the Potomac," stated there was a ford used by 
those frequenting the mill, and a little above a crossing path over 
a tree, which had fallen or been felled so as to constitute a foot- 
bridge.] 



Ixxxviii. 

It has been reported, and the story has never been contra- 
dicted, that when the French, in 1799, destroyed the Devil's 
Bridge, Suworrow's troops restored communication by lashing 
trees together with the sashes of their officers. It is true that the 
span is only twenty-five or thirty feet, but the horrors of the situa- 
tion more than made up for the narrowness of the gulf What 
made it far worse, fighting was going on and the slightest dis- 
abling wound was equivalent to death. The effect on the mind 
made this bridging of twenty-five feet far more difficult and ap- 
palling than five times greater breadth of placid water. There 
are instances of making bridges b)^ thrusting wagons into the 
stream in continuous lines across. 

Where there are plenty of large trees and plenty of men to 
handle them, a cob or a cantilever bridge over a small stream 
does not present much difficulty. The writer has seen a great 
many curious pieces of snap-work done with celerity and success. 
The Roelifif Jansen, a large and furious stream, burst its bounds 
and nearly scooped out a village. No trouble was experienced 
in constructing a cob dam across the new channel, which, while 
it allowed the water to pass freely, constituted a bridge, as it were, 
to get the materials in place. Had it been planked, it would have 
been a bridge. 

"Thirty-six inches for infantry, forty inches for artillery and cav- 
alry," are the figures in books as the depths set down as rules for 
fording. Infantry have often laughed at greater depths. Ewell, 
in July, 1863, forded the Potomac shoulder deep ; Humphreys, on 
the 6th April, Flat Creek arm-pit deep — that is, at least, from 
forty-eight to fifty-two inches. When Ginkel's grenadiers carried 
Athlone in the teeth of a sheltered defence, they forded the braad 
and impetuous Shannon under fire, cravat deep, which must have 
been from fifty-two to sixty inches, since grenadiers were men 
picked out for their height. At any time and under any circum- 
stances it was considered "a dangerous ford." How deep cavalry 
can ford depends upon the horses, and if the rule holds good, 
as it is consistent with common sense, infantry can ford, not swim, 
through as great a depth of water as cavalry, if the bottom is firm, 
because horses deepen a ford Avith their shod hoofs, whereas in- 
fantry often pack it. A spirited horse will not ford quietly when 
the water is as deep as his back ; he rises and wants to surge. 
The writer knows this by experience. Fifteen hands makes sixty 
inches, which would bring water over the seat of the saddle of 
average horses, and arm-pit or shoulder deep, say fifty inches, 
would bring water over the backs of average horses. Memory 
recalls at this moment Baner's infantry forded the Oder shoulder 
deep, dragging by hand their artillery after them. — " Decisive 
Conflicts," Gettysburg, 107. 



Ixxxix. 

On reflection it is astonishing how often such feats of audacity 
have been attempted and succeeded At the passage of the 
Boyne, 1690, the Enghsh, in fact the whole infantry of their centre, 
struggled through the river up to their arm-pits in water, under 
fire, to attack an enemy of equal force in position and to some ex- 
tent protected by artificial defences. At the capture of Cork by 
Marlborough, 1690, four English regiments advanced through the 
Rape Marsh up to their shoulders in water. At Athlone, 1691, 
WiUiam's troops plunged, up to their cravats in water, into the 
Shannon, running not only deep but strong, forded the river under 
fire, and captured strongly occupied works. Numerous other in- 
stances might be cited; the most remarkable, Villar's advance 
through an inundated country, in the spring of 1706, to the cap- 
ture of fortified towns and strongly occupied .works. On this 
occasion the French infantry charged about a mile through water 
up to their shoulders, and the horses of the cavalry were in many 
places compelled to swim (Moret's '■'■Qninze Ans du Regne de Louis 
XIV" [1700-17 15 j, II., pages 149-15 1 ). In the operations 
around Savannah, and after its capture, 1864, on more than one 
occasion (according to letters received) short men had to swim 
for their lives. 

Meade telegraphed to Humphreys, "7th April, 6.15 p. m., the 
[Crook's] cavalry has forded delly deep." [The writer had his mare 
measured, and with her belly deep was equal to thirty-four inches, 
and, under the saddle, back deep was equal to about sixty inches, 
equal to about arm-pit deep of a man standing five feet ten in his 
boots. This argument, showing that the Appomattox should have 
been crossed some way or another to the support of Humphreys, 
was fortified by measurements received from Farmville a number of 
years ago, which are doubtless among the writer's papers at home 
far distant, and at present inaccessible. Communications have 
been addressed requesting duplicate information, but as yet have 
met with no response.] 

[(Fording and Fighting in the Water.) — '■'■These fords 
[those of the '■ most easterly branch of the Nile, the Pelusaic '] 
[which ' may be forded on horseback when the Nile is at the 
lowest, or even by men on foot if they do not mind being wet to 
the waist '] the troops of Perdiccas bravely attempted to pass, in 
the face of the first Ptolemy's army. One [branch or arm] they 
crossed, but were routed at the second, while fighting up to their 
breasts in the water." — Bartlett's " Forty Days in the Desert." 
London, 1862. Page 24.] 

" Several different systems for a Ponton Equipment have been 
adopted in different countries, and it is therefore still a matter 
for military study as to which of them is best, in whole or in part, 
or what improvements or substitutes can be suggested for all. 



xc. 

" Pontons of ordinary shape are not exclusively applicable for 
forming a bridge ; when insufficient for that object they may be 
used as boats or in rafts to convey bodies of troops across a river; 
the horses being made to swim with their heads held up by their 
bridles at the sides of each ponton ; the artillery in such cases 
being carried over on rafts. Indeed, it was in this way that, in 
1814, a preliminary footing was rapidly established on the right 
bank of the Adour, about three miles below Bayonne, capable of 
resisting the strong sortie sent out from that garrison to oppose it. 

"Of numerous similar instances of the service which even an 
extemporized pontoon-train has rendered to an army, I will select 
only the following one, recorded by Captain Connolly in his 
"History of the Royal Sappers and Miners," Vol. I., page 254: 

"A reinforcement of thirty men, under Lieutenant Rutherford, 
R. E., arrived at the Cape of Good Hope on the 24th of July, 
1 8 19. In consequence of hostilities with the Kaffirs, the detach- 
ment marched seven hundred miles to the south-eastern frontier. 
It traversed a wild and thickly wooded country, where there were 
neither bridges nor roads ; and, in the absence of soldiers of the 
Quartermaster-General's Department, facilitated by their exer- 
tions the progress of the troops. In places Avhere civil artificers 
could not be procured at any rate of wages, they executed various 
services and Avorks of defence for the security and tranquillity of 
the settlement. On one occasion they constructed a temporary 
bridge, of chance material, to span one of the principal rivers of 
the country, which was swollen with floods and rendered deep, 
rapid, and dangerous. The bridge was thrown in six hours, and 
the whole of the force, about two thousand horse and foot, a 
demi-battery of guns with ammunition wagons, about one hun- 
dred baggage wagons with commissariat supplies, camp equipage, 
&c., crossed in perfect safety in three hours." — Extract from "The 
Royal Engineer." By the Rt. Hon. Sir Francis B. Head, Bart. 
London, 1869. At pages 36 and 37. 

"As soon as this [Lassoo] experiment was concluded and the 
drivers had reattached themselves to their wagons, the whole train 
was ordered to advance in file — that is, one ponton carriage, &c., 
guarded by its sappers, following another. After they had pro- 
ceeded in this shape for a short distance, Captain Micklem very 
sharply uttered the word of command : ' Form for defence against 
cavalry,' and in less than two minutes, by a movement exactly the 
reverse of that described by the lines : 

'These are Clan-Alpine's warriors true; 
And, Saxon, — I am Roderick Dhu ! ' 

he, his horses, his drivers, and his sappers, became the invis- 



XCl. 

ible garrison of a fort or polygon of twenty sides, formed by his 
pontoon and covered wagons, drawn up so close to each other 
that, in several instances, they almost touched, and in others left 
an interstice or embrasure of about a foot or eighteen inches on 
the outside. 

"As I rode around and close to this rapidly constructed fort, 
wherever I came to an interstice a sapper on one knee, with his 
sword in bayonet form attached to his firearm, with two others 
standing one behind the other above him, each and all looking 
direct, at me. nearly together snapped their Sniders in my face. 
Others beneath the wagons shot at me from between the wheels; 
and I have no hesitation in saying that the officer's word of com- 
mand was so completely carried into practical eft'ect that the ram- 
part formed by his wagons was totally impenetrable, not only to 
cavalry using swords, but also to lancers." — Extract from "Head's 
Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At pages 44 and 45. 

" Fortification is the art of enabling a small body of men to 
resist, for a considerable time, the attack of a greater number." — 
Extract from "Head's Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At 
page 155. 

" Now, to obliterate [Impossible !] that word from future engin- 
eering proceedings, the 'trench-railway' has been invented, or, 
as there is really nothing new in its principle, it would be more 
correct to say that the ordinary railway of the firm of Stephenson, 
Brunei & Co. has been at Chatham adopted and adapted to the 
parallels and approaches of a siege. 

"The facility with which it can be so adapted has been de- 
monstrated by the fact, that during last summer a squad of twenty- 
five sappers, Avho had been duly instructed in the work, with the 
assistance of twenty-five fatigue men, laid down four-hundred 
yards of line in instruction trenches, at Brompton, in twenty-five 
minutes, so that the trollies or trucks for carrying guns, ammuni- 
tion, &c., were able to pass along the iron road. The materials 
had been previously prepared and brought up, but the whole of 
the laying of sleepers and rails, and spiking down the latter were, 
it is alleged, done in the time mentioned. And very nearly at 
that rate I myself saw the work proceed." — Extract from " Head's 
Royal Engineer." London, 1869. At pages 156 and 157. 

"A certain number of barrels, usually the ordinary ones used 
by the navy or commissariat for provisions and rum, according to 
their size and power of flotation, are firmly lashed together 
side by side, and in this form take the place of the piers of an or- 
dinary permanent bridge or of the pontoons of a floating bridge. 

"The seventy barrels I witnessed avouM enable an army 
without pontoons, with its cavalry, field artillery and infantry, four 



XCll. 

deep, to cross a river fifty yards broad. The wooden cases lined 
with metal, used for carrying on board ship ammunition for the 
new heavy guns, can be adapted by the pontoon train for this pur- 
pose." — "Royal Engineer." By Sir F. B. Head. London, 1869. 
At pages 56 and 57. 

" Royal Engineer Establishment. 
" Chatham, 186-. 

"i. — Lieutenant , Royal Engineers, will prepare a 

project for a military bridge of piles, to support twelve-pounder 
Armstrong guns, to be made of Fir poles, 8" diameter and length 
as required, over a river one hundred yards wide and six feet 
deep, with tidal rise of five feet, banks and bottom of river of 
solid clay. Reports to describe how the poles would be driven, 
no boat being available ; pile-engine to be made on the spot ; 
monkey 13" shell roadway to be covered with fascines, as no 
planks are available. 

"2. — A general description of the proposed bridge, and of the 
method of constructing it, Avith an abstract estimate of the men, 
tools, materials and time required for its formation. 

" 3. — A practical analysis of the data, showing the load to be 
borne, and its action upon the constituent parts of the bridge, the 
width of roadway required, <S;c., with a detailed examination into 
the powers of the parts of the bridge to resist the forces, &c., to 
which they will be subjected. 

"4. — A detailed description of the arrangement and construc- 
tion, and of the method of putting together and securing the parts 
to the bridge. 

" 5. — A detailed description of the subdivision of the work 
and the organization of the working parties, with separate esti- 
mates of the number of men and tools, of the quantity of material, 
and the length of time required for each successive operation in 
forming the bridge. 

"6. — A general plan, with the necessary sections and eleva- 
tions of the bridge, accompanied by drawings on a larger scale of 
those details which cannot be clearly explained otherwise. 

"The dates of beginning and ending the project to be written 
on the plan and memoir." 

"[Signed,] Superintendent of Field Works." 

"Royal Engineer." By Sir F. B. Head, pages 168-9. Lon- 
don, 1S69. 

According to the report of Edward Maguire, Lieutenant U. 
S. Engineers, in his ■' Exploration and Survey in the Department 
of Dakota," 30th June, 1877 : 

"While in the field the attention of the detachment was 



XClll. 

devoted to topographical work. * * * In addition to 
topographical work I was engaged in the superintendence of the 
Bridging and Crossing of streams and in such road-making as 
was found to be necessary in order to allow, the passage of the 
train [page 1337]. The next morning (i8th May, 1876) the com- 
mand moved again, crossing Heart River. The Heart at this 
point is about thirty yards wide, three feet deep, with a fairly 
firm sandy bed and a slight current. The water was clear and 
good. A great deal of work was required in corduroying the 
bank to enable the train to cross, and it was only after a delay of 
three hours that the head of the column commenced its march 
for the Sweetbriar [page 1341]- 

"The next day's march of thirteen and a half miles brought 
us to Crow's Nest, or Buzzard's Roost Butte. The first portion 
of the route lay over an exceedingly rough country covered with 
drift. After struggling over a distance of one and a quarter miles, 
we arrived on the banks of the Sweetbriar. It was found to be 
a rushing torrent fully fifty feet wide and much over ten feet in 
depth. To cross it with the means at hand was impossible, so it 
was determined to go southward and turn the stream. This was 
done, and skirting the valley we passed out into an open, flat and 
marshy prairie, in a north-westerly direction towards Crow's Nest. 
The ground was very soft, and interspersed with fragments of slate, 
and the last four and and a half miles were passed over a swamp, 
double teams being necessary for each wagon. At noon a terrible 
storm arose — the rain came down as in sheets, while, for twenty 
minutes, hail five-eighths of an inch in diameter descended with 
great violence. * * * 

" Crow's Nest consists of two peaks, the eastern one being 
considerably taller than the other. It is so called from the fact 
that large numbers of crows formerly built their nests and brooded 
there. Twin Buttes are plainly visible from the eastern peak. 

" The only water at this camp was that in ' coulees ' and ' buffalo 
wallows.' There was no wood easily accessible, and the grass 
was poor. The bridge was laid once during this march [page 
1341]. The flowers were very beautiful, and as they were crushed 
under the horses' feet they gave forth a protest of the most deli- 
cate and welcome odor [page 1342]. 

"These Indians were bold enough to assemble on the bluffs 
on the south side of the Yellowstone, and dare the troops on the 
other side to an encounter [page 1344]. 

"It is thought that a few remarks in reference to one serious 
defect in the organization of the columns operating in the field 
during the campaign will not be out of place. I^^That defect was 
the absence of a good bridge train. On leaving Fort Lincoln 



XCIV. 

there were placed, under my orders, two wagons containing tools 
and some one and a half inch pine plank, and some, two by four 
and three by six, pine pieces. * * * though simple 
it was of incalculable benefit, and shows how useful and valuable 
a small canvas ponton train would have been. I am free to say 
that I think no supply-train should be sent into that western 
country without at least two trestles, four canvas pontons, and 
the accompanying bridge material. Four pontons are estimated, 
because a substantial raft could be made of that number for cross- 
ing the larger streams. If these could not be obtained from the 
regular Engineer depot, the Quartermaster's department should be 
called upon to construct them in accordance with proper plans 
and specifications. 

" Last season the material mentioned above saved the column 
many miles of hard marching and great loss of time ; but, unfortu- 
nately, the supply was soon exhausted and it then became neces- 
sary to resort to the long, tedious and uninteresting operation of 
filling in the bed of the stream to be crossed. It is thought, also, 
that there should accompany each column a detail of men whose 
sole duty should be to construct and care for the bridges. Much 
time would be saved by thus having men who would be familiar 
with the work, and who would take a greater interest in it than 
can be expected of those who are detailed from day to day. 

"The wagon train made fifty-nine crossings in all, and the 
average time consumed in making these crossings was forty 
minutes each. As a matter of interest, there will follow a de- 
scription of some of the methods of crossing streams, which have 
been or can be employed by our troops in the western country. 

''I St. — By filling in the bed of the stream or ravine with logs, 
covering these with a layer of brush, and in turn covering the 
brush with a thick layer of sod or earth. It is very seldom that 
the time can be allowed for carrying this structure high enough, 
and consequently the approaches must be cut quite deep; and 
experience has shown that there is not more than one teamster 
in twenty who will not let his team run down the slope of the ap- 
proach and strike the causeway with a heavy thud, thus breaking 
through the roadbed and requiring constant work of refilling. 
The brush used may be sage, willow and young cottonwood. 
The sage is by far the most easily manipulated and the most en- 
during. Logs, to act as side-rails, should be laid, and the road- 
way should be at least fifteen feet broad. The axes of the ap- 
proaches and the crossing should be in the same plane, perpen- 
dicular to the axis of the stream. This would seem a trivial 
remark, but it was observed last summer that, unless closely 
watched, the men would, unconsciously, deviate from the proper 



xcv. 

direction, and the crossing would be oblique to the stream. 
Whenever that happened, there was trouble with the teamsters. 

" 2d. — By making a crib-work of spare wagon-tongues, and 
laying others covered with sod to form the roadway. The wagon- 
pole is of oak, and ten and seven-tenths feet long. 

"3d. — By employing the bull-ropes or fifth-chains as suspen- 
sion cables, and laying at the bottom of the catenary three or 
four wagon-tongues to act as a species of girder. The flooring 
is laid with other wagon-tongues, and the whole covered with sod. 
To prevent swaying, lariats may be fastend to the ropes and 
anchored to the shore. This method is, of course, limited to 
timbered streams and to those which are a little less in width 
than twice the length of a wagon-tongue, or twenty-one feet. 
[This is something on the principle of Tressilian's telegraph wire 
suspension bridges.] 

"4th. — By employing floating piers, each consisting of a wagon- 
body placed over the number of empty water-kegs that can be con- 
fined within the body. The roadway, as before, is formed of wagon- 
tongues. Lariats can be used as anchoring cables for the piers. 

"A keg is capable of sustaining a weight of 45S.69 pounds. 

" The interior dimensions of the six-mule army wagon-body 
are as follows : depth, 2 feet ; length, 10 feet; width, 3.58 feet. 

" Fourteen ten-gallon kegs will about fill a wagon-body of the 
above dimensions; and hence each set of kegs will virtually sustain 
a weight of fourteen times 458.69 pounds, or 6,421.66 pounds. 
Subtracting from this the average weight of the body, 423 pounds, 
we shall have 5,998.65 pounds as the weight which can be borne 
by each pier. 

"The dimensions of the wagon-tongue are as follows: 

" Length of tongue, ... 10.7 feet. 

Breadth at point, . . . B' = 2.5 inches. 

Depth at point, .... D'= 2.5 " 

Breadth at butt, . . . B"= 3.88 " 

Depth at butt, .... D"= 2.75 " 

Mean breadth, . . . . B' = 3.19 " 

Mean depth, . . . . . D'= 2.625" 

"Supposing the tongues not to lap on the piers, we shall have 
for the length of the tongue between supports, 7 feet, 12 inches: 

"The average weight of the army wagon is 1,800 pounds, and 
assuming the weight of a mule as 1,000 pounds, we shall have 
7,800 pounds as the weight of the wagon and six-mule team. 
Assuming, now, the average weight of the load to be 4,000 
pounds, we shall have 11,800 pounds as the Aveight on the bridge. 



XCVl. 

The total length of bridge occupied by wagon and team is 
forty-nine feet, and consequently the load per running foot is 241 
pounds, nearly. Referring to the breaking weight of the tongue, 
we see that four tongues laid as balks are sufficient; forty tongues 
will be required for flooring, if laid close. There will then be in 
all forty-four tongues, weighing twenty-eight pounds each. In 
other words, each bay, exclusive of the piers, will weigh 1,232 
pounds, or 115.1 pounds per running foot. We have, as the 
weight of forty-nine feet of bridge, with load, 11,800 pounds 
plus 1 15. 1 pounds, X 49, or 17,440 pounds, nearly. This weight 
will be borne by at least five piers ; but we have seen above that 
each pier will support 5,998.66 pounds, and consequently five 
piers would support 29,993.3. In other words, the bridge would 
have nearly double the strength absolutely necessary. It is also 
to be seen that any field-battery can be crossed on such a bridge. 
A similar bridge can be constructed by using simply the kegs, 
lashed together, for piers; but the other method is preferable, as 
the wagon-body keeps the kegs together, besides furnishing a 
level bed on which to lay the balks. 

"5th. — By felling four trees, which, with the butts resting on 
the banks, will [Cantilever], by crossing each other two and two, 
form supports for a girder, and then laying a flooring. They 
should either be spiked or lashed together where they cross. 

"6th. — By forming rude trestles, which may be either simply 
notched, or, what is better, spiked with lariat pins. The girder 
timbers can be squared off" on the upper side and the stringers be 
notched so as to hold better. The main pieces of the legs may 
be anchored to the shore by lariats. A tripod trestle -bridge can 
be formed of simple tripods connected at the bottom by braces. 
A bar is lashed or pinned across two legs of the tripod, and on 
this rests the cap-piece, as in the Figure 6. 

"7th. — By various combinations of saplings forming what are 
termed single or double lever bridges. 

"A small work on field fortification, by Major W. W. Knollys, 
F. R. G. S., Ninety-third Southerland Highlanders, contains a 
very good description of such bridges. 

"A single-lever bridge is composed of two frames which lock 
into each other. A full sized section of the stream or gap should 
be first traced on the ground. The line representing the breadth 
should be bisected. Two standards should then be laid down on 
the section and on them marked the places wheie the main tran- 
soms, the fork transom, and the ledges will come. The frames 
should then be constructed. These distances should be between 
standards at the transom, nine feet six inches, and at the ledger 
ten feet six inches. In the other frame the distances should be 



XCVll. 

eleven feet and twelve feet, respectively. As the frame lies on the 
ground with its butts toward the stream, the transom should be 
under and the ledger above the standards. The diagonal dimen- 
sions of the frames are measured to ascertain whether the posi- 
tions of the pieces of the latter have not changed. Of the di- 
agonals, one is altogether above the frame, the other has its butt 
over and its top under. The diagonals are lashed to each other 
where they cross, and also to the standards. The frames are 
raised and lowered into their positions by means of foot and guy 
ropes. The pickets for the foot ropes are driven into the ground 
about two paces from the edge of the bank and four paces on 
each side of the centre of the frame. The foot ropes are attached 
to the butts and passed twice around the pickets. The pickets 
for the guy ropes are driven in about twenty paces from the bank 
and ten paces from the central line. The fore and back guys are 
fastened to the tips, the ends of the fore guys being thrown across 
the stream and those of the back guys being passed twice around 
their respective pickets. The frames are then raised by hand 
and carried to the edge of the bank. The butts are then gradu- 
ally lowered into position, one frame being hauled over till it is a 
little beyond the perpendicular, in which position it is secured by 
fastening the back guys to their pickets ; the other frame is dealt 
with in a similar manner. Both frames are then lowered till they 
interlock. A spar is laid across the fork formed by the crossing 
of the standards, to serve as a support to the road beams. The 
roadway is composed of balks lashed to each other, and covered 
with planks, spiked or rack-lashed down, or by fascines covered 
with loose brushwood, earth or heather. The ends of the balks 
should be attached to a beam or stout spar, half buried in 
the ground and picketed down, its direction being perpendic- 
ular to the length of the bridge. It is desirable to place rails or 
breast lines at the edges of the bridge. At each transom the 
road beams should be all tips or all butts, and the ends of each 
pair should be lashed together. It must be noted that the frames 
should not make a greater angle with each other than 120°. 

"A double-lever bridge is formed in a manner similar to that 
in which a single-lever bridge is constructed, with the exception 
that the two frames do not cross each other, but are connected 
by means of a second frame, which has no diagonals. Double- 
lever bridges are suited for openings of forty feet. Even open- 
ings of sixty feet have been spanned by a double lever bridge. 

"Another combination can be made by forming a lever truss 
bridge. The frames are made as in the case just cited, but an 
extra support is given to the roadway by the rope at the centre." 
The figures annexed explain themselves. {Ibid, pages i354-i35S-) 



XCVlll. 

[F. B. Tressilian, a young officer who suggested the idea of con- 
structing improvised suspension bridges over streams not over two 
hundred feet wide, using telegraph wire for the cables, was one of 
the brightest and most original men I ever met. He had all the 
expedients of war at his finger ends. Like Korner, he was a sol- 
dier-poet. One of his lyrics, jotted down on a shingle, while on 
duty in the trenches before Vicksburg, which he also set to music 
(in the same way that Roget de L'Isle composed the words and 
notes of " The Marseillaise), was like a trumpet peal, worthy of 
Tyrtoeus. He afterwards became a Fenian, and started from New 
York, with other noted bloods, in a schooner, intending to land 
in Ireland and organize armed resistance against the British Gov- 
ernment. After hovering around the coast for some time, and find- 
ing nothing could be done, he returned, and suddenly turned up 
in New York again — then disappeared. 

An article, which he partly jotted down in his Diary and partly 
related to me, I furnished to The Historical Magazine, for x\ugust, 
1869, pages 89-97. It is entitled, "IX. — Incidents connected 
with the History of the 'Army of the Tennessee.' " From the 
Diary of one its officers. [The author of the following Diary was 
Captain (afterward Lieutenant-Colonel) F. B. Tressilian, U.S. V., 
Aid-de-Camp and Engineer on the Staff of Major-General John 
A. Logan. He was a man of uncommon ability and courage ; 
never at a loss for expedients; and competent to produce great 
results with what, to ordinary men, would have proved utterly 
insufficient means. He was a very warm friend of the writer ; 
and, as a memento of his regards, copied out the following from 
his Diary to oblige Major-General de Peyster, who has never ne- 
glected an opportunity to collect such reminiscences of the great 
American conflict. It is almost a misfortune for the future his- 
tarian that Colonel Tressihan did not at least set in order his 
recollections of the decisive battle of Shiloh, but more particu- 
larly of the siege of Vicksburg, in which he played a conspicuous 
part — actually converting Stumps into Mortars, and on another oc- 
casion BUILDING A BRIDGE OUT OF TELEGRAPH Vi^IRE, whetl mili- 
tary professionals were nonplussed at the absefice of ivhat they 
deeftied suitable or necessary material?^ This Diary is most interest- 
ing. It terminates abruptly with the disembarking of the Union 
troops at Pittsburg Landing [Shiloh], 1862. Tressilian's opinion of 
the position was anything but favorable. It is a great loss to his- 
tory that his graphic Diary, with its practical observations, was 
never printed in full. If there ever was a genius, in the ordinary 
acceptation of the term, Tressilian was eminently such a one.] 



XCIX. 

[" The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge 
across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre (near Port Gibson, 
I St May, 1863). At this time the water was high and current 
rapid. What might be called a raft bridge was soon constructed 
from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, 
&c., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. — 
XXXIV, 485. See Map to face page 466. " Personal Memoirs 
of U. S. Grant, 1885."] 

[Every battle or engagement has its fellow or parallel, either in 
whole or in part. At Prague, 6th May, 1757, if Prince Moritz 
could have got across the Moldau at Branik, a little south of 
Prague, the Austrian army might have been annihilated. Prince 
Moritz was three pontons short, and the Moldau was not ford- 
able ; whereas there were more than sufficient pontons at Farm- 
ville, and the Appomattox was fordable. In assaulting die 
Austrian lines Prince Henry waded through a soft marsh waist- 
deep, which is about forty-four inches, or nearly back-deep for a 
horse. Belly-deep for ordinary horses is not much over thirty 
inches. From the utter impossibility of getting over or through 
the Moldau, Prince Moritz was compelled to stand idly by and 
see the Austrians, thoroughly whipped, withdraw and find refuge 
behind the fortifications of Prague, or march off to reinforce Daun 
and win at Koltin. At Farmville abundant troops, which could 
easily have got across, left Humphreys to take care of himself, 
and allowed Lee to escape, affording him another chance to get 
off, and necessitating a terribly harassing pursuit of about forty 
miles in about as many hours, just the unsatisfactory case of Prague 
followed by the necessity of another fight within a few days. 
This was exactly Blucher's idea of the folly of not profiting by 
every opportunity, especially of the defeat of an enemy.] 

[" The rates of march, for Russian troops, under good condi- 
tions of weather and roads, are as follows, per hour: 

For Infantry, 22/3 miles. 

For Foot Artillery, ^yi " 

For Cavalry and Horse Artillery, at 

a walk, ........ 3I/3 " 

For Cavalry and Horse Artillery, 

alternately at walk and trot, . 4^ " 

For Horse Train, 22/3 " 

For Ox Train, 2 " 

The length of a division of Infantry on the march, in column 
of double files or sections, is from 3,000 to 4,000 paces; and in- 
cluding its wagon train, from 9,000 (21,000 feet) to 13,000 (17,- 
000 feet) paces. The length of a Cavalry division on the march. 



c. 

in column of threes, is from 4,000 to 5,000 paces, and including 
its train, from 9,000 to 10,000 paces." — "The Russian Army and 
its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877 and 1878." By F. V. Greene. 
New York: 1879. P^'ge 136-] 

COPY OF AN INSCRIPTION APPENDED TO A PICTURE IN THE OLD 

WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING, IN WASHINGTON, WHICH HAS 

DISAPPEARED. IT IS PERTINENT TO FORDING. 

General Geo. Rogers Clarke was born in Albemarle Co.,A^a., 
in 1752, but spent the greater part of his life in Kentucky and 
Indiana. In 1778 he raised a small volunteer force in Virginia, 
crossed the Ohio, reduced nearly all the British posts between the 
Mississippi and the Great Lakes, and arrested the incursions of 
the Western Indians. His marches through the pathless wilder- 
ness were so rapid that he generally took the enemy by surprise, 
his prudence so great that he rarely lost a man, and his daring 
has never been surpassed. /;/ attacking Vincennes in Feh'uary, 
1779, he was five days in wading his army across the valley of the 
Wabash, fiooded with melted snoivs for a breadth of six miles, gene- 
rally waist deep, and sometimes up to the shoulders, an exploit that 
parallels HannibaVs crossing of the Thrasymene AParsh. 

General Clarke was variously employed by the State of Vir- 
ginia and the United States up to 1786, in maintaining possession 
of the Western country and suppressing Indian hostilities. He 
died in 18 18, near Louisville, Kentucky. 

This conquest and armed occupation of the Northwestesn 
Territory by General Clarke, was made the ground on which the 
Count de Vergennes and the American Commissioners obtained 
for the United States, by the treaty of 1783, a boundary on the 
line of the Great Lakes instead of the Ohio River. 

I have become so thoroughly disgusted with the wilful or un- 
intentional perversion of facts recently publiaAied, or special pleas 
presented as histories of the American Rebellion by first hands, 
politicians, flatterers, partisans, parasites, perverters, or purveyors 
for the diseased public taste, that I have not attempted to con- 
cise or correct this chapter on Fording, &c., but give it just as I 
found my notes, some of them long since jotted down, others 
studied shortly after the occurrences on which they bear as testi- 
mony, corroborative of opinions then expressed. They were sub- 
mitted to one of the bravest men I ever kncAv, and also to one of 
the most honest men I ever met. The one is where " the wicked 
cease from troubling and the weary are at rest," but the other 
survives to bear witness to the correctness of the foregoing state- 
ments and deductions, and herewith, to attest the fact, his letter, 



CI. 

one of a number of similar communications received from him, is 
published, and immediately follows. 

T^ ^ -n New York, April 2 ^d, 1886. 

Dear General de Peyster: ' ^ ^ ' 

* * * It was not until last evening that I succeeded 
in finishing the reading of the papers you gave me. I am very 
sorry that all of my memoranda concerning army matters are for 
the time being locked up in a storehouse and not conveniently 
accessible. My recollection of the eveiits narrated corresponds fully 
with the account as you have if. You have given H^imphreys that 
just credit which was his due, a credit which he himself did not 
strive or ask for, being so absorbed in that intelligent, energetic and 
fearless performance of all that not simply duty, but the highest pa- 
triotism, combined with military ability, led him to attempt and to 
perform. 

At one time I wrote you in regard to some fords above, one 
at a mill ; also of a place where a fallen tree served as a foot 
bridge. Also of the fact of the river being fordable at ordinary 
stages in many places ; of guiding and accompanying Hon. E. B. 
Washburn from General Meade's headquarters to and across the 
river by a ford the next night after leaving Farmville. The 
proximity of large trees near the left bank, and buildings on the 
right bank, all of which would have furnished materials for a bridge. 

I ought, and perhaps did, mention that Gen. Meade, who re- 
mained for a time where Gen. Humphreys crossed [High Bridge?], 
received reports that the engineers were constructmg a bridge at 
Farmville, in consonance with his instructions, and not until quite 
late in the day [7th April], did he learn that that was not being 
accomplished as he expected. 

Where Gen. Humphreys crossed, the bank and bluff was very 
steep and abrupt, the wagon road making quite a detour to reach 
the bottom. The slope on the opposite side being less steep and 
farther from the stream. There was originally 35 spans in the 
R. R. bridge, 100 feet each in length ; earth had been filled in, 
shortening the bridge to 29 spans, if I recollect right, of which 
two or three had been injured or partially destroyed by the enemy 
when we arrived. Gen. Humphreys' route diverged to the right 
over a gradual rise, but coming to a very rough, broken region 
just before reaching the place [Cumberland Church] of his en- 
gagement with the enemy. After reaching the height of ground, 
about a half mile from the river [south side, right bank ?], a road 
ran in the direction of Farmville; this was the road taken by the 
cavalry. Nearer the river the country was a succession of spurs 

and deep ravines. ,^ ^ 1 

Yours very truly, ^_ ^_ p^^^^_ 



en. 

WILLIAMSBURG FARMVILLE. 

[It is extraordinary how exactly history often repeats itself- 
At pages LVII. and XCIX. mention is made that, during the 
battle of Prague, 6th May, 1757, the corps, or division, of Prince 
Moritz had to stand idle and see the wrecks of the Austrian army 
escape, in consequence of the want of three pontons. Just so the 
plans of Wellington were traversed before the battle of Toulouse, 
27th March, 1814, at Portel on the Garonne, for the want of five 
pontons (Larpent, 458). Had the British column been provided 
with five more boats, the slaughter, fourteen days afterwards, ex- 
perienced in carrying the French positions might have been 
avoided. These, however, were accidents irremediable at the 
moment. At Farmville, 7th April, 1865, any difficulty might have 
been obviated at once. Humphreys might have, after Cumber- 
land Church, in justice, quoted the bitter remark of Hooker in 
regard to his abandonment at WiUiamsburg, 5th May, 1862 : 
" History Avill not be believed when it is told that the noble of- 
ficers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this un- 
equal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence 
of more than thirty thousand of their comrades with arms in their 
hands. Nevertheless, it is true." (Rebellion Record, A^ol. V., 
Doc. page 16, i.) 

This example does not stand alone. After the great French 
disaster at Oudenarde, Marshal Vendome wrote to Louis XIV. : 
" It was impossible for me to imagine that fifty battalions and 
about one hundred and eighty squadrons, comprising the best 
troops in this [the French] army, would be satisfied to look on 
and see us [the French right] fighting for six hours, they looking 
on exactly as, at the opera, the audience watches what is being- 
acted upon the stage, from the upper boxes." Hooker, in his 
report, seemed simply quoting and applying the language of the 
French duke, writing one hundred and sixty years previous. 

On the same page, XCIX., reference is made to Wading or 
Fording and Marching. Lieut. -Col. Townshend Wilson, in his 
"The Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France" (211), tells us how 
"in the dark and rainy night of the 25th October, 1708, Lange- 
ron's grenadiers, wading up to their waists through the Wash, burst 
into Leflingham and captured stronghold and strong garrison, all 
at the cost of eight grenadiers killed and twenty wounded." As 
to Marching, Berwick's Spanish infantry marched seven long 
leagues (say thirty miles) without water and in intense heat 
[Ibid. 141), and this same Spanish infantry marched forty-five 
long leagues (about one hundred and ninety miles) in eight 
days, in a rough country, destitute of roads and supplies. 
This Avas somethins; terrible, considering the heavy firearms and 



cm. 

accoutrements, and inattention to every rule of hygiene in those 
days, when the " common soldier " was indeed regarded as " com- 
mon," and of as little account as a serviceable brute beast. 
i^Ibid. [1708] 271-2). Finally, in regard to Panics, at Sheriff- 
muir, Sunday, 13th November, 17 15, the Enghsh centre, in- 
fantry and dragoons, fell into total rout at the onslaught of 
the opposing clans; and "the dastard leader" of the English 
army. General Witham, gallopped to Sterling, ten miles off, 
"frantically proclaiming that 'all was lost'" {Ibid. 397). Any 
amount of similar examples might be brought forward, but the 
space accorded is now filled up; still numerous authorities, beam- 
ing with such illustrations, are easily accessible to the curious or 
critical on such subjects. 



ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES. 



Passages des Rivieres, et la Construction des Ponts Militaires a 
I'usage des Troupes de toutes Amies. Par C. A, Haillot, Cap- 
itaine [&c.] Plates. 8vo. Part III., page 524. Paris: 1835. 

Hand-Book of Field Fortifications, &c., &c. By Major W. W. 
Knollys, Ninty-third Sutherland Highlanders. Illustrated. 
i2mo. Page 273. Philadelphia [London] : 1873. 

General Theory of Bridge Construction. With practical Illustra- 
tions. By Herman Haupt, A. M., C. E. 16 plates. 8vo. 
Page 268. New York: 1856. 

Treatise on Bridge Architecture, in which the superior advan- 
tages of the flying pendent-lever bridge are fully proved. 
With an historical account and description of the different 
bridges erected in various parts of the world, from an ancient 
period down to the present time. By Thomas Pope, Archi- 
tect, &c. Plates. 8vo. Part XXXII. , pages 288. New 
York: 1811. 

Bridges and Draw-bridges. Ecole d'Application de I'Artillerie 
de Mechanique appliquee aux Machines. Plates. Folio. 
Pages 47. [Metz : no date.] 

Description of a System of Military Bridges, with India Rubber 
Pontons. Prepared for the use of the United States Army. 
By George W. Cullum, Captain United States Corps of En- 
gineers. Plates. 8vo. Pages [143]. New York: 1849. [Pro- 
fessional Papers, No. 4, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.] 

Systems of Military Bridges in Use by the United States Army, 
those adopted by the Great European Powers, and such as 
are employed in British India. With directions for the pre- 
servation, destruction and reestablishment of bridges. By 



CIV. 

Brigadier- General George W. CuUum, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Corps of Engineers. 8 plates. 8vo. Part VI., Pages 226. 
New York: 1863. 
War Series. No. III. Information from Abroad. Report of the 
British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, by 
Lieutenant-Commander Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy. 
Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Navigation, -Navy De- 
partment: 1883. Washington Government Printing Office: 
1885. XXIII.— "The Royal Engineers' Ponton Troop." 
Pages 253-258. 



ERRATA.— TREMAIN'S WAR MEMORANDA. 
Prepared by Gen. H. Edwin Tremain. 



Page 4, line 20.— For " 1883," read " 1880-1." 

Page 6, line 16. — For "around the left flank and Grant's 
armies and thus get ahead of him" read '^ around the left flank 
of Grant's armies and thus get ahead of theiJiy 

Page 7, line 6. — Italicized portion should read, "//?<? old cav- 
alry division of the Army of the Potomac." 

Page 9, lines 18, 19. — Expunge portion in brackets : [ ] 
. Page 10, line 8. — Instead of" for and will," read " and we will." 

Page 17, line 15. — Gen. Tremain claims that this line was 
formed and Reade's battery put in position under his personal 
direction, while Crook was rallying Gregg's brigade. 

Page 20, line 4. — For "John J.," read "John Irwin." 

Page 36, line 3-6. — Gen. Tremain asks, "May not both state- 
ments be true ? " 

Page 37, line 37. — For "formed across," read "formed across 
this road." 

Page 38, line 35. — For " Davies and Custer," read " Devin 
and Custer." 

Page 43, line i. — For "in," read "by." 

Page 45, line 5. — For "they," read "the." 

Page 48, line 11 — For "reformed," read " he rejoined." 

Page 55, lines 44, 45. — (?) and (! ?) signifies that the original 
MSS. was almost illegible. 

Page 63, lines 44, 45 — For "thorough-are," read "thoroughfare." 

Page 64, lines 29, 30. — Expunge portion in brackets : [ ] 

Page 65, line 10. — For "to," read "with." 

Farmville, Bridging and Fording. 
Page lii, line 3. — For " battery," read " bat or pack." 
( Typographical errors not noticed.) 



^upplementart) Iii^t of Hubllcationd. 

Subsequent to August, 1884, and uot hitherto Noticed. 

BY 

f. Watt^ At §tpUx: 



Master of Arts, Columbia College of New York, 1872. — Hon. Mem. Clarendon Hist. See, 
Edinburgh, Scotland; of the New Brunswick Hist. Soc, St. John, Canada; of the 
Hist. Soc. of Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, &c. ; Life Mem. Royal Hist. Soc. of 
Great Britain, London, Eng. ; Mem. Maatschappij Nederlandsche Letterkunde, Ley- 
den, Holland. — First Hon. Mem. Third Army Corps (A. of the P.) Union ; Hon. Mem. 
Third Army Corps Gettysburg Battlefield Reunion and Member of the Honorary Com- 
mittee ; Mem. Amer. Hist. Association, U. S. A. ; Associate Mem. Military Service 
Institution of the U. S., &c., &c. — Colonel N. Y. S. L, 1846, assigned for " meritorious 
conduct" to command of 22d Regimental District, M. F. S. N. Y., 1840; Brig.-General 
for "Important service" [first appointment in N. Y. State to that rank, hitherto elect- 
ive], 1851, M. F. S. N. Y. : Adjutant General S. N. Y., 1855 • Brevet Major General 
S. N. Y., for " meritorious services," by " Special Act" or " Concurrent Resolution," 
N. Y. State Legislature, April, 1866 [first and only General officer receiving such an 
honor (the highest) from S. N. Y., and the only officer i/ius brevetted (Major General) 
in the United States]. 

Articles published in the United Service Magazine, equal in matter 
to small 13mo. volumes : 1. The Condottieri of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Centuries, October, 1884 ; 2. The Thirty Years' War, ISTo- 
vember and December, 1884, and February and May, 1885 ; 3. Army 
Administrative Service, Januaiy, 1885 ; 4. Biographical Sketch, Rear- 
Admiral George Henry Preble, April, 1885 ; 5. Major-General Gershom 
Mott, XJ. S. v., and the Third Corps, Army of the Potomac, August, 
1885 ; 6. Anthony Wayne, Third General-in-Chief of the United States 
Army (with portrait), IMarch, 1886. 

Biographical Sketch of Anthony Wayne [Prominent IVIen of the Revo- 
lutionary Period], Magazine of American History, February, 1886. 

Literature of the Thirty Years' War, Army and Navy Quarterly, 
October, 1885. 

Brief de Peyster and Watts Genealogical References, with partial List 
of Authorities, IVIarch, 1886. 

The IVIassacres of St. Bartholomew outside of Paris, 24th August — 4th 
September, 1572. January, 1885. 

Gypsies: Information Translated and Gathered from Various Sources. 
New York : June, 1885. 

Torstenson before Vienna ; or, the Swedes in Austria in 1645-1646. 
With a Biographical Sketch of Field-lVIarshal-Generalissimus Leonard 
Torstenson. l^ovember, 1885. 

Francesca da Rimini (a literal translation of a famous episode in 
Dante's Inferno). Decemlber, 1885. 

War IVIemoranda of Brig.-General H. Edwin Tremain, 1865. Edited 
by General de Peyster, 1886. 

N"ot Subsequent to August, 1884. 

La Royale : Last Twenty -four Hours of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia (amended edition.) — Farmville (embracing a consideration of the 
engagement or battle at Cumberland Church or the Heights of Farm- 
ville, the last stand-up fight of the combined Second-Third Corps, re- 
presenting the Army of the Potomac, with the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, 7th April, 1865). Fording and Bridging. 

IMy Novel ; "The Baroness of Stern-Burgstall ; or, the Churme after the 
Storm. An historical and military romance of the turbulent period im- 
mediately succeeding the Treaty of Osnabruck or IMunster, or Peace of 
Westphalia, autumn of 1648. 1865. 

Also, a series of JMilitary Lessons in Strategy and Tactics, and Bio- 
graphical Sketches and Reviews, published in The Leader (^. Y.) in 1861, 
1862 and 1863, equal in amount to a large volume — worth looking up, as 
containing the essence of many works written by the ablest military critics 
and historians; also Biographical Sketches, Criticisms and Reviews in the 
New York Citizen and Round Table ; also in the Vohmteer and Soldier's 
Friend; also numerous IMilitary Essays, Criticisms and Biographical 
Sketches in the Army and Navy Journal, 1863, 1864, and 1865, especial- 
ly a series of articles on New American Tactics, which were translated 
and copied into foreign military journals, among these J. Correard's 
Journal des Sciences Militaires des Armes de Terre et de Mer. Paris : 1865- 
1866. A new set of tactics were published in France, founded on this idea. 




Taken about 1863. 



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